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ABSTRACT
This dissertation offers the first full-length study of
the Richmond Junto and its role in shaping politics in
Virginia between 1815 and 1845. The Junto led the Jacksonian
movement in Virginia and worked successfully to keep the
state allied with the Democratic party of Andrew Jackson and
Martin Van Buren until the early 1840s. The Junto
represented an influential force in Virginia politics during
this transitional period, and to a certain extent this small
group of men, led by Thomas Ritchie, Peter V. Daniel, Andrew
Stevenson, William H. Roane, and Richard E. Parker,
epitomized the state's response to the turbulent events of
the era. Its actions were expressive of the way in which
Virginians chose to come to terms with the changes in
American politics and society during the Age of Jackson.
The Junto's course was marked by ambivalence. It
sought, for instance, to preserve both the rights of the
states and a strong federal Union, and to revive Virginia's
influence at the national level without compromising the
state's political principles. To achieve these goals, the
group consistently articulated a traditional states' rights
position, but also moved to adopt the modern features of the
second party system. This strategy produced mixed results.
The Junto managed to maintain influence in the state for
nearly three decades, and Virginia never cast its
presidential ballot for a Whig candidate. At the same time,
bitter factionalism and violent partisan debate came to
characterize Virginia politics in the years after 1832.
The goal of this study is to reveal the pivotal role
played by the Richmond Junto in defining and shaping
political debate in Jacksonian Virginia. It offers an
analysis of the group's political ideology and its methods
of operation, as well as a discussion of the Junto's
objectives, accomplishments, and failures.

vi
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Introduction
This dissertation offers the first full-length study of
the Richmond Junto and its role in shaping politics in
Virginia between 1815 and 1845. The Junto led the Jacksonian
movement in Virginia and worked successfully to keep the
state allied with the Democratic party of Andrew Jackson and
Martin Van Buren until the early 1840s. The Junto
represented an influential force in Virginia politics during
this transitional period, and to a certain extent this small
group of six to eight men epitomized the state's response to
the turbulent events of the era. Its actions were expressive
of the way in which Virginians chose to come to terms with
the changes in American politics and society during the Age
of Jackson. The members of the Junto viewed themselves as
caught between two worlds: the older, traditional world of
their fathers, the revolutionary generation, and a new world
of democratic change and economic expansion that they found
both appealing and foreboding. In confronting these new
political, economic, and social realities, the Junto
consistently used the yardstick of the past to measure the
strange new world unfolding before them. To a certain
*

extent, the members of the clique remained rooted in the
world of their fathers and devoted to the revolutionary
2
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political ideology that those men had formulated. Throughout
much of this period, the Junto rarely thought of discarding
or even of amending that ideology. Indeed, its members
considered it their particular duty to preserve and protect
that faith in republican government, devotion to liberty and
equality, and insistence on personal independence that had
been handed down as their most precious political legacy. As
the members of the Junto moved to protect this legacy, first
on the state and then on the national level, they discovered
that many Americans did not share their devotion to the
republicanism of the older generation. The emerging modern
party system that the Junto slowly came to embrace in the
1830s clearly valued party loyalty and unity over
ideological consistency and purity. To a large extent, this
work is an attempt to examine and evaluate how the Richmond
Junto, and by extrapolation Virginia, altered its definition
of republicanism and reconciled its political ideology with
the realities of Jacksonian America and the second party
system.
My interest in the Junto stemmed from a desire to
understand more clearly the rise of Southern sectionalism
between the Revolution and the Civil War. The changing
nature of Southern life and thought during those decades,
especially in the realm of political culture, provides the
key to understanding growing sectional sentiment and the
ultimate call for secession in 1860 and 1861. I chose to

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

examine Virginia for a number of reasons: in more ways than
one, Virginia remained the leading state in the region,
although its prestige and influence continued to slip
throughout the era; very little modern scholarship outside
of biography exists on post-Jeffersonian Virginia; and,
finally, the Old Dominion and its leaders played prominent
roles in both of the defining events of early American
history, the American Revolution and the Civil War. An
examination of Virginia between those two wars would thus
help shed light on the sectionalizing forces that tore the
nation apart in 1861.
Such an expansive topic required narrowing, and I soon
realized that a detailed study of the actions and ideas of
the so-called Richmond Junto, a shadowy informal clique of
politicians, editors, judges, and bankers, offered a window
through which larger developments across the state and
nation could be viewed. The Junto was intimately involved in
all of the great questions facing the nation in the first
half of the 19th century: slavery, economic growth,
constitutional debates, and political reform. Its members
wrote extensively about how they and others felt on these
issues, corresponded with national political leaders, and,
on more than one occasion, helped shape Southern responses
to them. The Junto presented, then, an ideal way to explore
the response of countless individuals to the basic questions
of the Jacksonian period.
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The clique's members were not, by and large, well known
figures in Jacksonian America. None of them approached
Daniel Webster, John Calhoun, or Henry Clay in stature or in
influence. They were state and regional leaders, not
national spokesmen. Because of this fact, few studies exist
that document how these men attempted to resolve the
fundamental questions facing them and their society.
Scholarly examinations of the Richmond Junto are limited to
a few journal articles, some of dubious merit. Most of these
brief accounts focus on the origins and early career of the
clique, dismissing entirely its influence after 1824.1 The
only recent article on the group denies its existence,
claiming that the Junto was merely a politically motivated
rhetorical creation.2 There are published biographies of key
Junto members - Thomas Ritchie, Peter V. Daniel, and Andrew
Stevenson - but these works are of limited significance for
my purposes because they focus on telling the story of one
man's entire life and seldom dwell at length upon their
experiences as Junto associates.3 A handful of monographs
‘Harry Ammon, "The Richmond Junto, 1800-1824," Virginia
Magazine of History and Biography. Vol. 61 (1953), 395-418;
Rex Beach, "Spencer Roane and the Richmond Junto," William and
Mary Quarterly. 2nd series, Vol. 22 (1942), 1-17; Joseph H.
Harrison, Jr., "Oligarchs and Democrats: The Richmond Junto,"
VMHB. vol. 78 (1970), 184-198.
2F. Thornton Miller, "The Richmond Junto: The Secret AllPowerful Club - or Myth," VMHB. Vol. 99 (1991), 63-80.
3Charles Ambler, Thomas Ritchie: A Study in Virginia
Politics (Richmond: Bell Book & Stationary Co., 1913) ; John P.
Frank, Justice Daniel Dissenting: A Biography of Peter V.
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and dissertations mention the Junto and its role in
Jacksonian politics, almost all of them following the
interpretation laid out by Charles Ambler early in the
twentieth century.4 Ambler's work on Thomas Ritchie and on
sectionalism in antebellum Virginia remain valuable, but
surely it is time to reexamine the dynamics of party
politics in Jacksonian Virginia.
Historians have written some fine biographies of
prominent early nineteenth century Virginians, including
Littleton Waller Tazewell, David Campbell, Charles Fenton
Mercer, William Cabell Rives, James Barbour and Henry Wise.5
Daniel. 1784-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964);
Francis Fry Wayland, Andrew Stevenson: Democrat and Diplomat.
1785-1857 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1949).
4Charies Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia From 1776 to
1861 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) ; Harry Ammon, "The
Republican Party in Virginia, 1789 to 1824" (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Virginia, 1948); Clyde C. Gelbach, "Spencer
Roane of Virginia, 1762-1822: A Judicial Advocate of State
Rights" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1955);
Margaret E. Horsnell, "Spencer Roane: Judicial Advocate of
Jeffersonian Principles"
(Ph.D.
diss.,
University of
Minnesota, 1967); Bert Marsh Mutersbaugh, "Jeffersonian
Journalist: Thomas Ritchie and the Richmond Enquirer. 18041820" (Ph.D. diss., University of Missouri, 1973); Norman
Risjord, The Old Republicans: Southern Conservatism in the Age
of Jefferson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965).
5Norma
Lois
Peterson,
Littleton Waller
Tazewell
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1983); Norma
Taylor Mitchell, "The Political Career of Governor David
Campbell of Virginia" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1967);
Douglas R. Egerton, Charles Fenton Mercer and the Trial of
National
Conservatism
(Jackson:
University
Press
of
Mississippi, 1989); Raymond C. Dingledine, Jr., "The Political
Career of William Cabell Rives" (Ph.D. diss., University of
Virginia, 1947); Charles D. Lowery, James Barbour: A
Jeffersonian Republican (University, Al: The University of
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The focus of these works, however, remains on these men and
their careers at the national level. Few of them deal
extensively with state politics during the Jacksonian
period. Also scarce are studies of particular regions or
counties within Virginia during this period.6 We still know
very little about political change and debate on the local
level in the Old Dominion between 1790 and 1860. Three
dissertations on Virginia political developments merit
special mention. Lynwood Miller Dent has written a thorough
and sound history of the Virginia Democratic Party that the
Junto controlled in the 1820s and 1830s. The complicated but
crucial debate over Martin Van Buren's subtreasury plan and
its impact on Virginia politics is clarified by Harold
Moser. Finally, Katherine Ruth Malone's study offers a
thoughtful and penetrating examination of the role of
"fundamental principles" in Virginia during the early 19th
century.7 Each of these works helps to illuminate the nature

Alabama Press, 1984); Craig M. Simpson, A Good Southerner: The
Life of Henry A. Wise of Virginia (Chapel Hill: The University
of North Carolina Press, 1985).
6One notable exception is Daniel W. Crofts, Old
Southampton: Politics and Society in a Virginia County. 18341869 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992).
7Lynwood Miller Dent, Jr., "The Virginia Democratic
Party, 1824-1847" (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University,
1974) ; Harold D. Moser, "Subtreasury Politics and the Virginia
Conservative Democrats, 1835-1844" (Ph.D. diss., University of
Wisconsin, 1977); Katherine Ruth Malone, "The Virginia
Doctrines, the Commonwealth, and the Republic: The Role of
Fundamental Principles in Virginia Politics, 1798-1833" (Ph.D.
diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1981).
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of political culture in Jacksonian Virginia. This study
seeks to expand upon these works and fill many of the gaps
still remaining in the historiography of antebellum Virginia
political history by examining the Richmond Junto and their
role in bringing Jacksonian democracy to the Old Dominion.

Before charting the influence of the Richmond Junto, it
must first be established that such an organization existed.
There is no definitive proof of this: no secret diaries, no
minutes of meeting, no confessions from supposed members.
This is not unexpected, since no one, then or now, denied
that the group lacked formal organization or structure. But
substantial circumstantial evidence can be cited to support
claims that the Junto was real and exerted influence over
political affairs. Most important in documenting the
existence of the Junto are widespread mention of such a
group in newspapers and private correspondence, second hand
accounts of meetings of the clique as described by friends
or relatives, and various accounts of political meetings
held in Richmond in which Junto members were in control of
the proceedings from beginning to end. The men most
frequently mentioned as Junto associates - Thomas Ritchie,
Andrew Stevenson, Peter V. Daniel, William H. Roane, Philip
N. Nicholas, John Brockenbrough, and Richard E. Parker also served repeatedly on the Democratic Party's Central
Committee, the most influential political body in the state.
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The Central Committee oversaw presidential campaigns in
Virginia and enforced party discipline. In addition, these
same men were among the very few Virginians who corresponded
regularly with national party leaders such as Martin Van
Buren. Given these pieces of evidence, it can be safely
argued that an organization popularly known as the Richmond
Party, or Junto, existed in Jacksonian Virginia.8
Scholars agree that the Junto emerged during Thomas
Jefferson's presidential bid in 1800, when concerned
Virginians banded together to assure their leader's victory
at the polls. In its earliest incarnation, the Junto, led by
Wilson Cary Nicholas and Spencer Roane, worked merely as a
semi-formal organizing committee that oversaw Jefferson's
campaign. Gradually, the scope of its operation and
influence spread in the first two decades of the 19th
century. But the group still lacked cohesion and was active
only during the quadrennial presidential elections.9
8The Junto had many names, the most common of which were
the Richmond Party and the Richmond Junto. But the group was
also referred to as the Central Influence, the Central Junto,
and the Junta. In naming the circle the Richmond or Central
Junto, opponents drew upon traditional fears of a small clique
of men secretly controlling the state's political affairs from
the seat of power, the state capital. The word junto, or
junta, entered the English language in the early 17th century
and carried connotations of despotic rule and secret cabals
like the "archetypal Whig Junto of William Ill's and Queen
Anne's time." See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary
(1991) and The Random House Unabridged Dictionary of the
English Language (1981 edition). Quote from Harrison,
"Oligarchs and Democrats," 186.
9Beach, "Spencer Roane and the Richmond Junto," 1-17;
Ammon, "The Richmond Junto," 395-418.
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A rejuvenated Junto emerged after the War of 1812 when
Roane led an attack against the nationalistic policies of
the federal government. In a series of widely read essays,
Roane warned of the dangerous consequences of a loose
construction of the Constitution and of consolidating power
in the hands of the federal government. While Roane remained
leader of the group, Thomas Ritchie, his cousin and editor
of the Richmond Enquirer. was using his paper to reassert
the primacy of the so-called "Virginia Principles" or
"Principles of '98." Built around the ideas articulated in
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and James Madison's
Report of 1799, the "Virginia Principles" Ritchie described
rested squarely on the foundations of the state rights
concept of government.10
After Roane and Nicholas both died in the early 1820s,
Ritchie became the undisputed leader of the Junto, a
position he never relinquished. In fact, after 1824 it would
be more accurate to refer to the group as Ritchie's Junto.
Ritchie had come to Richmond early in the century after
briefly trying his hand at teaching, the law, and medicine.
He finally found his calling when he began editing the
Richmond Enquirer in 1804. Soon Ritchie's paper was the
dominant one in the state, and the only one, Thomas
Jefferson remarked, worth reading. Ritchie's intense support

10For a complete explication of the "Virginia principles",
see Malone, "The Virginia Doctrines."
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for state rights and his familial connection with both
Nicholas and Roane allowed him to gain stature both state
wide and within the Junto.11
As leader and spokesman of the Junto and editor of the
most widely read paper in the state, Ritchie exerted
enormous influence in Virginia affairs between 1815 and
1845, when he moved to Washington to edit the Union, the
Polk administration paper. Throughout his career in
Richmond, Ritchie's overriding political goals were to build
party unity and to ease regional tensions in the Old
Dominion. Despite his devotion to state rights, the editor
treasured the Union and condemned those who threatened to
tear it apart for petty reasons, such as South Carolina
Nullifiers or northern abolitionists. Ritchie, an awkward
looking man who lacked public speaking skills, astutely
avoided the spotlight, never held elective office, and
repeatedly turned down offers to move his base of operation
to Washington. Thomas Ritchie was a force that virtually
everyone in Jacksonian Virginia had to contend with at one
time or another.
“Biographical account of Thomas Ritchie by Margaret
Ritchie Stone, MS, [n.d.], Ritchie-Harrison Papers, College of
William and Mary; Ambler, Thomas Ritchie. 9-12; Mutersbaugh,
"Jeffersonian Journalist," 10-22. Ritchie was the cousin of
Spencer Roane, John and William Brockenbrough, and the
brother-in-law of Richard E. Parker. Stevenson married a
Brockenbrough and Philip N. Nicholas courted Spencer Roane's
daughter after his first wife died. Ritchie, Stevenson, P.N.
Nicholas, Daniel, and John Brockenbrough were all neighbors in
the Shockhoe Hill area of Richmond. Harrison, "Oligarchs and
Democrats," 190; Ambler, Thomas Ritchie. 11-16.
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Ritchie's lieutenants, those who formed the inner
circle of the Junto, were also powerful and respected men.
Peter V. Daniel was a lawyer, judge, long-time Lieutenant
Governor, and Supreme Court Justice from 1841 to 1860.
Daniel served as the inside source of information for the
Junto on the General Assembly and the Executive Council.
Daniel's devotion to Jackson and his party outmatched even
Ritchie's. Andrew Stevenson, a professional politician,
diplomat, and arch-intriguer, was elected Speaker of House
in 1827 and later appointed Minister to Great Britain. By
all accounts Stevenson was vain, pompous, and widely
despised, but he was the Junto's man in Washington.12 A
third member of the clique, John Brockenbrough, served as
President of the Bank of Virginia for decades. Junto
meetings were frequently held at his residence, which later
became the White House of the Confederacy.13 His brother,
Judge William Brockenbrough, was also a Junto associate at
times. Two more men rounded out the inner circle of the
Junto. William H. Roane, a planter and politician, son of
Junto founder Spencer Roane and grandson of Patrick Henry,
served as United States Senator from 1837 to 1841. Although
a pale imitation of his father, William was a faithful

12Frank, Justice Daniel Dissenting, viii-ix;
Andrew Stevenson. 1-77.

Wayland,

13Ambler, Thomas Ritchie. 15-16, 27.
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supporter and party hack.14 Finally, Philip N. Nicholas, the
popular younger brother of Wilson Cary Nicholas, wore many
hats. As a planter, politician, judge and banker, Nicholas
built up enough of a following across the state to run
briefly as a vice-presidential candidate in 1832, against
the Junto's wishes.15
The men who made up the Richmond Junto lived in a
society marked by dramatic change. The story of Virginia in
the years between 1815 and 1845 is largely one of people
coming to terms with the remarkable transformations taking
place in their daily lives. As the country developed and
expanded, and as technology began to revolutionize every
facet of life, Virginians struggled to adjust to these
changes.16 The modern world seemed very different from the
world of their fathers. Life had seemed simpler and purer
then. Right and wrong were easy to distinguish. A man knew
his place in society, and what was expected of him. People
14Ambler, Thomas Ritchie. 146, 185; Ninety-Second
Congress, First Session, Biographical Directory of the
American Congress. 1774-1971 (United States Government
Printing Office, 1971), 1615.
15Thomas P. Abernethy, "Philip N. Nicholas", Dumas Malone,
ed., Dictionary of American Biography (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1962, originally published 1934), 7:484-485.
Abernethy describes Nicholas as a member of the Junto and as
"one of the guiding forces in the establishment of the
Jacksonian party in Virginia."
16Historians have recently stressed the centrality of the
Market Revolution in reshaping life during the Jacksonian
period. For an excellent summary of the literature on this
topic, see Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian
America. 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
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around the country admired Virginia and accepted its
leadership in national affairs. But now all of the security
and pride of that older order was being eroded by a society
that revolved around impersonal social and economic
transactions and political opportunism. Commercial centers
like New York and Philadelphia were increasing their realm
of influence, and Virginia's vaunted position in the Union
was steadily slipping.
Virginians responded to these changes with words and
actions marked by confusion, anger, and desperation. Strong
feelings of nostalgia, of better days gone by, pervaded
public discourse.17 The example of their fathers, the men
who had fought for independence and forged a government and
society unlike any other, was both an inspiration and a
burden to them. While they could point to a firm set of
goals to follow and ideas to emulate, the new generation of
Virginians also realized that they could never measure up to
the deeds and the wisdom of their fathers. No matter what
the post-revolutionary generation accomplished, the memory
of the Founding Fathers would forever overshadow them. The
Junto operated within this framework, and many of its
17Robert P. Sutton, "Nostalgia, Pessimism, and Malaise:
The Doomed Aristocrat in Late-Jeffersonian Virginia," VMHB.
Vol. 76 (1968), 41-55; Thomas E. Buckley, S.J., "The
Declension of Virginia, 1776-1860: An Historiographical
Perspective," unpublished paper, 1990. Daniel Jordan describes
the essence of politics in late Jeffersonian Virginia as "a
stressful blend of change and continuity." Jordan, Political
Leadership
in
Jefferson's
Virginia
(Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1983), 13.
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actions can be seen as an effort to recapture and
reestablish what it believed was the purity of the founding
of the nation.
In Virginia, the spirit of the revolutionary
generation, including Washington, Jefferson, and Madison,
must have been especially strong. Yet the new generation of
state leaders had other concerns as well, more concrete ones
that compounded their anxiety and confusion. The exodus of
farmers from Virginia to the west and southwest continued
unabated throughout the late 18th and early 19th centuries.
The state's population, wealth, and prestige were all on the
decline. Regional disputes between the farmers of the west
and the planters of the east kept tensions high for decades,
and during the 1829-1830 constitutional convention, threats
of disunion were commonplace. Then Nat Turner's slave
rebellion shocked the state, touching off a frank and
painful debate on the future of the peculiar institution in
the Old Dominion. Political struggles grew so intense that
men were publicly assaulted for expressing their views. In
short, the first half of the nineteenth century proved to be
a stressful and confusing period to many in the Old
Dominion.
As the world changed around them, Virginians maintained
a profound ambivalence about progress and its consequences.
They were delighted at the benefits of the Market Revolution
and eagerly sought to partake of them. Men of all political
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persuasions called for internal improvement projects, for
stable banks, and for extended trade. Yet steeped as they
were in a political culture that prided itself on stability,
deference, and order, many Virginians were inherently
suspicious of innovation. They understood clearly that their
traditional society and way of life were under attack. Some
welcomed the change, but many more were willing to fight to
preserve their heritage, especially in the realm of
political ideology. A great majority of politically-minded
Virginians continued to cherish the ideas of classical
republicanism as they had been formulated and expressed in
Revolutionary America. Virginians, and the Junto, placed
special emphasis on the dangers of the consolidation of
centralized power and the necessity of virtue and
disinterestedness in government.18 Failure to avoid either
of these would inevitably lead to

corruption, tyranny, and

the destruction of the Union. Strict adherence to the tenets
of this philosophy was necessary, then, in order to insure
the independence, liberty, and equality of the people. So
pervasive was this belief system in the state that those men
who broke away from the Jacksonian ranks in the early 1830s

180n classical republicanism and its continuing influence,
see Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); Gordon
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic. 1776-1787 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); Robert E.
Shalhope, "Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an
Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography,"
WMO. 3rd series, Vol. 29 (1972), 49-80.
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to form an anti-administration party chose to explain their
actions by insisting that Jackson was abusing his executive
powers and threatening to overthrow the government. Because
of their commitment to this political ideology, Virginians
resisted efforts to amend or discard it. They also moved
slowly to accept the new definitions of party that were
being formulated in the Jacksonian period. Experience, they
argued, had proven that the precepts of classical
republicanism represented the best guideline for the country
to follow.
Early nineteenth century Virginians, then, tended to
interpret their world through the ideas and beliefs of their
fathers. The political philosophy forged in the 1770s to
oppose British rule was still potent fifty years later.
Indeed, the key to understanding Virginia's actions in the
Age of Jackson is acknowledging its devotion to the
revolutionary ideology of Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison. The great tension in the lives of many Virginians,
one that resonated in every facet of their existence, was
the need to preserve, to conserve, their republican heritage
in a modernizing society.
This brief examination of Virginia society helps to put
into perspective the outlook and actions of the Junto. Two
central goals bound the clique together and gave it purpose.
The first and most important goal of the Junto was the
articulation and preservation of the state rights argument.
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In 1830 Ritchie summed up the guiding sentiment of the group
in a letter to William Cabell Rives. "You must not be
surprized," the editor wrote, "to find us pressing at this
time our old State Rights doctrine ...; believing that they
alone will save the country from the gulf of consolidation and that if we give up now, we are gone forever."19 Like
many Jacksonians, Ritchie viewed the political world in
terms of an apocalyptic struggle between the forces of
liberty and the forces of power. An excess of either was
dangerous; too much liberty produced anarchy; too much power
led to autocratic rule.20 At times the Junto equated liberty
with the rights of the states, and power with the federal
government. The group believed that it must constantly be
wary of attempts to augment the powers granted to the
government in Washington.
The second major focus of the Junto was a desire to
revitalize Virginia socially, economically, and politically;
to restore the state to its former glory by increasing its
influence in national councils, improving transportation
networks, and by encouraging social and benevolent reform.
To achieve the latter two goals, Junto members joined and
worked with a number of private and public organizations

19Thomas Ritchie to William Cabell Rives, April 15, 1830,
William Cabell Rives Papers, Library of Congress.
20Harry Watson, Liberty and Power: The Politics of
Jacksonian America (New York: Noonday Press, 1990), 43-44.
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dedicated to reviving the state's economy and culture.21 In
political affairs, the Junto worked to boost Virginia's
power by serving as the leader of the southern wing of the
national Jackson party. This entailed maintaining party
orthodoxy and following the dictates of party leaders,
something that was not always easy for independent minded
Virginians. Ritchie spent a great deal of time on issues
involving party discipline and often met with strong
resistance from the rank and file members of the party. At
times, even he and fellow Junto members balked at the
actions of Jackson and Van Buren. To a large degree,
however, the Junto's efforts to link Virginia with the
national Democratic party proved successful.
The Junto's actions were guided by efforts to achieve
its two paramount objectives. Those policies and leaders
most likely to preserve state rights and increase Virginia's
influence were supported; those that did not were opposed.
In 1824, that logic led Ritchie and the Junto to back
William H. Crawford for the presidency. During the campaign,
the Junto joined with Martin Van Buren and his Albany
Regency in an attempt to reforge the New York-Virginia
alliance that had once controlled national politics.
Crawford's crushing defeat at the national level led to a
shakeup of Virginia's Republican Party, but did not
21Stevenson, Ritchie, John Brockenbrough, and Parker, for
instance, were all board members of the Richmond Lancasterian
School that opened in 1816. Wayland, Andrew Stevenson. 34.
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significantly weaken the Junto. In fact, the notion of a
"corrupt bargain" and John Q. Adams's nationalistic measures
proved so unpopular in Virginia that the Junto moved
gradually to support Jackson in 1828, despite the strong
reservations that its members and most Virginians had about
the military leader. By election day, these qualms had been
forgotten, and Jackson was viewed as a crusading reformer
who would return the country to its original purity and
principles. The dramatic change in the way Virginians
portrayed Jackson between 1824 and 1828 is one of the most
striking developments of the period. Again, Ritchie and the
Junto worked intimately with Van Buren during the campaign
to help form the foundations of a national Jackson
coalition.
Jackson's election in 1828 was a sweet victory for the
Junto, but they had little time to relish it. Jackson's
decisions concerning appointments and other actions in his
first administration quickly produced a split in the
Virginia Jacksonian party ranks that was exacerbated by the
power struggle between Van Buren and John C. Calhoun in 1829
and 1830. Some Virginians made it clear that they did not
care for the New Yorker, but the Junto was determined to
keep its strong ties with Van Buren, who by late 1830 seemed
positioned as Jackson's successor. At the same time, a
constitutional convention revealed the depth of sectional
antagonism in the state. Ritchie supported many of the
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reform measures proposed by western Virginians, as did most
of the Junto, except for those members who were closely tied
to eastern plantations. A bitter debate on the future of
slavery in Virginia and an aborted attempt to keep Van Buren
off of the party's ticket in the state kept the Junto busy
in 1831 and 1832. Despite defections from the Jacksonian
ranks, Old Hickory himself remained enormously popular in
Virginia, and he swept to an easy victory in 1832, capturing
eighty percent of the popular vote.
After Jackson's re-election, the Junto enjoyed a
commanding position in state political leadership. Then two
events badly split the party and weakened the Junto's grip
on political control. Jackson's handling of the
Nullification Crisis - specifically, the Proclamation and
the Force Bill - outraged many Virginians devoted to state
rights. Both measures, critics claimed, smacked strongly of
executive usurpation. Somehow, the Junto managed, to hold the
party together during the crisis, but not before several key
politicians had abandoned the Jacksonian coalition. Even
more costly to the Junto was Jackson's decision to remove
federal deposits from the Bank of the United States in 1834.
Again, Virginians committed to state rights expressed their
displeasure at this act of presidential high-handedness. The
Junto was split itself on the question of banking, and
failed to keep the party unified on this question.
Jackson's policies and flamboyant personality cost him
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support in Virginia. Defectors increased, and by 1834
opposition to his rule had coalesced in the form of the Whig
party, who exploited public dissatisfaction with the
president and won control of the state legislature. The
Whigs promptly stripped Ritchie of his position as public
printer and removed fellow Junto member Peter V. Daniel from
the state's Executive Council. The Junto countered by
portraying the Whigs as wealthy and corrupt men and by
returning to the old themes of reform and fundamental
principles. Even though the Democrats recaptured control of
the legislature in 1835, both the party and the Junto lacked
the cohesion and unity of purpose that they had once had.
The Whigs tried unsuccessfully to defeat the Democrats
in 1836 by claiming that Van Buren held abolitionist
sentiments. The Junto denounced these charges sharply and
backed the New Yorker in the strongest terms. When Van Buren
carried Virginia that year, it was the first time that the
state's vote had gone to a northern candidate. Economic
problems early in his administration badly hurt Van Buren,
and by 1837 a conservative revolt in Virginia, led by
William Cabell Rives, began to draw people away from the
traditional power base of the Junto. The Conservatives under
Rives tapped into discontent with Van Buren and his economic
policies and helped the Whigs to regain power in 1838.
Although the Junto managed to put together enough
support to carry Virginia for Van Buren by the slimmest of
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margins in 1840, the nature of politics in Virginia was
changing and the Junto's power was on the decline. The
question of slavery, which Ritchie and the Junto had tried
to keep out of public debate, was playing an increasingly
prominent role in Virginia politics. An equally significant
development was the reemergence of John C. Calhoun as a key
player in the Democratic party. In the late 1820s and early
1830s Calhoun was viewed as too radical by most Virginians,
but by 1840 his ideas appealed to many men in the state who
had experienced a decade of economic and political strife. A
new generation of political leaders in the Old Dominion
seemed especially interested in the South Carolinian.
Calhoun Democrats became potent enough in the early 1840s to
challenge the Junto for control of the party.
Faced with attacks from both the Whigs and the Calhoun
Democrats, the Junto attempted to redeem its standing in the
state by severing its relationship with Van Buren over the
question of annexing Texas in 1844. By then it was too late.
The group no longer spoke for Virginia. The increasingly
strident position of Southern spokesmen on the question of
slavery left little room for compromise and conciliation,
the forte of Ritchie and his group. The editor, dismayed by
developments in his beloved state, finally agreed to leave
Richmond in 1845 to run a national paper in Washington. With
Ritchie's departure, the Junto breathed its last.
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This dissertation explores and assesses the ways in
which one group of men confronted the tensions and
contradictions facing Americans in the early nineteenth
century. The Richmond Junto played a key role in shaping
Virginia's actions during the period known as the Age of
Jackson. Like many Virginians, the member's response to the
transformations taking place in their society was
ambivalent. The Junto, for instance, believed in preserving
both the doctrines of state rights and a strong federal
Union. While this may appear paradoxical, to the members of
the Junto it seemed an appropriate response. Ritchie,
Daniel, and the others lived dual lives. They were
Virginians first, heirs to a remarkably rich political
tradition. But they were also Americans, the first
generation to be raised as citizens of the United States.
These men desired both a rejuvenated Virginia and a strong
and prosperous country. They saw these goals as being
interconnected, not antithetical. In his will, Ritchie
reminded his fellow citizens to "Preserve both the Rights of
the Union and the Rights of the States. These are the two
great pillars of American prosperity and glory."22 Ritchie
died in 1854, just a few years before the two things that he
loved the most, Virginia and the Federal Union, dissolved
their relationship and engaged in civil war.

22Cited in Ambler, Thomas Ritchie. 300.
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Chapter I
"Sentinels of Liberty":
The Revival of State Rights, 1815-1824

In the years following the Treaty of Ghent, the rise of
American nationalism prompted Virginia's republicans to
reaffirm their faith in the Jeffersonian principles of state
rights. Alarmed at the direction in which the nation and the
commonwealth seemed headed after the War of 1812, the
state's Republican party, guided by the Richmond Junto,
fought tirelessly to stop the "fashionable heresies of the
time" before they brought permanent ruin to the Union. The
Junto, a small coterie of politicians headquartered in
Virginia's capital, firmly believed that the best antidote
to the consolidating tendencies of the central government
was a revival of the fundamental principles of the
republican faith.1 The Panic of 1819, the Marshall Court's

‘Richmond Enquirer (hereafter cited as RE), July 17,
1821. The importance of the Enquirer to early 19th century
Virginians, especially in the realm of politics, has been
noted by historians, but bears repeating. Founded in 1804, the
paper quickly became the medium through which most
politically-minded Virginians got their information. Ritchie's
paper had the highest circulation in the state until 1842.
Robert Hume Tomlinson, "The Origins and Editorial Policies of
The Richmond Whig and Public Advertiser. 1824-1865" (Ph.D.
diss., Michigan State University, 1971), 3.
25
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decisions in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) and Cohens v.
Virginia (1821), Clay's American System, and the Missouri

Crisis were all signs that the federal government, now under
the control of northern politicians and capitalists, had
dedicated itself to the destruction of the powers and
liberties of the states.
Spencer Roane, an early leader of the Junto, summarized
the sentiment of Virginia's political elite in 1819 when he
noted that the "tendency of the general government to
aggrandize itself and to sweep away the State authorities"
was undeniable. "If a powerful counteraction is not made,
every thing will be lost. Our confederation will be but a
name, and the liberties of the people will fall with the
State governments." Virginians, with their distinguished
history of leadership in the nation, must again rise to the
occasion and repel the assaults on the sovereignty of the
states. "Whenever state rights are threatened or invaded,"
Junto spokesmen pledged, "Virginia will not be the last to
sound the tocsin."2
A second and equally important motivation for
recommitting the Old Dominion to the tenets of Jeffersonian
republicanism concerned the declining influence of the state
in national affairs. That Virginia's prestige had slipped
seemed obvious to party leaders, as obvious as the challenge
2Spencer Roane to James Barbour, Dec. 29, 1819, William
and Mary Quarterly, series 1, Vol. 10 (1901-1902), 7-8; RE,
March 30, 1819.
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to the state's authority posed by the centralizing policies
of the federal government. By spearheading a reaction
against nationalism, the Junto hoped that Virginia,
birthplace of Washington, Henry, Jefferson, and Madison,
would resume its rightful place in the nation's councils.
The usually astute John Quincy Adams thought he discerned
the true reasons for the state's actions when he noted that
"Virginia opposition ... to implied powers ... is a
convenient weapon, to

be taken up or laid aside as it suits

the purposes of Stateturbulence and

ambition."3

At the forefront of the movement to revive state rights
ideology in Virginia stood Spencer Roane and Thomas Ritchie.
Roane, judge of the supreme court
Junto until his death

of Virginia, guided the

in 1822. In his attacks on John

Marshall's Supreme Court, Roane provided an ideological
rationale for anti-nationalistic sentiment in the state. By
all accounts a zealous partisan and a throwback to an
earlier age, the jurist looked to the past for his
inspiration and deprecated the democratic urges of the day.
Roane's arguments were derived largely from the ideas of the
Old Republicans, men like John Randolph of Roanoke and John
Taylor of Caroline, who can accurately be described as rigid

30ct. 28, 1821; quoted in Harry Ammon, "The Richmond
Junto, 1800-1824." Virginia Magazine of History and Biography.
Vol. 61 (1953), 409.
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conservatives and ultra-strict constructionists.4
After Roane's death in 1822, new leaders gained power,
men who had different notions of how to wage the war on
centralization. Thomas Ritchie, Roane's cousin and editor of
the Richmond Enquirer. assumed leadership of the clique.
Although he shared the same goals as Roane, the reawakening
of a "spirit of republicanism" and the restoration of
Virginia's influence at the national level, Ritchie
exhibited more moderation and willingness to compromise than
his kinsman. The editor believed that the Junto could best
achieve its goals by keeping the Republican party, and the
state, unified. That entailed making compromises, assuaging
sectional tensions, and discarding some of the more extreme
Old Republican principles.5 The Junto, now led by Ritchie,
Andrew Stevenson, Peter V. Daniel, John and William
Brockenbrough, Richard E. Parker, and William H. Roane, also
worked diligently to reestablish the Virginia-New York
4Rex Beach, "Spencer Roane and the Richmond Junto," WMO.
2nd series, Vol. 22 (1942), 1-17; Clyde C. Gelbach, "Spencer
Roane of Virginia, 1762-1822: A Judicial Advocate of State
Rights" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1955);
Margaret E. Horsnell, "Spencer Roane: Judicial Advocate of
Jeffersonian Principle" (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota,
1967). Roane awaits a skillful biographer. For the Old
Republicans, see Norman Risjord, The Old Republicans: Southern
Conservatism in the Age of Jefferson (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1965).
5,,A Virginian," RE, April 30, 1819. Charles H. Ambler,
Thomas Ritchie: A Study in Virginia Politics (Richmond: Bell
Book & Stationary Co., 1913); Bert Marsh Mutersbaugh,
"Jeffersonian Journalist: Thomas Ritchie and the Richmond
Enquirer. 1804-1820" (Ph.D. diss., University of Missouri,
1973) .
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alliance that had guided the country in its infancy. The
state could never stand up to the federal government alone,
they reasoned, especially when critics around the country
were complaining about the influence Virginia had on
national political affairs. Thus, when Martin Van Buren,
leader of the Albany Regency and the New York Republican
party, visited Richmond in 1822 and 1823 to discuss a
possible alliance he found a receptive audience. As the
presidential election of 1824 neared, the forces of the
Regency and the Junto joined in an effort to elect William
H. Crawford. Van Buren and Ritchie agreed that Crawford
represented the best hope of saving the Republican party and
the country in a time of such crisis.6
Crawford's defeat at the hands of John Quincy Adams
proved a bitter blow to Van Buren, the Virginia Republican
party, and the Junto, but not a fatal one. In fact, the
inner circle at Richmond managed to retain a good deal of
political power within the state. Moreover, their efforts to
revive the state rights philosophy in the commonwealth had
begun to bear fruit.7 Adams's victory had been a setback, to
6For Van Buren's trips to Richmond and the renewal of the
Virginia-New York alliance, see Robert V. Remini, Martin Van
Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959); Richard H. Brown "Southern
Planters and Plain Republicans of the North: Martin Van
Buren's Formula for National Politics" (Ph.D. diss., Yale
University, 1955).
7In 1819 Roane noted that a "revival of the spirit and
principles of 1799 has ... taken place here." Roane to
Barbour, Dec. 29, 1819, WMQ, series 1, Vol. 10 (1901-1902), 7-
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be sure, but the Junto refused to give up their fight to
save Virginia from the dangers of consolidation. "There is
yet a Spartan band to rally around the rights of 'the
States' and of 'the people,'" Ritchie wrote in February of
1825, "who though defeated, will persist.... The Old
Dominion is firm, fearless and unshaken."8
The defiant tone of Ritchie's words was a hallmark of
the Old Dominion's response to the events of the lateJeffersonian era. Virginians spoke out so forcefully against
the policies of nationalism because they believed that the
stakes were so high. Since 1800 orthodox Republicans had
accepted the doctrines of the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions and Madison's Report of 1800 as the essence of
their political creed. The notion of state sovereignty and a
strict construction of the powers of the federal government
constituted the most fundamental tenets of what was
popularly known as the "Virginia principles." Intertwined
with this devotion to state rights were concerns about the
purity of the republican experiment. Many Virginians
believed that efforts to increase the power of the general
government fostered corruption and tyranny and threatened
the independence of the individual citizen. If unchecked,
such policies threatened to topple republicanism in the
8. Early in 1822 Ritchie spoke of the increased vigilance of
the state in its efforts to stop the "march of usurpation."
RE, Jan. 5, 1822.
8RE, Feb. 12, 1825.
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young nation.9
Virginia's political faith seemed to be under full
attack as early as 1815. Economic nationalism and judicial
review threatened to upset the delicate balance between the
powers of the state and federal governments outlined in the
Constitution. If these dangerous doctrines were not resisted
and put down, the results would be catastrophic. A corrupt
and powerful national government would reduce the states to
a permanently subservient position and steadily reduce the
sphere of liberty in the country. Something must be done to
preserve the powers of the states, and Virginia, with its
revolutionary heritage and prominent place in the Union, was
uniquely qualified to lead the attack. The sense of urgency
many Virginians felt during these years can be seen in the
response of "Nestor*' to the Supreme Court's ruling in Cohens
v. Virginia (1821). Would Virginia "succumb" to the "usurped

powers" of the court, he asked, or act to prove that "she is
still a FREE, SOVEREIGN, and INDEPENDENT state." The "eyes
of the nation," he noted, "are anxiously looking toward
Richmond" to see how the state would respond.10

9Kathryn Ruth Malone, "The Virginia Doctrines, the
Commonwealth, and the Republic: The Role of Fundamental
Principles in Virginia Politics, 1798-1833" (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1981), describes the state's
devotion to the principles of 1798 and persuasively argues
that they "served as the articulated outline of the ideology
which shaped the political culture" of Virginia in the first
three decades of the nineteenth century. (10)
10"Nestor," RE, Jan. 10, 1822.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

32

Despite the inflammatory rhetoric, "Nestor's" warning
contained some truth. How the Old Dominion responded to the
challenges posed by nationalism was important and was
closely monitored across the nation. In 1822 a Virginian
still occupied the White House, Jefferson and Madison still
engendered national respect, and the state still ranked near
the top in population and wealth. Developments in Virginia
between 1815 and 1824 clearly had national significance.

The first signs of the state's uneasiness with national
events came shortly after the War of 1812. Most Virginians
had supported "Mr. Madison's war" and experienced the heady
nationalism of the day. But as the fighting ended and the
glow of patriotism faded, the state's political leaders
found themselves confronted with a daunting series of
problems. While events at the national level portended ill
for the rights of the state, the discontent of western
Virginians threatened to divide the state along regional
lines and weaken the power of the inner circle at Richmond.
Political leaders in western Virginia stepped up their call
for improved transportation networks, expanded state banking
facilities, and democratic constitutional reform. In 1816,
the same year that Ritchie signalled the Junto's break with
the national party by speaking out against the tariff and
the rechartering of the Bank of the United States,
disgruntled westerners convened in Staunton and proposed
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widespread changes to the state's constitution.11
The result of the nationalistic measures of Congress
and of the Supreme Court and the grumblings within the state
for reform was a headlong charge back into the particularist
doctrines of the state rights school, led by the Junto. One
sign of this return to the principles of 1798 was the
restoration to party favor of Randolph and Taylor, who had
kept the torch of the "Virginia principles" alive during the
high-tide of nationalism. Both men had temporarily fallen
from grace with party leaders earlier for criticizing
Jefferson's second administration and opposing James
Madison's presidential candidacy in 1808.12 Randolph's
refusal to support the War of 1812 and his charge that the
country was "enveloped in the toils of French duplicity"
cost him at the polls as well, where his constituents ousted
him from office for the only time in his long career.
Taylor's warnings against the "wartime extension of federal

"Charles Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia From 1776 to
1861 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1910), 93-102. For
Ritchie's break with party leadership, see the Enquirer.
March-August, 1816, passim.
12For Randolph's well-known break with Jefferson, see
Russell Kirk, John Randolph of Roanoke: A Study in American
Politics (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978); Robert Dawidoff,
The Education of John Randolph (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.,
1979), esp. ch. 5; for Taylor's opposition to Jefferson, see
his letter to James Madison, Jan. 15, 1808, James Madison
Papers, University of Virginia; Daniel P. Jordan, Political
Leadership
in
Jefferson's
Virginia
(Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1983), 19. Ammon discusses the
two men's role in the election of 1808 in "The Richmond Junto,
1800-1824," 403-405.
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powers" in An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the
Government of the United States, published in 1814, went
largely unnoticed amidst the celebrations of the Battle of
New Orleans and the news of a peace treaty.13 But
developments after the war vindicated Taylor and Randolph,
and by 1817 they were being hailed as true republicans and
restored to their rightful place as party spokesmen.14 With
new found unity, the Republican party of Virginia marshalled
its forces for the fight against the dangers of nationalism.
An early target of the Junto was the Supreme Court.
Between 1816 and 1821, the high tribunal handed down three
decisions that sparked controversy in Virginia and
strengthened devotion to the principles of '98. In 1816, the
court's verdict in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, concerning the
fate of the Fairfax land grants, "did much to diminish

13John Randolph, "To the Freeholders of Charlotte, Prince
Edward, Buckingham, and Cumberland," May 30, 1812, reprinted
in Kirk, John Randolph of Roanoke. 238-243, quote on 243; John
Taylor, An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the
Government of the United States (Fredericksburg, Va: Green and
Cady, 1814) , as discussed in Risjord, The Old Republicans.
149; Robert Shalhope, John Tavlor of Caroline: Pastoral
Republican (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press,
1980). On Randolph and Taylor's ostracism, see Ammon, "The
Richmond Junto," 404-405.
14The timing of Randolph and Taylor's restoration is
disputed. I agree with Malone, "The Virginia Doctrines," 160;
Risjord, The Old Republicans. 177; and Jordan, Political
Leadership. 19, that it came about by 1817 or so. Ammon, in
"The Richmond Junto," 404-405, argues that reconciliation did
not take place until 1320, as does Charles D. Lowery, James
Barbour. A Jeffersonian Republican (University, Al: The
University of Alabama Press, 1984), 58, 133.
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nationalistic sentiment" in the state.15 When the justices
ruled three years later in McCulloch v. Maryland that a
state could not tax the Bank of the United States, political
leaders in the Old Dominion spoke out strongly against both
the Court and the bank it defended.16 Finally, in Cohens v.
Virginia , Virginians expressed outrage when the Court

accepted a case appealed from the highest court in the
state.17
Each of the court's rulings, derived from a loose
construction of the Constitution, elicited vigorous response
from Virginia Republicans. Spencer Roane was especially
active in attacking Marshall and his fellow justices. In a
series of essays written under the pseudonym of "Hampden,"
Roane lambasted the reasoning of the McCulloch decision and
began an extensive reformulation of the theory that the
Constitution protected state sovereignty by clearly limiting

15Ambler, Sectionalism. 103.
16Chief Justice John Marshall, a neighbor of most of the
Junto members and source of their irritation on this matter,
commented extensively on the negative reaction in Virginia
towards the Court's ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland. "Great
dissatisfaction has been given to the politicians of Virginia
by our opinion on the bank question," he told Bushrod
Washington. They will attack the decision in the papers and we
will be "condemned as a pack of consolidating aristocratics."
Marshall to Washington, March 27, 1819, John Marshall Papers,
College of William and Mary.
17Marshall thought that this decision "has been assaulted
with a degree of virulence transcending what has appeared on
any former occasion." Marshall to Joseph Story, June 15, 1821,
Marshall Papers, William and Mary (typescript copy of original
in Massachusetts Historical Society).
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the powers of the central government. Two years later, in
1821, Roane wrote again, this time in response to Cohens.
Thinly disguised as "Algernon Sidney," the jurist continued
his attack on the high court and his campaign to instill a
state rights ideology among his countrymen. Roane's essays
constitute an excellent summary of the southern state
rights' platform as it stood in the early 1820s. As such,
they merit careful consideration.18
In his essays Roane set out to awaken his fellow
countrymen "from the fatal coma which has fallen upon them"
and to warn of the "progress of federal usurpation." In
order to do this, to stop the dangerous expansion of the
powers of the central government, Roane proposed a
"recurrence to fundamental principles" and a reexamination
of the nature of the Constitution.19
Roane argued that the compact that formed the Union in
1789 represented the culmination of the ideals of the
American Revolution. In their desire to create a strong and
permanent union, the writers of the Constitution had been
18"Hampden," RE, June 11, 15, 18, 22, 1819, reprinted in
John P. Branch Historical Papers of Randolph-Macon College.
Vol. 2, no. 1 (June 1905), 77-121; "Algernon Sidney," RE, May
25, 29, June 5, 8, 1821, reprinted in Branch Historical
Papers. Vol. 2, no. 2 (June 1906), 78-183. Until recently,
scholars had also attributed the "Amphictyon" letters (RE,
March 30, April 2, 1819) to Roane. Gerald Gunther, in the
introduction to John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v.
Maryland (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), has
challenged that notion and named William Brockenbrough,
another Junto member, as "Amphictyon."
19"Hampden," 121; "Algernon Sidney," 78-79.
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wise enough to place limits on the powers that the national
government could wield. The states had given up some of
their powers in joining the Union, but maintained their
sovereignty. The first ten amendments offered further
safeguards against abuses of power and delegated all
unspecified powers to the people and to the states. The
hallmark of the Constitution, Roane concluded, was its
deliberate efforts to preserve state sovereignty.20
Since the adoption of the Constitution, there had been
those who had attempted to subvert its true meaning by
giving inordinate powers to the central government. In 1798,
the threat of the Federalists had been turned back by
Jefferson and Madison's brilliant rebuttal in the Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions. The "Doctrines of '98" represented
the "Magna Charta" of all true republicans and "its
principles have only been departed from since by turn-coats
and apostates." But the country was once again falling prey
to the designs of the Federalists, who were even more
dangerous now because they disguised themselves as
Republicans. Under their influence, a "money-loving,
funding, stock-jobbing spirit has taken foothold among us,"
Roane claimed. While the "liberties and constitution of our
country are endangered," the people remained "sunk in

20"Hampden," 79, 83-93; "Algernon Sidney," 97-99.
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apathy. "21
To make his countrymen aware of the dangers that
confronted them, Roane spelled out the implications of the
court's rulings. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Marshall and his
fellow justices had sought "to adjudicate away the reserved
rights of a sovereign member of the confederacy, and vest
them in the general government." The consequences of this
were plain for all to see. "If the limits imposed on the
general government, by the constitution, are stricken off,
they have, literally, the power to legislate for us 'in all
cases whatsoever'; and then we may bid a last adieu to the
State governments." Likewise, the Cohens decision
"completely negatives the idea that the American States have
a real existence, or are to be considered, in any sense, as
sovereign and independent states.1,22 Here was the essence of
Roane's argument. Virginians and their fellow countrymen
must resist the federalist pronouncements of the high court
by adhering closely to the fundamental doctrines of the
republican faith. To do otherwise would be tantamount to
rejecting the principles that underlie the Constitution.
Ignoring the threat posed by the Court could prove fatal to
the rights of the states and the cause of liberty.
21"Hampden," 82-83; "Algernon Sidney," 78. Roane chose his
words well. His references to stock-jobbers and the evils of
banking were clearly designed to evoke traditional opposition
concern about the dangers of an artificial
"paper
aristocracy."
22"Hampden,11 80-81; "Algernon Sidney," 80.
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The "Hampden" and "Algernon Sidney" essays were widely
applauded in Virginia and attracted the praise of Jefferson
and Madison, but Roane was not alone in condemning the high
court.23 In 1819 the state legislature adopted one
resolution, introduced by Junto member Andrew Stevenson,
that suggested a constitutional amendment to limit the scope
of the Supreme Court's powers, and a second that instructed
its senators in Congress to oppose the Bank of the United
States. Two years later the legislature approved three more
amendments designed to reduce further the court's
jurisdiction.24
Letters and editorials criticizing the high court and
pleading for action on the part of the states appeared
frequently in the columns of Ritchie's Enquirer. One writer
insisted that the Supreme Court had interpreted the
Constitution in a "directly different manner" than that
intended by its framers. Another bemoaned the court's
23Jefferson wrote Roane that the "Hampden" essays "contain
the true principles of the revolution of 1800." Jefferson to
Roane, Sept. 6, 1819, Paul L. Ford, ed., The Writings of
Thomas Jefferson (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1899), 10:140143. In 1821 Jefferson said of the jurist, "to him I look, and
have long looked,
as our strongest bulwark" against the
forces of consolidation. Jefferson to Archibald Thweatt, Jan.
19, 1821, Ford, ed., Writings of Jefferson. 10:184-185. For
praise of the "Algernon Sidney" letters, see Jefferson to
Roane, June 25, 1821, Branch Historical Papers. Vol. 2, no. 1,
(June 1905), 138-139, and Madison to Roane, June 29, 1821,
James Madison Papers, Library of Congress.
24Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of
Virginia —
1819 (Richmond: Thomas Ritchie, 1819), 56-59;
Malone, "The Virginia Doctrines," 209; Ammon, "The Richmond
Junto," 408; Ambler, Sectionalism. 104.
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pronouncements and fretted over the declining "watchfulness
and opposition" on the part of state rights' advocates. An
anonymous poet, who made up for his lack of literary talent
with partisan zeal, had a stern warning for the Chief
Justice:
Old Johnny Marshall mind your ways,
and let the States alone sir,
or else before there are many days,
you'll yield your place to Roane sir.25
Ritchie hinted at the partisan overtones involved in the
Court's decisions. In October of 1819 he twice called upon
his fellow Virginians to interpose their authority against
the court's ruling in McCulloch in the same manner that the
state had opposed the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.
"Crito" ended his diatribe on the Cohens decision with a
challenge: "Defenders of the federal Constitution in its
proper powers! - Defenders of state rights! - Sentinels of
liberty! - to your posts!"26

25"Franklin," RE, April 23, 1819; "A Virginian," RE, April
30, 1819; Anonymous, n.d. [1821?], Marshall Papers, William
and Mary (photostat of original at University of Virginia).
26RE, April 20, 23, Oct. 15, 22, 1819; "Crito," RE, Feb.
17, 1821. Apparently there were limits to Ritchie's devotion
to this cause. When the editor and printer declined to publish
in pamphlet form Roane's "Algernon Sidney" essays, the jurist
snapped that "Ritchie and Gooch [co-owner of the Enquirer1
have not liberality and public spirit enough to engage in the
publication of books or pamphlets unless they conduce to their
immediate emolument." Roane to Archibald Thweatt, Dec. 11,
1821, Branch Historical Papers. Vol. 2, no. 1 (June 1905),
140-141. For other evidence of a split between the two leaders
of the Junto at this time, see Ritchie to Roane, M.S., n.d.
[probably 1821 or 1822], Virginia Historical Society.
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Despite such enthusiasm, the popular response to
Ritchie's plea for action and to Roane's abstract legal
arguments proved disappointing. While Marshall's
condemnation of Roane's writings was expected, the Junto
leader complained bitterly of the "apathy of the times" and
chided Jefferson and Madison for not taking a more prominent
role in the struggle against the aggrandizing measures of
the national government.27 Madison responded by claiming
that "in the existing posture of things ... the latitude of
jurisdiction assumed by the Judicial power of the U.S. ...
is less formidable to the reserved sovereignty of the
States, than the latitude of power which it has assigned to
the Legislature." In other words, Roane was barking up the
wrong tree.28 Other Virginians agreed. They found it
difficult to get excited about obscure and legalistic
debates on the limits of judicial powers, especially when
27Roane to Thweatt, Dec. 11, 24, 1821, Branch Historical
Papers. Vol. 2, no. 1 (June 1905), 140-142. Marshall slammed
Roane for his "coarseness & malignity of invention." Marshall
to Joseph Story, June 15, 1821, Marshall Papers, William and
Mary (typescript copy of original in Massachusetts Historical
Society). What most upset Marshall about Roane's and the
Junto's response to the Court's decision was their efforts to
return the country to what he believed were the dark days of
the Articles of Confederation. By 1821, Marshall was convinced
that "A deep design to convert our government into a mere
league of states has taken hold of a powerful & violent, party
in Virginia. The attack upon the judiciary is in fact an
attack upon the union." Marshall to Story, Sept. 18, 1821,
Marshall Papers, William and Mary (typescript copy of original
at Massachusetts Historical Society).
28Madison to Roane, May 6, 1821, M.S., General Collection,
UVA.
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more pressing matters confronted them. In 1819 and 1821
people were much more concerned about the state of the
economy.
The Panic of 1819 compounded the financial troubles of
the South, and of the eastern portions of Virginia in
particular. With the notable exception of the immediate
postwar years, Tidewater and Piedmont Virginians had watched
the value of their land and of their agricultural exports
decrease dramatically since the 1790s. A steady exodus of
farmers to the south and west served as a further reminder
of the bleak conditions in the area. The economic panic that
paralyzed the nation's commerce starting in 1819 accelerated
the pace of both these phenomena. Between 1817 and 1830 the
value of Virginia's exports dropped steadily, as did the
total value of land in the state.29 More than 2,000 people
left Richmond between 1817 and 1820, and at the height of
the depression property in the city lost from one-half to
three-quarters of its value. "The distress of Richmond has
increased one hundred fold," one city dweller wrote in March
of 1819. "The Banks are loosing [sic] all their specie - and
have been obliged to stop discounts - men of the best credit
today, are suspected tomorrow, and the next are found
ruined." On top of everything else, much of Virginia

29Avery Craven, Soil Exhaustion As a Factor in the
Agricultural History of Virginia and Maryland. 1606-1850. in
University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences. Vol.
13, no. 1 (1925), 72-121.
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experienced a severe drought in the summer of 1819 that
threatened to ruin many crops completely. Times had rarely
been harder.30 John Randolph predicted, only half-jokingly,
that the "day would come" in eastern Virginia "when the
master would run away from his negroes and be advertised by
them in the public prints."31
Those who remained behind responded to their plight in
a number of ways. John Taylor and Edmund Ruffin experimented
with new farming techniques. Planters banded together in
agricultural societies, the most famous of which was the
Albemarle Agricultural Association. At its meetings,
regularly reported in the Enquirer. members of the
Association presented reports on the results of their
agricultural experiments.32 Eastern Virginians even tried to
30Charles S. Sydnor, The Development of Southern
Sectionalism. 1819-1848 Vol. 5 of A History of the South
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948) , 113. In
chapter 5 of his work, Sydnor assesses the impact of the Panic
on the South; William Dandridge to Dr. James Morris, March 22,
1819, Morris Family Papers, UVA; RE, July and August, 1819.
See editorial of Aug. 10, 1819 for anxiety over drought
conditions.
31Ambler, Sectionalism. 111. For similar expressions of
despair, see Robert P. Sutton, "Nostalgia, Pessimism, and
Malaise: The Doomed Aristocrat in Late-Jeffersonian Virginia,"
VMHB. Vol. 76 (1968), 41-55; Thomas E. Buckley, S.J., "The
Declension of Virginia, 1776-1860: An Historiographical
Perspective," unpublished paper, 1990.
“Taylor's Arator. first published in 1814 and republished
in 1823, offered the most extensive discussion of new
agricultural techniques. Ruffin's later work was equally
influential. See Craven, Soil Exhaustion. 97-99, 105-106, 134142. The Enquirer began printing speeches from the Ablemarle
Association in 1818. See also "Minute Book of the Agricultural
Society of Albemarle," Annual Report of the American
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grow cotton on their lands, and for a brief time in the mid1820s production rose steadily and the venture looked like
it might succeed. But falling prices and the thin soils of
the region combined to make eastern Virginia's experiment
with King Cotton a short one.33
The unsuccessful efforts of eastern planters to reverse
their economic decline served to harden their commitment to
the political doctrines of the state rights school. As they
examined the sources of their impoverished condition, it
became increasingly clear that factors beyond their control
were partly to blame. Since they could not hope to control
crop prices on the international market, eastern Virginians
sought out ways to lower costs, such as reducing high tariff
duties, and to expand their markets, such as ending trade
restriction with the West Indies.34 Such goals put them at
odds with the nationalists in Congress. By 1820, eastern
Virginians had come to view most of the policies associated
with Henry Clay's "American System" as inimical to their
interests. A federally funded program of internal
improvements, a national bank, and a protective tariff, they

Historical Association. Vol. 1 (1918), 263-349.
“Virginia produced 25,000,000 pounds of cotton in 1826,
but only 10,000,000 pounds in 1834, two million pounds less
than had been produced in 1821. Ambler, Sectionalism. 115,
n. 53 =
“William H. Roane to John C. Calhoun, Nov. 24, 1824,
Harrison Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society; RE, Jan.
8, 1822.
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argued, were all part of a plan to weaken the economic and
political power of the agricultural South at the hands of
the capitalists and manufacturers of the North.
Even before the Panic of 1819 hit, the planters of
eastern Virginia had attributed the region's economic woes
to the corruption and mismanagement of the Bank of the
United States. Although they had no problem with state
chartered banks, strict constructionists considered a
national bank unconstitutional, and Ritchie had heaped abuse
upon it since its rechartering in 1816. The "bank question" not just the debate over the constitutionality of its
charter, but discussions of its policies and impact on
regional economies - was among the most talked about
subjects of the day, far outstripping in volume and in
intensity the debates on the Supreme Court's decisions.35
Coupled with distrust of the Bank of United States was
a strong aversion to protective tariffs. Eastern Virginians
sensed that tariff duties ostensibly designed to encourage
American manufacturing were in fact nothing more than
government approved taxes imposed on the agricultural South
to nourish the commercial and manufacturing interests of the
North. In petitions, memorials, private correspondence, and

35For typical examples of anti-Bank sentiment, see
Ritchie's editorial of Sept. 18, 1818 and Sept. 3, 1819, as
well as the essays of "Lycurgus," Oct. 16, 1818, and
"Americanus," Oct. 20, 1818, all in RE. Junto members held
positions of power in all of Virginia's banks, both state and
national.
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newspaper columns, Virginians explained how artificially
high duties hurt the South both economically and
politically. The tariff, as John C. Calhoun made clear in
his Exposition (1828), forced farmers to buy high and sell
low. Protective duties were also of dubious
constitutionality, and the Old Dominion's congressmen
spearheaded opposition to the tariff in Washington by
cultivating a steady habit of voting against any rate
increases.36
Another burden imposed upon the South by the national
government, eastern Virginians argued, was a bloated and
useless system of internal improvements. Ritchie, like many
eastern Virginians, agreed that a state-funded program of
improvements was desirable, in fact necessary, to revive the
commerce of the state. But a federally-funded program was
both unconstitutional and clearly designed to benefit the
western portions of the country at the expense of
easterners. What use did a Tidewater or Piedmont farmer have
for costly projects that offered them no relief from their
36While the South split over the tariff of 1816,
Virginia's delegation opposed it 13 to 6. By 1824, the rest of
the South had joined Virginia in condemning the protective
tariff. Lowery, James Barbour. 92-93, 141. For examples of
eastern Virginia's opposition to the tariff, see RE, Sept. 24,
1819, Feb. 19, April 28, May 2, Aug. 11, 1820 (Proceedings of
a meeting called in Richmond to protest the tariff), and "The
Farmers and Merchants of Fredericksburg, A Memorial on the
Policy of Protective Tariffs," which appeared on the front
page of the Enquirer of Aug. 25, 1820. The memorial, written
by John Taylor, noted that the "mercantile, naval, and
agricultural occupations, are all discouraged by restrictions
upon commerce."
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economic misfortunes?37
From this brief examination of the response of eastern
Virginia to the economic and political questions of the day,
it can be seen that provincialism and sectionalism had
assumed new importance in the state by 1820. In an 1821
editorial Ritchie summarized the region's growing hostility
to the American System and to all things northern. As the
editor saw it, the North was the "place where the people
were losing interest in the preservation of the
Constitution; where the public expenditures were being made;
where the United States Bank sat in majesty; where the
spirit of mercantile cupidity was enveloping itself in the
mantle of monopoly and privilege; and where the people
wished to enthrone the federal government and debase that of
the states."38 Among the more important consequences of the
depressed economic condition of much of the state during the
postwar years was the considerable aid it gave to the
Junto's efforts to reassert the primacy of the "Virginia
principles."
37RE, March 20, Nov. 16, March 16, 1819. Mutersbaugh,
"Jeffersonian Journalist," 129, explains Ritchie's support of
state-supported internal improvements:
"There were no
constitutional
difficulties
here,
and
no
fear
of
centralization sliding toward tyranny." Philip N. Nicholas
informed Andrew Stevenson that their opinions on internal
improvements "suit the meridian of Richmond and the Old
Dominion better than that of Washington." Nicholas to
Stevenson, April 8, 1824, Papers of Andrew and John White
Stevenson, LC.
38The words are Ambler's analysis of Ritchie's editorial
of Aug. 8, 1821, in Sectionalism. 119.
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A more significant development that pushed Virginians
toward adopting a strong state rights ideology was the
Missouri Crisis. Between 1819 and 1821 debate on this
question occupied center stage, at times reaching fever
pitch. From start to end of the crisis the state's political
leaders, including the Jutno, rallied their fellow citizens
to action. They argued that "Virginia at the head of the
Southern States, ought now to speak as she did in '98. She
ought to put forth her whole strength + save the
Constitution from this unhallowed assault." The General
Assembly agreed and adopted resolutions pledging to resist,
"with manly fortitude, any attempt which Congress may make
to impose restraints, or restrictions, as the price of
admission [of Missouri to statehood], not authorized by the
great principles of the constitution."39
In discussions on the Missouri question that followed,
two main issues impressed Virginians as vital to the welfare
of their state and the Union. First and foremost, efforts to
restrict Missouri's entrance into the Union must be resisted
at all costs. Attempts by northern congressmen to impose
conditions upon the territory's admission to statehood were
unconstitutional and set an ominous precedent that
threatened all of the states. The Tallmadge Amendment, which

39Thomas McLeland to Joseph C. Cabell, Jan. 12, 1820,
Cabell Family Papers, UVA; Journal of the House of Delegates
of the Commonwealth of Virginia .. . 1820 (Richmond: Thomas
Ritchie, 1820), 166-178.
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sought to end slavery in Missouri, amounted to "a vital blow
... aimed at the constitution of the United States.... A
government limited in its powers is to be endued with an
authority to which there is no assignable limit." To
acquiesce in this bold move on the part of northern
politicians would be equivalent to forfeiting state
sovereignty. Ritchie made this clear when he noted that "it
is in the interest of all the states to support the rights
of Missouri: her rights are those of Virginia."40
Leaders in the commonwealth also expressed concern that
proposals to exclude slavery from Missouri would provoke a
divisive and unproductive debate on the merits of that
institution. Undoubtedly, such a discussion would only
heighten sectional animosities. "The East and the South
stand on very different grounds" when it came to the topic
of extending slavery, Ritchie noted. "The former says, 'We
believe it to be expedient to restrict slavery;' the latter,
'We believe a restriction to be a breach of the constitution
which we have sworn to support." Northern critics of
slavery, "fiery enthusiasts" quick to charge the "southern
people with inhumanity" for owning slaves, failed to
"conceive how difficult it is for us to be rid of it, in a

40RE, Jan. 22, 1820, May 27, 1819; see also Ritchie's
editorials on July 9, Oct. 22, 1819.
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manner consistent with our future peace and tranquillity."41
By throwing the debate on slavery into the political arena,
northern zealots had presented the young nation with a
problem that it simply was not capable of resolving without
causing irreparable damage.
Virginians also believed that they detected ulterior
motives in northern efforts to halt the extension of
slavery. "Some sinister design, something inimical to the
interests of the southern states" lurked "behind the
specious mask of humanity." The real purpose for northern
maneuvering on the Missouri question was to "exclude a very
great majority of the citizens of the Southern States from a
participation of the benefits and advantages ever to be
derived from the fertile western regions, and confine them
and their prosperity, to the narrow limits which they now
possess." Spencer Roane echoed this sentiment when he wrote
Madison that the state would never consent to be "damned up
in a land of Slaves" as a consequence of northern "lust for
dominion and power." Far removed from Virginia, John Quincy
Adams speculated that the political dealings surrounding the
Missouri Compromise were calculated to produce a new
political alliance "terrible to the whole Union, but
portentously terrible to the South - threatening in its
41RE, Jan. 11, Feb. 10, 1820. Even at this early stage of
the debate over slavery, Ritchie had no stomach for extended
discussion of this divisive question. "Where will the vortex
of this slave question terminate?" he wondered aloud in the
Feb. 3, 1821 edition of the Enquirer.
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progress the emancipation of all their slaves ..., and
threatening that political ascendancy of Virginia ..." which
had guided the country since Jefferson's election in 1800.42
When news reached Richmond in early 1820 of a proposed
compromise that would admit Maine as a free state, Missouri
as a slave state, and fix a line at 36 degrees and 30
minutes, above which slavery would be forbidden, Virginians
were stunned. Ritchie could barely contain himself. "A
compromise! who will compromise with the constitution of the
country? and barter away its essential principle?" In the
capital "indignation at the idea of such a compromise is the
ruling sentiment." People say, "If we yield now, beware.
They will ride us forever." George Hay wrote to his uncle,
James Monroe, that Richmonders considered the Compromise "a
base + hypocritical scheme to get power under the mask of
humanity + it excites the most unqualified indignation +
resentment.1,43
In a series of letters to Virginia senator James
Barbour, Junto members and intimates explained their reasons
for condemning the compromise. Henry St. George Tucker, a

42RE, Dec. 16, 1819; Roane to Madison, Feb. 16, 1820, in
Ammon, "Richmond Junto," 412; Charles Francis Adams, ed.,
Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (Philadelphia, 1874-1877), 4:529.
The best treatment of the Missouri Crisis remains Glover
Moore, The Missouri Controversy. 1819-1821 (Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1953).
43RE, Feb. 8, 10, 1820; George Hay to James Monroe, Feb.
18, 1820, James Monroe Papers, LC.
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western Virginian in the capital for the legislative caucus
to determine the state's presidential nominee in 1820,
confided to Barbour that "I am unable to describe the
sensation in Richmond at the intelligence conveyed by your
letter. A compromise which gives up the fairest and largest
part of the Western Territory and leaves us to a narrow slip
intersected with mountains in one direction, destroyed by
Earthquakes in another, and interspersed in a third with
swamps and bayous, and infested with mosquitoes, and bilious
diseases, never can be grateful to us." William Gordon
discounted such practical considerations and went straight
to what he believed was the heart of the matter. The South
must resist the compromise not because of the "value of the
territory or the disadvantage of the bargain so much," but
rather because it "manifests what we consider a spirit of
injustice and want of faith in the Northern politician,
which if yielded to would lead only to farther and more
daring and vital usurpations." Linn Banks, Speaker of the
House of Delegates, used blunter language. "If a compromise
of this kind be constitutional and expedient," he predicted,
"it would lead directly to a dissolution of the Union, by
giving an unjust influence in the National Councils, by
which the Southern people would become the 'hewers of wood
and drawers of water' for those of the North." In one fell
swoop, northern politicians had announced their plan to
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smash the Union and enslave the South.44
Excitement over the proposed compromise reached such
heights in Richmond that the legislative caucus was
temporarily adjourned. By mid-February, however, tempers
cooled and "reason ... resumed her empire." The caucus
reconvened and endorsed Monroe, despite his alleged support
of the Compromise. "We prefer him as president to any
other," Roane informed Barbour, "but would not sacrifice our
Constitution or risque [sic] our safety to insure his
election. I expect this is a general sentiment in
Virginia."45 Monroe's nomination amounted to a "tacit
acceptance" of the Missouri Compromise on the part of
Virginia's political leaders, albeit in a tone of
resignation and not acquiescence. "We submit ..., we bow to
it," Ritchie seethed, "though on no occasion with so poor a
grace and so bitter a spirit.1,46
Ritchie could find something positive to say about the
Missouri Compromise. Along with the controversy surrounding
^These and similar letters to Barbour appear in WMO.
series 1, Vol. 10 (1901-1902), 5-24. Tucker's letter, dated
Feb. 11, 1820, appears on pages 10 and 11; Gordon's, Feb. 18,
1820, 18-19; Banks's, Feb. 20, 1820, 20-22. Barbour had broken
the news of the proposed compromise and Monroe's support of it
in a letter to Charles Yancey, who leaked it to the state
legislators. Ibid., 6.
45Charles Yancey to Barbour, Feb. 16, 17, 1820; Roane to
Barbour, Feb. 19, 1820, both in WMO. series 1, Vol. 10 (19011902), 13-18. For Barbour's role in getting Virginians to
accept the Missouri Compromise, see Lowery, James Barbour.
110-141.
46Ammon, "The Richmond Junto," 413; RE, March 7, 1820.
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the American System and the Supreme Court's decisions, the
compromise had provoked a much-needed return to the sound
doctrines of the past. "A short time ago," the editor noted,
"and the very sound of state rights was scarcely heard out
of Virginia. But now the people begin to awake."47 Ritchie's
assessment proved an accurate one. The questions of the day
had reinvigorated the American political process by blowing
life into the smoldering sectional animosities that lay just
beneath the surface of the political landscape in the mis
named Era of Good Feelings. Virginia's response between 1816
and 1822 had been to restore to primacy the fundamental
doctrines of the republican faith, including state rights
and a strict interpretation of the Constitution. Now the Old
Dominion's leaders turned their efforts to bringing about
similar developments on a national scale. That could best be
accomplished by putting a man who shared their beliefs in
the White House.

The presidential election of 1824 began soon after
James Monroe's second inauguration in March of 1821. Because
no one stood out as the obvious successor to the Virginia
dynasty, the field of candidates grew significantly. John
Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, John Calhoun, William Crawford,
and Andrew Jackson all had designs on the office. While no
one matched Jefferson or Madison in stature, Adams and
47RE, Aug. 31, 1821.
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Crawford had served the country ably for decades, and
Calhoun and Clay were rising stars in Congress. Jackson's
popularity stemmed chiefly from his military successes in
the War of 1812 and in Florida. Although all five candidates
claimed membership in the Republican party, they differed
significantly in their political beliefs and in their
interpretations of the Constitution.48
The lack of ideological unity in the national
Republican party had in fact been a point of contention with
the Junto throughout Monroe's two terms as chief executive.
The clique's tepid support for Monroe had stemmed in part
from his qualified endorsements of nationalistic policies
and his efforts to extinguish party differences, a policy
referred to as amalgamation. A few Virginians agreed with
the fifth president that political parties represented "the
curse of the country." Daniel Norton, a young planter
writing to a friend in Europe, expressed this displeasure
when he complained of the damaging effects of party spirit
on men. "So blinded are men to their own interests and to
the good of the community, that when once they have joined
and act[ed] under the influence of party spirit, rather than
break that charm that holds them together, they will dance

48George
Dangerfield,
The
Awakening
of
American
Nationalism. 1815-1828 (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 218230.
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hand in hand into Hell."49
A more common sentiment in Virginia was the belief
that party distinctions needed to be preserved because they
were both natural and beneficial to a democracy. Party
spirit must exist, "Fabricus" told his fellow Virginians,
"in every free country.... Nothing but the rod of despotism
can keep it down. To a certain extent, it may even be
salutary; it creates and keeps alive a degree of vigilance
on men in power which may often produce the happiest
effects." William H. Roane, who had replaced his father in
the Junto, notified John C. Calhoun that Monroe's efforts to
abolish parties had cost him in Virginia because people
realized that "there must ever be parties in the country."
Jefferson explained to his good friend the Marquis de
Lafayette that "the parties of Whig and Tory, are those of
nature. They exist in all countries.... The sickly, weakly,
timid man, fears the people, and is a tory by nature. The
healthy, strong, and bold cherish them, and is formed a Whig
by nature." To many politically-minded Virginians, attempts
to eliminate competing parties could never succeed because

49Monroe to James Madison, May 10, 1822, Stanislaus Murray
Hamilton, ed., The Writings of James Monroe (New York: G.P.
Putnam's Sons, 1902-1903), 6:284-290; Daniel N. Norton to J.J.
Ambler, July 2, 1824, Papers of the Ambler and Barbour
Families, UVA.
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they went against human nature.50
Virginia's desire to preserve party distinctions struck
a responsive chord with Martin Van Buren, who by 1822 was
busy reviving the political alliance between New York and
the Old Dominion, this time based upon a union of the Albany
Regency and the Richmond Junto. The New Yorker had convinced
himself that the "settled purpose of Mr Monroe[']s
administration ... [was] ... to destroy the Republican Party
by amalgamating it with its opponents." There was still time
to reverse Monroe's folly and salvage the party of Jefferson
if Virginia, spokesman for the South, lended its support to
Van Buren's plan. "All hopes of the restoration of the
party," Van Buren explained, "now rests on the fidelity of
Virginia & New York.... Without the two pillars I have named
the edifice cannot be sustained."51
To bring about the reorganization of the Republican
party, Van Buren opened correspondence with prominent
Virginians and travelled to the commonwealth to cultivate
friendships with the Junto. The Little Magician's manners
and devotion to the "Virginia principles" impressed
political leaders in the state. Writing from Washington,
Virginia congressman John Floyd told Junto associate
50"Fabricus," RE, Jan. 3, 1822; William H. Roane to John
C. Calhoun, Nov. 24, 1824, Harrison Family Papers, VHS;
Jefferson to Lafayette, Nov. 3. 1823. Ford. ed., Writings of
Jefferson. 10:279-283.
51Martin Van Buren to David Evans, June 9, 1824, Martin
Van Buren Papers, LC.
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Claiborne W. Gooch that Van Buren represented "our hope to
the north.... He will serve the purposes better than any, as
his notions of State Rights are correct, and he is now
almost the only distinguished man out of our own state who
entertains opinions ... approximating our own." Ritchie
struck up an immediate relationship with the New Yorker that
lasted until 1844, when the two split on the Texas question.
In 1822 and 1823 Van Buren's plans found enthusiastic
support among the political leaders of Virginia.52
By the summer of 1823, Van Buren's Albany Regency and
the Junto had settled on William Crawford as their choice to
succeed Monroe. Ritchie had held back discussions on the
campaign in the Enquirer until late 1822, claiming that the
country had more pressing problems to address. In fact,
Ritchie and the Junto still had not selected their
candidate. Calhoun and Clay could be dismissed quickly
because of their support for various nationalistic measures
after the War of 1812. The South Carolinian, Ritchie
explained simply in late 1822, "is not the candidate we
should select as the President of the U.S. - the why and
wherefore it is unnecessary to explain." The Kentuckian's

candidacy in the state stalled because many Virginians "look
on Mr. Clay as a deserter from the good old Virginia
52John Floyd to C.W. Gooch, June 9, 1824, Gooch Fa mi ly
Papers, VHS. In 1838 Ritchie wrote to Van Buren that from the
"first moment of my acquaintance with you, I have been your
personal & political friend." Ritchie to Van Buren, July 2,
1838, Van Buren Papers, LC.
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politicks."53

The Junto expressed strong reservations about Jackson,
suggesting that his fiery temper and meager experience made
him peculiarly unqualified for high civil office. Virginians
had castigated Jackson for his actions in Florida in 1818
and 1819 by claiming that he had exceeded the constitutional
limits of his power as territorial governor. One voter was
so disgruntled at Jackson that he confessed to being
"entirely at a loss to decide which is the most alarming,
the conduct of Genl. Jackson, or the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the case of the United State Bank.1,54
Ritchie had condemned Jackson in 1819 as well, and saw
nothing in the General's conduct since that warranted a
reappraisal. The editor summed up the feelings of the Junto
toward Jackson when he wrote that "we think he has been
betrayed into errors by the enthusiasm of his feelings, and

53RE, Jan. 5, Aug. 13, Nov. 29, 1822. In an editorial on
April 4, 1823, Ritchie bluntly stated that "Mr. Calhoun has
less chance in Virginia than any other candidate who has been
named." See also M. Sheppard to Andrew Stevenson, April 28,
1824, Stevenson Papers, LC. Littleton Waller Tazewell
dismissed Clay as a "mere politician" completely lacking in
principles. Tazewell to John Randolph, March 4, 1824, Tazewell
Family Papers, VSL. Waller Taylor, however, insisted that Clay
was popular in Virginia in 1822, and that he had heard that
"even Judge Roan [sic], the great stickler for State Rights,
is supposed to be favorable to him." Taylor to Archibald
Austin, March 11, 1822, Austin-Twyman Papers, William and
Mary.
^"Virginia," RE, March 30, 1819. Attacks on Jackson
filled the Enquirer from July 1818 to March 1819. For a
scathing indictment of Old Hickory's career, see "Algernon
Sidney," RE, Dec. 22, 1818, Jan. 7, 12, 14, 1819.
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the warmth of his temper."55 Despite warnings from his
supporters that his enemies in Virginia had successfully
created "an impression that you were a man governed alone by
Passion and impulse," Jackson continued to believe that the
Old Dominion would cast its vote for him on election day.56
Having eliminated Jackson, Calhoun, and Clay, only two
candidates remained from which the Junto could select.
Adams, though respected for his intellect and services to
the country, was a recent convert to the Republican party,
and a Yankee to boot. Ritchie and others had strong
reservations about Adams's reliance on the doctrine of
implied powers. The New Englander did, however, maintain a
significant following across the state and was the second
choice of many Virginians.57
The Junto selected Crawford, then, partly by a process
of elimination. But the Georgian's services to the country
and his devotion to state rights principles were more

55RE, May 6, 1823. See also RE, July 30, 1822, Feb. 28,
March 2, 6, 19, 26, May 14, 1824; J.A. Coles to Andrew
Stevenson, April 11, 1824, Stevenson Papers, LC.
56Col. Charles P. Tutt to Andrew Jackson, June 24, 1823,
John Spencer Bassett, ed. Correspondence of Andrew Jackson
(Washington: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1926-1935),
3:199; Jackson to George Martin, Jan. 2, 1824; to Andrew J.
Donelson, Feb. 12, 1824; to John Coffee, March 14, 1824,
Ibid., 3:221-233.
57RE, Jan. 23, May 20, June 15, July 4, Aug. 5, 8, 1823;
J.A. Coles to Stevenson, April 11, 1824, Stevenson Papers, LC.
John Taylor of Caroline, while not thrilled by any of the
candidates, found Adams the least objectionable. Taylor to
Monroe, April 29, 1823, Monroe Papers, LC.
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important in leading the Junto to select him as their
candidate. After a distinguished public career, Crawford had
narrowly missed capturing the Republican party's
presidential nomination in 1816, and had been impatiently
waiting for his turn ever since. Ritchie and his group had
long admired Crawford, although they fretted over his
flirtation with nationalism immediately after the War of
1812 and preferred Spencer Roane for president until his
death in 1822. Still, Crawford's flaws were smaller and
fewer than the other candidates, as one commentator
explained. "The election of Mr. Crawford will restore our
institutions to their primitive purity and simplicity. The
elevation of Mr. Adams or of Mr. Jackson will perpetuate the
extravagance and false splendor of the government, and
perhaps by sanctioning usurpations of power, make it too
strong for the rights and the liberties of the people."58
Moreover, Crawford was the choice of Van Buren and his New
York party; the Georgian could serve as the instrument by
which a Virginia-New York alliance could regain power.
Ritchie announced the party's support for Crawford in early
April 1823, thereby shifting the contest for the presidency

58RE, April 8, Aug. 5, 1823, Feb. 19, 28, 1824;
"Bolinbroke," RE, Aug. 27, 1824. Articles attacking Crawford
slowly disappeared from the columns of the Enquirer after
September of 1823, and were replaced by statements supporting
and defending the Georgian.
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into high gear.59
The closeness and bitterness of the presidential race
led to dubious campaign tactics and violent personal
attacks. To Virginians accustomed to the genteel politics of
the past, the tone of the election seemed proof positive of
degeneracy. John Taylor complained that politicians now won
office "by crafty influence and pecuniary influence" rather
than by devotion to republican principles. David Campbell,
prominent landowner in western Virginia, wrote his wife in
disgust over the personal attacks on the candidates that
typified modern electioneering. "Such are the republicans of
the present day," he sighed. Old Republicans expressed

revulsion at the way the campaign unfolded. James M. Garnett
wrote John Randolph of Roanoke that newspaper editors, the
"Regulators-General of all the affairs of the Nation, will
condescend to make a President for the Profanum Vulgus, who
must necessarily be incompetent." William Branch Giles
insisted that "visionary, fanatical, excessive democracy"
threatened to force down fundamental principles. A new era
of politics was dawning, and tradition-minded Virginians
found little it it to commend.60
59RE, Feb. 13, Oct. 7, 1823; Remini,
Democratic Party. 49-51, 63-66.

Making of the

60John Taylor of Caroline to Monroe, April 29, 1823,
Monroe Papers, LC; David Campbell to Mary Campbell, Feb. 16,
1823, Campbell Family Papers, Duke University; James Mercer
Garnett to John Randolph of Roanoke, Oct. 21, 1823, John
Randolph Papers, LC (typescript); William B. Giles, RE, April
9, 1824. Not surprisingly, Randolph confessed that he opposed
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A second development that worried the faithful in the
commonwealth was the steady stream of charges of 'Virginia
influence' that issued from politicians and editors across
the country. The Junto took particular care to downplay such
claims, and Jefferson seemed particularly adamant about
coaxing other states into assuming leadership roles in the
struggle against the dangers of nationalism. In the columns
of the Enquirer Ritchie repeatedly urged the same policy,
all the while insisting that "there is no spirit in
Virginia, which aspires to a sway or dictation over the
other states.1,61
On top of accusations of 'Virginia influence' came more
specific charges that a club or Junto ruled the state from
Richmond. Although attacks on the Junto stretched back to
1816, they increased in number and intensity as the election
neared. Newspapers from across the state and the nation
described the sinister machinations of the "Central
Influence" in Richmond, with the Lynchburg Virginian and
"this age of reformation + spectacle, - where presents +
speeches + entertainments are 'got up' + all erectness of
spirit + manly sincerity [are] exploded for fulsome
adulation"; Randolph to Garnett, Sept. 26, 1825, Randolph
Papers, LC (transcript).
61Jefferson to Spencer Roane, June 25, 1821, Branch
Historical Papers. Vol. 2, no. 1 (June 1905), 138-139;
Jefferson to Nathaniel Macon, Oct. 20, 1821, Ford, ed.,
Writings of Jefferson. 10:193-194; RE, July 2, 1822; see also
issues of Feb. 21, Aug. 13, 1822, Sept. 19, 1823, William H.
Roane told Calhoun that Virginia "should fold her arms +
remain completely passive" regarding the outcome of the
election. Roane to Calhoun, Nov. 24, 1824, Harrison Papers,
VHS.
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Niles7 Register leading the way.62 Soon mention of the group
and their modus operandi began appearing in personal
correspondence as well, including those of Crawford's rival
candidates.63
The most thorough and infamous attack on the Junto came
from an anonymous writer who published a series of letters
that first appeared in the Washington Republican in November
of 1823. Reprinted in pamphlet form as Letters on the
Richmond Party and signed simply "A Virginian," the epistles
generated considerable interest across the state. Unlike
earlier jabs at the Junto, the author of the Letters named
clique members and described in great detail their deeds in

6211A Virginian.11 Albany Advertiser. Aug. 26, 27, Sept. 17,
1816. By my count, at least eleven different newspapers, six
from outside Virginia, contained articles on the Junto in
1822, 1823, and 1824. The sharpest attacks came from the
editor of the Virginian. John Hampden Pleasants, who moved to
Richmond in late 1823 to found the Richmond Constitutional
Whig in support of Adams's candidacy; Lynchburg Virginian.
April 15, 29, 1823, Aug. 17, Nov. 20, 1824. Pleasants's zeal
got him into plenty of trouble and an occasional duel.
Ironically, a son of his lifelong rival Thomas Ritchie killed
Pleasants in a duel in 1846. For Pleasants's belligerency, see
John Campbell to James Campbell, Nov. 29, 1823, Campbell
Family Papers, Duke.
63Dr. Thomas G. Watkins to Andrew Jackson, March 13, 1822,
Bassett, ed., Correspondence of Jackson. 3:153-155; Francis W.
Gilmer to Peachy R. Gilmer, Jan. 13, 1824, MS, VHS, in which
F.W. Gilmer refers to the Junto as a "club of inveterate
tories bound together by fraudulent collusion + family compact
... [who] ... put up + put down whom they please"; E.H. Lundy
to William Brodnax, Feb. 10, 1824, William H. Brodnax Letters,
VHS; John Quincy Adams to Louisa C. Adams, Sept. 6, 1822,
Worthington Chauncy Ford, ed., Writings of John Quincy Adams
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1917), 7:301-302; Henry Clay to
Peter Porter, Feb., 1823, cited in Remini, Making of the
Democratic Party. 38.
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the past and their goals for the future. "A Virginian"
dwelled at length on the family connections in the group and
their controlling interest in Virginia's court system and
banks. The current Junto had been formed in 1816, when the
"old party" of Wilson Cary Nicholas joined forces with the
nascent Richmond Party to oppose Monroe's election. Since
then the Junto had controlled affairs in the state behind a
veil of secrecy. Its decision to join with the Republicans
of New York to elect Crawford in 1824 held ominous
implications for the commonwealth. Now that the group's
leadership and tactics stood exposed, the author trusted
that the people of Virginia must disable the Junto before it
ruined what remained of the state's power and prestige.64
In Richmond the Letters produced much excitement and
speculation. Most readers agreed that the author's purpose
was to affect the outcome of the presidential election.
Others viewed it as a personal attack upon the men mentioned
as Junto leaders. Whatever its purpose, the pamphlet
certainly got Ritchie's attention. The editor had carefully
^Letters on the Richmond Party. By a Virginian.
Originally published in the Washington Republican (Washington
City, 1823), microfiche copy from original in LC. Speculation
as to the author of the pamphlet consumed a great deal of
time, both then and now. Leading candidates include Alexander
McRae and John H. Pleasants. I would add Henry Lee to the
list. Lee was a political hack living in Washington at the
time who knew Virginia politics intimately. On Nov. 29, 1824,
Benjamin Watkins Leigh wrote to him that "you were mistaken,
when you supposed there was a 'Richmond party' - if, indeed,
what you published last summer on that subject, were not (as
I more than half suspected) a mere banter." Leigh to Lee, Nov.
29, 1824, Benjamin Watkins Leigh Papers, VHS.
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refuted every charge of a Junto in his paper, claiming time
and again that such an organization never existed. The idea
of a Richmond Party was a "phantom" conjured up by political
zealots for partisan purposes. They combined it with the
"cry of Virginia candidate-Virginia influence ... for the
purpose of bringing one of the candidates into odium and
contempt." Ritchie expressed surprise that any man with
common sense would believe "that this proud and independent
state is ruled by a Junto at the City of Richmond; that her
citizens are in fact the puppets of a political and
intriguing oligarchy at the metropolis."65
While Ritchie could brush aside insinuations of a
autocratic Junto operating from the state capital, he found
it harder to ignore accusations that the Virginia Republican
party had compromised the state's integrity by forming a
"combination" with the politicians of New York to elect
Crawford. In September of 1824, Hezekiah Niles began a six
part expose on the union between the Junto and the Albany
Regency, ending it in mid-October by claiming that the
"combination" sought to push Crawford on the nation through
political "management and, I believe, I may say political
fraud." Calhoun noted this development as well. "Between the
65RE, March 7, May 6, 1823; for other instances of
Ritchie's denials, see issues of Sept. 7, 1816, April 22, May
2, Aug 5, 1823, Sept. 14, 24, Oct. 5, 1824. David Campbell
offered a lengthy description of the pamphlet and the uproar
it caused in Richmond to his brother James. David Campbell to
James Campbell, Dec. 5, 10, 1823, Campbell Family Papers,
Duke.
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Regency at Albany and the junto at Richmond there is a vital
connection," he informed Samuel Gouverneur. "They give and
receive hope from each other, and confidently expect to
govern this nation." Ritchie explicitly denied that any
"combination with the leading politicians of New York"
existed, and thought that Niles "labors under some delirium
of the brain" for suggesting such a thing.66
Ritchie's denial of a union between New York and
Virginia to elect Crawford strengthened the Georgian's
standing in the Old Dominion. Crawford's prospects remained
bright in the state, thanks in part to the Junto's efforts
to explain his past support for the tariff and internal
improvements and their savage attacks on the other
candidates. Ritchie confidently predicted victory on both
the state and national level for his candidate. Then
disaster struck. Crawford suffered a paralytic stroke at the
home of James Barbour in September 1823. The stroke left
Crawford personally incapacitated and politically
handicapped.67
Perhaps even more damaging was Crawford's nomination at
“Hezekiah Niles, "The Sovereignty of the People," Niles'
Weekly Register. Sept. 4, 11, 16, 28, Oct. 2, 16, 1824, quote
from Oct. 16; Calhoun to Samuel Gouverneur, Nov. 9, 1823,
cited in Remini, Making of the Democratic Party. 41; RE, Sept.
14, 24, Oct. 5, 1824, quote from Sept. 24.
67RE, April 22, May 20, June 15, July 4, Aug. 8, 1823;
Lowery, James Barbour. 147. Ritchie often downplayed
Crawford's illness and insisted he was capable of serving as
president if elected; see, for example, RE, June 1, 8, Aug.
10, 1824.
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the hands of a discredited and despised congressional
caucus. Hostility toward this form of nomination had been
growing for years, and as late as 1820 Ritchie himself had
condemned it, claiming it was "no longer needed." But the
bitter contest of 1824 led him to change his mind. Crawford
must receive the official sanction of the national
Republican party to insure his election, and that seal of
approval had always been issued by the congressional caucus.
Besides, no reasonable alternatives existed. "Why rail
against it," Ritchie asked his readers, "unless some better
substitute is to be devised?"68
Crawford's campaign leaders severely underestimated
popular resentment of the caucus and paid the consequences.
Only 68 of 220 Republican congressmen showed up at the
Washington caucus to cast their vote, many of them from
Virginia and New York. Opponents heaped abuse on the
undemocratic mode of election and agreed with Niles that it
represented a "deliberate attempt ... to overthrow the
constitution of my country ." Citizens in Winchester urged an

end to the caucus system, claiming it encouraged abuses of
power and led to tyranny. "Power usurped, and usurpation
long acquiesced in, are often mistaken for right."69
68RE, April 14, 1820, March 28, 1823; Ritchie rallied the
faithful to support the caucus system; see "Publius," RE, Dec.
23, 1823, Jan. 1, 3, 1824 for a particularly able defense.
69For the results of the Washington caucus, see RE, Feb.
19, 1824. Niles' Weekly Register. Oct. 13, 1823; "Resolutions
of Town Hall Meeting in Winchester, Virginia," April 5, 1824,
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Ritchie developed an ingenious answer to such claims.
Without the guidance and unity provided by the congressional
caucus, he claimed, the election would undoubtedly be thrown
into the House of Representatives to be decided. A small
group of politicians would then select an executive, rather
than the people. John Wickham saw through this argument when
he wrote sarcastically to Littleton Waller Tazewell that in
Richmond the "opinion is very general that a caucus is
necessary and the Doctrine that the Liberties of the people
are best supported by passive obedience is thought a very
sound one.1,70
The final blow to Crawford's presidential hopes came
from Pennsylvania, where Jackson won the nomination of the
state Republican convention in March 1824. Pennsylvania's
actions changed the complexion of the campaign nationwide.
Jackson gained considerably from it, while Crawford appeared
almost totally discredited. Van Buren and the Junto knew
this, but refused to give up on their nominee. Plans were
made to replace Albert Gallatin, Crawford's vicepresidential nominee, with Henry Clay, in the hopes of
strengthening the ticket in the West.71 These last minute
Broadside, VHS.
70RE, Feb. 12, 1824; Wickham to Tazewell, Jan. 11, 1824,
Tazewell Family Papers, VSL.
71C.W. Gooch to Van Buren, Sept. 14, 1824, P.N. Nicholas
to Van Buren, Oct. 19, 31, 1824, both in Van Buren Papers, LC;
Gales and Seaton to Ritchie, Oct. 17, 1824, Gooch Family
Papers, UVA.
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changes proved to be too little, too late. While Virginia
cast its 24 electoral votes for Crawford, he finished a
distant third behind Jackson and Adams nationally, just high
enough to have his name submitted to the House of
Representatives, where the deadlocked election would be
decided. Amid charges of intrigue and of a "corrupt bargain"
with Clay, John Quincy Adams won the election on the first
ballot early in 1825.72
The rumor that Clay and Adams had struck a bargain to
effect the latter's election in the House outraged
Virginians, and turned many of them against both men. From
Richmond, Andrew Stevenson's young niece wrote him that the
"good people are run mad here about the Presidential
election - I was with some of your great men at Dr.
Brockenbrough's the other night, and found them all
universally denouncing Clay and Adams. They ([Philip] N.
Nicholas, Dr. and Judge B[rockenbrough], [William H.] Roane,
[John] Campbell, etc) said they would take Jackson or any
body now in preference to Adams."73 That the Junto was
contemplating supporting Jackson, even for a moment, showed
the degree of their disenchantment with Adams. By bargaining
with Clay, he had shown his lack of devotion to the
72RE, N o v . 1824-Feb. 1825, passim; Dangerfield, American
Nationalism. 218-230; Remini, Making of the Democratic Party.
72-84.
73B. Coles to Andrew Stevenson, Feb. 3, 1825, Stevenson
Papers, LC; John Campbell to David Campbell, Jan. 28, 1825,
Campbell Family Papers, Duke.
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preservation of republican principles. His subsequent
actions only hardened those feelings among the Junto.

Between 1816 and 1824, the Richmond Junto oversaw the
revival of state rights thought in Virginia. By decrying the
dangers of the centralizing policies of Congress and the
Supreme Court in the years that followed, the group had
succeeded to a large extent in renewing attachments to what
it considered the cardinal principles of republicanism. As
far as its second goal, that of revitalizing the Old
Dominion's role in national politics, was concerned, the
Junto met with mixed results. The union with Van Buren and
New York held promise, despite Crawford's defeat. It was
clear that a new style of politics had emerged during the
campaign, one that differed significantly from the methods
of the past, and one that could not be ignored. To many it
seemed that "Virginia men, and Va. principles and Va.
conduct ... are getting quite out of fashion."74 In order to
continue its struggle, the members of the Junto realized
that they needed to adapt to the changing times without
abandoning their commitment to the "Virginia principles,"
which they continued to see as vital to their continued
well-being. The Junto also realized that it needed to ally
itself with someone capable of inspiring enthusiasm and

74David Watson, Dec. 1824, Miscellaneous Memoranda, 18221829, David Watson Papers, LC.
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unifying the state and the country behind its goals. In 1825
the Junto began scanning the political horizon for the man
who could carry its dreams to fruition.
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Chapter II
"Jackson and Reform": 1825-1828

Among the more intriguing and perplexing tasks
confronting the historian of antebellum Virginia is
explaining why the state strongly supported Andrew Jackson
in 1828 after opposing and even condemning him just four
years earlier. What happened in those years to make Jackson
a more attractive candidate to the Richmond Junto and their
fellow Virginians? Had the issues involved changed
dramatically? Did Old Hickory confess the errors of his way
and hew closer to the strict construction line after 1824?
In their zeal to gain political power, did Virginians
abandon the political principles they claimed to hold
sacred? The answer to these questions can be found by
examining the changing perceptions of Jackson that the Junto
and others articulated during the campaign of 1828. In 1824,
the Junto had branded Jackson as a dangerous and high-handed
military chieftain unfit to rule the nation. But the
nationalistic measures of the Adams administration, coupled
with Jackson's emergence as the leader of a new political
coalition ostensibly based on the doctrines of state rights,
led the clique to reevaluate the General. While Ritchie
73
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still had reservations about Jackson's qualifications for
the office of president, other members of the group came to
support his candidacy with varying degrees of enthusiasm. As
the election neared, however, the Junto dropped all
criticism of Jackson and embraced him openly. It now
described the Hero of New Orleans as the the herald of a new
age of liberty and reform. The Junto, and Virginia,
supported Jackson in the election of 1828 because it
believed that he would restore virtue to the American
government. Henry Lee summed up the sentiment of many voters
in the state when he told Jackson that the "honorable men in
this great republic hope by electing you to preserve our
liberty."1
Some commentators, both contemporary and modern, have
argued that Virginians supported Jackson in 1828 only
reluctantly, viewing him as the lesser of two evils. There
is a certain validity to this claim, and it does explain why
some in the state voted for Jackson. William Pollard's
comment that "I am affraid [sic] whilst I am endeavoring to
get rid of Charybdis I shall fall in with Scylla,"
accurately describes the sentiment of a segment of Virginia
voters.2 Even some of those who convinced themselves to vote
^enry Lee to Andrew Jackson, Sept. 17, 1828, quoted in
Robert Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American
Freedom. 1822-1832 (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 101.
2William Pollard to A.G. Ruffin, March 7, 1827, Wilson
Cary Nicholas Papers, Library of Congress; John Wickham to
Littleton Waller Tazewell, Dec. 17, 1826, Tazewell Family
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for Jackson did so with reservations or stipulations.
Virginia will "do everything she can" to elect Jackson, John
Campbell wrote in November 1827, "but the moment he gets
into any of his tantrums and gets afoul of the Constitution
again, she will most assuredly get afoul of him with all the
force she can muster."3 Despite such ambivalence, the notion
that Virginia voted for Jackson merely because he was the
least objectionable candidate must be discarded as too
simplistic. It fails to take proper measure of the
importance that Virginians attached to their political
philosophy.
The Richmond Junto's role in bringing Jacksonianism to
Virginia has never been fully explored. The group
established itself as the leader of the opposition movement
in the state by late 1825 and was later enormously

Papers, Virginia State Library; Richmond Enquirer (hereafter
cited as RE), Oct. 17, 1826, May 22, 1827; For examples of
scholars who accept this thesis, see Charles H. Ambler, Thomas
Ritchie: A Study in Virginia Politics (Richmond: Bell Book &
Stationary Co., 1913), 106; Katherine Ruth Malone, "The
Virginia Doctrines, The Commonwealth, and the Republic: The
Role of Fundamental Principles in Virginia Politics, 17981833" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1981), 285295. Malone wrote that Virginians accepted Jackson "with
regret rather than enthusiasm" (295).
3John Campbell to David Campbell, Nov. 16, 1827, Campbell
Family Papers (hereafter cited as CFP), Duke University.
Ritchie expressed a similar sentiment in a September, 11,
1827, editorial in the Enquirer. when he wrote that Virginia's
support for Jackson did not "necessarily involve the
obligation to support measures which she cannot approve." It
could be argued that these warnings to Jackson were actually
part of a strategy on the part of Jackson's supporters to
placate those who still distrusted him.
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influential in organizing the Jackson campaign in Virginia.
For much of the campaign, however, the members of the Junto
remained uncertain about Jackson's candidacy. They wanted to
insure that he was pledged to positions compatible with
their own on such matters as the protective tariff and
federally-funded internal improvements. The Junto insisted
that Old Hickory measure up to their state rights standards.
The Junto and its followers were too dedicated to the tenets
of republicanism to cast their votes for a man who had not
earned their respect and admiration, or who did not share
their concerns about the future of the Union. Virginia's
decision to support Crawford in 1824, despite his poor
health and fading hopes of victory, made clear the
importance that Old Dominion voters placed on a candidate's
principles. Expediency was no reason to vote for any man for
any office. What mattered was his commitment to preserving
liberty and his devotion to the Constitution. Had Jackson
failed to measure up to these standards, he would have been
rejected out of hand by the Junto and by Virginia. To earn
the state's vote, Jackson, like any other office-seeker,
would have to pass a test of political orthodoxy.4
Jackson gained the Junto's support in 1828 because he
4John Tyler spoke for many Virginians when he warned
that, "Should he [Jackson] abuse Virginia, by setting at
naught her political sentiments, he will find her at the head
of the opposition, and he will probably experience the fate of
J.Q.A." Tyler to John Rutherfoord, Dec. 8, 1827, Lyon G.
Tyler, The Letters and Times of the Tvlers (3 vols., Richmond:
Whittet and Shepperson, 1884-1896), 1:376-378.
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seemed capable of defeating Adams and returning the federal
government to its original purity. The Junto viewed the
threat to state rights posed by the Adams administration as
so grave that it focused all of its efforts on turning Adams
out of power. Moreover, the group insisted that his
successor be devoted to preserving the liberties of the
people and the rights of the states. Like Jefferson in 1800,
the new president must be dedicated to the fundamental
principles of republicanism. The logic of this argument
drove the Junto to emphasize Jackson's soundness on all of
the issues facing the country: the tariff, internal
improvements, and corruption in the federal government. In
short, the Junto came to portray Jackson as the living
embodiment of the southern state rights philosophy. This
strategy worked marvelously and helped Jackson to capture
69% of the vote in Virginia in 1828.5 But the unrealistic
image of Jackson as the savior of the South inevitably
cracked once he was in office. There was no way that Jackson
could satisfy completely the expectations placed upon him by
the Junto and by other southerners in 1828. Much of the
bitter factionalism of Virginia politics in the 1830s can be
traced to the disillusionment of those who supported Jackson
in 1828, only to see him betray their trust. When, during
the course of his administration, Jackson deviated from the
P

Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Presidential Elections
Since 1789 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1987),
93.
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true state rights course, many Virginians felt not just
disappointment, but betrayal.
The Junto's march toward Jacksonianism between 1825 and
1828 followed three distinct stages. First, the group warned
Virginia voters that the Adams administration presented
dangers to the rights of the states every bit as real and
threatening as those of 1798. Strong action was needed now,
as it had been then, to prevent the overthrow of republican
government. Next, the Junto concluded that Jackson was the
only candidate capable of defeating Adams and reforming the
federal government. It acknowledged Jackson's faults, but
insisted that he was the best hope for success. Having gone
this far, the group then spent the last months of the
campaign reshaping Jackson's image in Virginia. By election
day, the General was not only the defender of liberty and
the agent of reform, but the "new apostle of the South, the
new Jefferson, the new sentinel of southern power and
prerogative in the nation."6 In a time filled with political
corruption and dangerous doctrines, the Junto argued,
Jackson stood ready to defend the rights of the states. Only
he was "capable of seeing the interest of the Southern &
Western people" clearly; only he was free from the
corrupting influence of faction, for "no party

William J. Cooper, Jr., The South and the Politics of
Slavery. 1828-1856 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1978), 7.
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considerations would induce him to support a wrong
measure."7 The Junto succeeded in equating Adams with power,
corruption, and a federal government unbound by the
strictures of the Constitution, and Jackson with liberty,
virtue, and the rights of the states.8 That made the choice
in 1828 obvious.

The bitter and divisive presidential election of 1824
carried within it the seeds of political change at both the
state and national level. The death of the congressional
caucus, the rampant factionalism, and the generally low tone
of the campaign were just three indications that the
political status quo had been shaken, if not toppled. Quite
frankly, the future appeared bleak to many. Unprincipled
faction threatened to destroy the republican experiment.
Elections centered on personalities instead of principles.
Long standing party distinctions had been broken down and
beneficial political alliances torn asunder. John Quincy
Adams, the new president, had won office in a dubious
manner, and he could expect strong opposition from Jackson's
disappointed supporters. The nation found itself facing
another crisis, the Junto argued, and something must be done
7David Campbell to James Campbell, March 29, 1827, CFP,
Duke.
8RE, Oct. 26, Nov. 27, 1827, Sept. 5, 1828; John Campbell
to James Campbell, Dec. 13, 1827, CFP, Duke; John Tyler to
Henry Curtis, Mar. 18, 1828, Tyler, Letters and Times of the
Tylers. 1:383-386.
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to awaken the people to the dangers they faced. "Doctrines
are afloat," Ritchie wrote in early 1825, "which in times
past would have roused up the jealous principles of the
Republican Party."9 But that party now stood in disarray,
unable to guide the country as it had in the past. What was
needed to remedy the situation was a return to the political
distinctions of the past and a reassertion of the primacy of
the "Virginia principles" in political affairs. This was the
strategy Ritchie and the Junto mapped out in 1825 as they
began to evaluate the administration of John Quincy Adams.
The Junto had succeeded in reviving state rights
sentiment in Virginia, and this was the block upon which the
Adams administration stumbled in the state. Adams's and
Clay's perceived deviance from the true principles of
republicanism sparked and sustained opposition to them in
the Old Dominion. Virginians believed that the tenets of
their political faith, best expressed by Jefferson and
Madison in 1798 and 1799, had withstood the test of time and
had served admirably as an unerring compass for the freest
and most perfect nation in the world for half a century.
Since their creed derived from firmly held beliefs about
human nature, it was highly static and slow to accept
change. Virginians could find no reason to alter or abandon
their principles simply because the country had grown or

9RE, Jan. 6, 1825.
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times had changed.10 "Grant, that Virginia differs from most
of her sister states, as to the interpretation of the
constitution," Ritchie wrote in 1825. "Does this difference
prove that Virginia is in the wrong? Is the constitution a
nose of wax? Its words are the same as in 1789."n Human
nature had not evolved, nor had the forces of good triumphed
over the forces of evil. Power and liberty still existed in
inverse proportion to each other, power still corrupted,
patriotic opposition was still necessary and noble, and the
surest way to maintain political purity was still through a
"frequent recurrence to fundamental principles." Devotion to
liberty, to virtue, to the faith of their fathers, dictated
the course that true patriots must follow. "Obsta
principiis ," Ritchie proclaimed from the pages of the

Enquirer. and a great number of his fellow Virginians agreed
heartily.12
When Ritchie and the Junto applied their standards to
the Adams administration, they found it severely wanting,
and the new government came under immediate attack in
Virginia. The notion that Henry Clay had plotted with Adams
to elevate him to power proved impossible to shake in the
10Malone, "The Virginia Doctrines," 278-295.
nRE, Jan. 20, 1825.
12Ritchie used the phrase repeatedly in the Enquirer.
Junto member Andrew Stevenson told James Barbour that
"Principles and not men, has heretofore and will continue to
be my motto." Stevenson to Barbour, March 28, 1825, Barbour
Family Papers, University of Virginia.
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state, handicapping the administration from the start.13
The Junto viewed Clay and Adams's machinations as a clear
sign that the liberties of the people were being subverted
by politicians bent on personal gain. Such an
administration, founded in corruption, would surely continue
to ignore constitutional restraints and could never be
trusted. "I care not what principles regulate Mr. Adams's
and Mr. Clay's administration,” one disgusted observer
pronounced. ”1 care not how they conduct themselves in
future. It is enough for me to know, that it is an illgotten administration, 'begotten in sin, and brought forth

in iniquity'."14 Charges of a "corrupt bargain" marked the
beginning of an assault on Adams and Clay that intensified
in the years ahead.
Adams's Inaugural Address in March of 1825 increased
Virginia's displeasure with the new administration.15
Ritchie dissected the oration carefully before announcing

13Richmond Constitutional Whig (also known simply as the
Richmond Whig). Feb. 1, March 29, April 1, 8, 1825; RE, March
11, 22, April 12, 1825. In July and August of 1827, at the
height of the campaign, Ritchie dragged out the "corrupt
bargain" question again. The Junto's hatred of Clay outmatched
their dislike of Adams.
14"0ne From the East," RE, May 10, 1825. In a similar
vein, David Campbell told his brother that Adams's association
with Clay "injured him greatly in this State. Indeed we view
it as a corrupt one tho it may not be." David Campbell to
James Campbell, Oct. 22, 1826, CFP, Duke,
15James D. Richardson, ed. and comp., A Compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 1789-1897 (10 vols.,
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896-1899), 2:292-299.
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that the Chief Executive's loose construction of the
Constitution represented "no very agreeable prognostic of
the course which we, Virginians, are to anticipate from the
present administration.11 Adams hoped to "build up a
magnificent and splendid national government, upon the ruins
of the Constitution." The Old Dominion must continue its
struggle against the pernicious "doctrine of the general
welfare," Ritchie concluded. "The crisis is a serious one,
and calls for all our vigilance and all our energy."16 From
the state capital, John Campbell wrote to James Barbour in
Washington about the address. Federalist Richmond applauded
Adams's remarks, but "his views relative to the powers of
Congress in making internal improvement are altogether at
war with the doctrines of V[irgini]a." A short time later,
Andrew Stevenson wrote Barbour suggesting he decline a
cabinet position in the new administration. Ritchie and
other party leaders objected to him accepting, the
congressman implied, because they hoped to evaluate the
administration impartially. Barbour's presence in the
cabinet would hinder that. In fact, Stevenson's letter made
clear the Junto's disapproval of Adams.17
William Branch Giles and John Randolph, two Old
Republicans with ties to the Junto, attacked the president
16RE, March 8, 11, 1825.
17John Campbell to James Barbour, March 8, 1825, CFP,
Duke; Andrew Stevenson to Barbour, March 28, 1825, Barbour
Family Papers, UVA.
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more forcefully. Giles insisted that Adams's "entire
destitution of republican principles" and "blind sublimated
ungovernable ambition" made him especially dangerous. His
administration must be stopped before it did irreparable
damage to the edifice of liberty. The people gave the
government its power, Giles announced boldly, and they can
take it away. Randolph, ever full of venom, rarely missed a
chance to assail Adams and Clay and flatly stated his desire
to pull down the administration. Less than a month into his
term of office, Adams had already provoked opposition and
earned the enmity of some of Virginia's leading
politicians.18
The situation worsened considerably for the president
as the year ended. Barbour ignored Stevenson's and Ritchie's
advice and became Adams's Secretary of War, thereby vacating
his Senate seat.19 As the Virginia General Assembly prepared
to designate a replacement, the Enquirer was filled with
letters and editorials urging the legislature to select a
true republican to fight against the administration in
18William Branch Giles, "Political Disquisitions #3,"
March 25, 1825, in Political Miscellanies (Richmond, 1829).
Randolph's "Blifel and Black George" speech, delivered in the
Senate on March 30, 1826, was typical of the stridency of his
attacks on the administration. Virginia's other senator at the
time, Norfolk lawyer Littleton Waller Tazewell, was also an
early and outspoken opponent of Adams. Norma Lois Peterson,
Littleton Waller Tazewell (Charlottesville: University of
Virginia Press, 1983), 148.
19Charles D. Lowery, James Barbour. A Jeffersonian
Republican (University, Al: University of Alabama Press,
1984), 151-152.
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Washington. Commentators typically pointed out that the
"general welfare" clause of Article 1, Section 8 of the
Constitution was being used to usurp the powers of the
states. Under Adams, "Fabricius" warned his readers, "this
is no longer to be a confederative republic, but a great
consolidated empire. A reference to constitutional limits is
laughed to scorn. Expediency is the order ofthe day___

If

not resisted, the general government will becomeeverything
and the state nothing." Other analysts agreed and joined in
calling for their representatives to appoint a senator who
would "support the old Virginia Doctrines ofthe
constitution.1,20 The Legislature responded by selecting John
Randolph of Roanoke, that Argus-eyed protector of liberty,
to the post.21
Given the hostile atmosphere in Virginia toward the
Adams administration, it is not surprising that Adams's
nationalistic message to Congress on December 6, 1825 set

20,1Fabricius," RE, Nov. 8, 1825; RE, Oct. 28, 1825. See
also "Mutius," RE, Nov. 18, 1825; James Trezvant to William H.
Brodnax, Dec. 10, 1825, William H. Brodnax Letters, Virginia
Historical Society; Claiborne W. Gooch to Thomas Jefferson,
Dec. 31, 1825, Gooch Family Papers, VHS.
2lRandolph outpolled Giles (who had the support of the
Junto, but was even less popular than Randolph), John Floyd,
and Henry St. George Tucker, a popular western lawyer and
Randolph's step-brother. Lynchburg Virginian. Nov. 17, 1825;
Dice Robins Anderson, William Branch Giles: A Study in the
Politics of Virginia and the Nation from 1790 to 1830
(Menasha, WI: George Banta Publishing Co., 1914), 218. Doubts
about Tucker's orthodoxy on the internal improvement question
kept him from receiving the office. See John Campbell to David
Campbell, Jan. 19, 1826, CFP, Duke.
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off fireworks in the state. Ritchie condemned Adams's
commitment to expand the powers of the federal government,
ridiculed his plans to build "lighthouses of the skies," and
mused rhetorically, "are we really reading a state-paper, or
a school-boy's thesis?"22 In a similarly wry but revealing
comment, "Common Sense" quipped that "it was observed, by
one present, that he had heard a great deal of the
violations of the constitution committed by 'General
Jackson;' but from what he now heard , 'General Welfare' beat
him, all hollow, in the number of his violations ." At the

Fourth of July celebrations in Richmond that year, Ritchie
toasted "'Sky-light' Politicians; May those who dare to soar
'sky-high' beyond the Constitution of their Country, be
dashed, like Phaeton to the earth."23
Jesting aside, Virginians found much in Adams's message
to justify their apprehensions about the course of his
administration. The president's interpretation of the
Constitution and some of his statements, particularly his
comment that elected officials should not be "palsied by the
wills of their constituents," and his remark that "Liberty
is power," deeply troubled Virginians grounded in the
22RE, Dec. 8, 1825. Pleasants mocked Ritchie in the Dec.
9, 1825 issue of the Richmond Constitutional Whig: "There is
but one way in which Mr. Adams can hope to write a perfect
message, and that is, by first consulting Thomas Ritchie, Esq.
Let Mr. Ritchie furnish the ideas, and Mr. Adams add the last
polish, and then we shall have a great Message."
23"Common Sense," RE, Dec. 18, 1825; Constitutional Whig.
July 7, 1826.
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republican creed of their fathers.24 Representatives not
responsive to the voters? A central government with
enormously expanded powers? Nothing could alarm Virginians
more. The president's plans smacked distinctly of despotism.
To show the state's concern with the doctrines set forth in
Adams's message, the Virginia General Assembly passed
resolutions condemning a general system of internal
improvements and protective tariffs as violations of the
Constitution.25 "Rapid strides are making towards the
consolidation of all powers in the hands of that [federal]
government," Claiborne W. Gooch informed Thomas Jefferson
shortly after Adams's Message, "and it is feared that when
that consolidation takes place, the day will not be distant
when the liberties of the people will be subverted." Ritchie
was not alone in claiming that his opposition to the
administration dated from the delivery of Adams's first
message.26
The president's supporters responded swiftly to these
24Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents.
2, 299-317. Both Pleasants and Hezekiah Niles scrambled to
explain the president's quotes. See Constitutional Whig. Jan.
6, 1826, and Niles' Weekly Register. Jan. 14, 1826.
“The legislators used the language of the Virginia
Resolutions of 1798 in the preamble to the resolutions.
Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of
Virginia —
1825 (Richmond: Thomas Ritchie, 1825). Niles
thought the resolutions were passed solely for political
effect. Niles' Weekly Register. March 18, 1826.
26Gooch to Jefferson, Dec. 31, 1825, Gooch Family Papers,
VHS (photocopy); RE, June 1, 1827; Ambler, Thomas Ritchie.
101-102.
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early attacks upon his administration. In the Richmond
Constitutional Whig, the Lynchburg Virginian, and Niles'
Weekly Register, editors and essayists explained Adams's
policies, denied their unconstitutionality, and argued that
an unnatural coalition had formed with the sole and avowed
purpose of opposing every measure of the administration.
"The Crawford party," John Hampden Pleasants announced in
March of 1825, "are seeking at this moment, to rally an
opposition to Mr. Adams's administration ...," and the
Jacksonians, "that party who have no opinions," have joined
them. "It is an unprincipled opposition on all hands."
Ritchie was the ringleader, Pleasants noted, and had
secretly supported Jackson all along. Only the General's
unpopularity in Virginia prevented the Junto leader from
admitting this in public.27
The Virginian dragged out charges about the Junto
again, claiming Ritchie and his cronies (Giles received
special attention) were out to topple Adams any way they
could. "With unlimited talents and a paper of extensive
circulation to convey their opinions, the members of the
Richmond Junto issue their orders with all the hauteur of a
Roman Pontiff and the people obey with unresisting
servility." The Junto was the true subverter of liberty, the

^Constitutional Whig. Feb. 1, March 15, March 25, 1825.
Pleasants repeated these charges frequently throughout 1825
and 1826.
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editor concluded, not the Adams administration.28 Hezekiah
Niles, an old foe of Ritchie and the Junto, condemned its
attacks on Adams and chastised the group for "whipping-up an
opposition about something - any thing." The Baltimore
editor also jabbed at Giles and Randolph for being
doomsayers and for never suggesting solutions to the
problems they ranted about. He then defended vigorously
Adams and his Message.29
The composition and tactics of both the supporters and
detractors of the administration had begun to take form by
the end of 1825. The president's adherents denied all
allegations of wrongdoing and claimed an unprincipled
coalition of disgruntled politicians intended to derail the
administration's plans for fostering national growth and
harmony. The opposition, which the Junto and much of
Virginia had slipped into by year's end, castigated Adams
severely for discarding fundamental republican axioms and
for abusing the privileges of office. The administration,
born of corruption, was unquestionably jeopardizing the
liberties of the nation. James Trezvant summed up the
concerns and goals of the opposition as Adams's second year
began. "I fear the worst - yet I hope there is a redeeming
spirit in the virtue of the people which will ultimately
produce a reaction in public sentiment, and bring us back to
28Lynchburg Virginian. Nov. 17, Dec. 5, 1825.
29Niles' Weekly Register. Dec. 17, 31, 1825.
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the wholesome and sound constitutional doctrines from which
we have been certainly tho' gradually departing ever since
the end of Jefferson's administration.1,30 The message was
clear, but who was to be the messenger?
Ritchie and his circle judged the administration's
actions against the yardstick of their political principles.
Federally funded internal improvements, however beneficial,
stretched the powers of the central government beyond their
constitutional limitations. A protective tariff was not only
unconstitutional, but injudicious and immoral as well.
Executive patronage was inherently dangerous, because it
reposed excessive power in the one branch of government most
likely to abuse it. These conclusions flowed logically from
the ideology of state rights and strict construction. To
deny their validity or to forsake them for political
expediency constituted a repudiation of everything that they
held sacred.
Not all Virginians joined with the Junto in demanding
adherence to the "Principles of '98." Some chafed under the
yoke of the ideological constraints of the state rights
school. They denounced as antiquated the doctrines of strict
construction. Jefferson's and Madison's fears of a
consolidated federal government may have been well founded
in 1800, but that crisis had long passed. America had
30James Trezvant to William H. Brodnax, Feb. 8, 1826,
Brodnax Letters, VHS; Remini, Course of American Freedom. 1DO115.
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changed, and ideas must change to suit the realities of the
day. The country had different problems to solve in 1825
than it did in 1800, and the old interpretations and
solutions were no longer acceptable.31
Proponents of these conflicting ideologies clashed
repeatedly during the campaign of 1828 over nearly every
subject, including whom to support for the presidency.
Nowhere was the debate sharper than on the questions of
tariffs and internal improvements. The positions of Adams
and Jackson on these issues shaped the response of
Virginians to their respective candidacies. Debate in
Virginia on the protective tariff system and federallyfunded internal improvements centered not so much on the
economic dimensions of these issues, but on the ideological
aspects. Adams's opponents, including the Junto, argued that
both of these policies were not only unconstitutional, but
detrimental to the health of a republican government as
well.
As Virginians assessed the Adams administration and
began discussing the upcoming election, they came to focus
quickly on some old concerns. Debate over the
constitutionality of a protective tariff stretched back at
least to 1816, and Ritchie was an early and outspoken foe of

31In his study of James Barbour, Charles D. Lowery
describes this desire "to transcend the limits of ... rural
Virginia culture and to respond positively to complex national
needs." Lowery, James Barbour. 106.
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the principle of protection. Other Virginians joined the
fight against high tariffs when rates were increased
substantially in 1824. The tariff, however, received little
attention in the campaign of 1828 until Daniel Webster
introduced a bill to raise rates on imported woolens in
1827. While the bill never passed, it did increase anxiety
in Virginia and the South about the issue and the upcoming
revision of the tariff schedule in 1828.32 The Virginia
General Assembly was so concerned that they passed
resolutions, penned by Giles, that denounced the protective
tariff as "the most despotic and dangerous power that can be
exercised by government in any form. It places the
occupation and property of every man, under the control of
the government, and thus converts the citizen into the
slave, the natural man into a governmental machine."33 While
Giles's bellicose views foreshadowed the position taken by
South Carolina in the Nullification Crisis, they did not
reflect the prevailing sentiment of Virginia or the region
at the time.
Ritchie, attempting to keep relations with Pennsylvania
and New York on a friendly basis, assured his northern

32Robert Remini, Martin Van Buren and the Making of the
Democratic Party (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959),
134-135; Robert Remini, The Election of Andrew Jackson
(Philadelphia and New York: J.B. Lippencott Company, 1963),
143-148.
33The Virginia Resolutions of 1827, reprinted in Niles'
Weekly Register. April 21, 1827.
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friends that Giles did not speak for Virginia.34 The Old
Dominion did doubt the expediency, even the
constitutionality, of a protective tariff scheme, but Giles
had been excessive in his condemnation. Ritchie noted,
however, that Adams's approval of high tariffs made him
unpopular in Virginia, and he asked his northern
correspondents if they were familiar with Jackson's views on
this issue. Could they assure Virginia that the General was
opposed to the principle of a protective tariff? Such a
statement would go far toward convincing Virginians to
support Jackson's candidacy. While Ritchie waited for
Jackson's supporters to explain his views on the tariff
question, other Virginians were reporting that Jackson
opposed "prohibitory duties" and favored only "fair +
moderate protection" that would allow American manufacturers
to compete in the world market.35 Ritchie and the Junto
remained unconvinced. They realized that Jackson was
especially vulnerable on this question. If he came out
strongly in favor of protection, he would be lauded in
Pennsylvania but scolded in the South. If he spoke out
against the tariff, his northern supporters might abandon
him. Littleton Waller Tazewell and others who supported
Jackson understood the delicacy of the situation and warned

^Ambler, Ritchie. 113.
35William Cabell Rives to Thomas W. Gilmer, July 22, 1827,
William Cabell Rives Papers, LC.
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that Jackson's election in Virginia would be endangered if
he took a strong stance in favor of the tariff.36
Ritchie attempted to contain discussion on the tariff
question throughout most of the campaign. He continued to
placate his northern friends on the matter throughout 1827
and early 1828, even admitting at one point the
constitutionality of the tariff system. To Van Buren he
confided his concerns about the impact of the debate on
Jackson's candidacy in the South. Ritchie assured the New
Yorker that he was endeavoring to divert attention away from
the topic in his paper.37 But the debate on the "Tariff of
Abominations" in the summer of 1828 changed Ritchie's
response to the subject. He now joined the chorus of
Southerners who spoke out against "this vexatious measure,
which is at war with the spirit of the Constitution, as well
as the spirit of the age ...; this oppressive measure, which
operates so unequally and partially upon the different parts
of our country." The emerging Jacksonian coalition must work
to end this injustice, Ritchie argued, and on this matter
Virginia's devotion to the strict construction philosophy
and to the South would take precedence over party harmony

36Tazewell to Giles, June 26, 1828, M.S., UVA; John Floyd
to Sam Houston, March 15, 1828, Andrew Jackson Papers, LC;
Richard E. Parker to Tazewell, May 4, 1828, Tazewell Family
Papers, VSL.
37RE, N o v . 16, 1827; Ritchie to Van Buren, March 11, 1828,
Martin Van Buren Papers, LC.
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and unity.38
A second major battle in the campaign of 1828 involved
the question of internal improvements. In his first annual
address, Adams had outlined an ambitious blueprint for a
national system of canals, roads, turnpikes, and bridges
that would facilitate commerce and communication between the
various regions of the country, thereby drawing them closer
together. Regional prejudices and tensions would be set
aside as the farmer of the west joined hands with the
merchants and manufacturers of the east and north in
economic union. The federal government's function, Adams
reckoned, was to provide the resources needed to bring about
such a marriage. Like other loose constructionists, the
president hinged his scheme on the "general welfare" clause
of the Constitution, which gave Congress powers to provide
for the well-being of the nation. Besides, the president
argued, these improvements were badly needed, and the people
overwhelmingly favored them.39
Strict constructionists, however, argued forcefully
that the Founding Fathers never intended their words to have
such elasticity. After all, virtually any project could fall
under the rubric of providing for the general welfare. The
Constitution clearly placed limitations upon the federal
38RE, June 6, Aug. 5, 1828; Remini, Election of Jackson.
171-180.
39Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of Presidents.
2:299-317.
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government's powers and reserved others to the states. The
"power to make internal improvements" was an "original
substantive" power that could not be "assumed by the general
government." Granting Congress such power "would not only
destroy all the demarkations of power between the state and
general governments grounded upon principles of locality,
and generality; but would be consolidation in its
essence."40 Further, a program of federally funded
improvements would undoubtedly lead to corruption and the
abuse of power. Projects would always favor one section at
the expense of others. Taxes would be collected from honest
citizens to pay for improvements that might never benefit
them, or worse yet, might injure them economically. Such
unjust and unconstitutional measures must not be allowed to
come to fruition, regardless of how popular they were.41
Troubled by this issue, Ritchie wrote to Madison and
asked if Adams's plans for internal improvement did not
represent an assumption of powers by the federal government
similar to the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts in
1798. Ritchie knew that "old Virginia herself is divided
40The Virginia Resolutions of 1827, reprinted in Niles'
Weekly Register. April 21, 1827.
41RE, N o v . 8, Dec. 8, 1825, Feb. 18, 1826. Once again, it
should be pointed out that even the most doctrinaire
Virginians had no problem with state financed improvements.
The Enquirer was filled with proposals and calls for actions
on such projects. See April 12, 15, 19, 26, 1825; Jan. 12,
Feb. 23, March 7, June 6, 1826, etc. In July of 1828, a
convention met in Charlottesville to discuss internal
improvements.
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upon this subject," but suggested that a constitutional
amendment denying Congress power to fund internal
improvements would resolve the dispute once and for all.
Ritchie clearly hoped to link the younger Adams's actions
with those of his father in the hopes of discrediting his
administration. If he could get the father of the
Constitution to acknowledge the similarities between 1798
and 1825, Adams's fate in Virginia would be sealed.42
Madison's carefully worded reply failed to provide the
ammunition the editor had hoped for. While Madison admitted
concerns about the recent "license of construction which has
been applied to the Constitution," he refused to compare the
Alien and Sedition Acts with John Quincy Adams's message to
Congress. Madison lectured Ritchie on distinguishing between
a government assuming power against the will of its
constituents, which was the case in 1798, and the
"assumption by the Constituent Body through the Government
as the organ of its will," which the current call of the
people for internal improvements represented. The citizens
of the republic, he argued, possessed the absolute right to
shape the federal government's actions. Therefore, Madison
concluded, the best way to address the issues of the day was
for the people to instruct their representatives in

42Ritchie to Madison, Dec. 10, 1825, Madison-Todd Papers,
UVA.
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Washington rather than to propose constitutional
amendments.43
The exchange between Madison and Ritchie revealed more
than their respective positions on the internal improvement
question. Ritchie's letter underscored his devotion to a
theoretical political philosophy that many of his generation
accepted implicitly. Madison's response confirmed the
evolution of his political thought and his desire to stay in
touch with the sentiments and aspirations of his countrymen.
Democracy was fluid, evershifting, Madison maintained, and
ideological rigidity stunted the progress of liberty. In
this instance, the words of the disciples no longer matched
the ideas of the master.44
If Madison's reply disappointed Ritchie, it did not
slow down his assault on the administration or stop him and
his fellow Virginians from comparing the younger Adams with
the elder. The tenacious editor warned his readers
repeatedly that the Constitution was "again exposed to the
most serious dangers." Heretical doctrines were espoused
that threatened to hurl the country into the "gulf of
consolidation," and all true republicans knew that "the next
43Madison to Ritchie, Dec. 18, 1825, James Madison Papers,
LC. Apparently, Van Buren asked Madison the same question, and
Madison made the same distinction and suggestions to him in a
letter dated Sept. 20, 1826, Madison Papers, LC.
^For a first-rate treatment of Madison's maturation as a
political theoretician, see Drew McCoy, The Last on the
Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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step to consolidation, is Monarchy in some of its forms."45
John Campbell, a Junto intimate, thought that Adams's
"latitudinarian doctrines have gone far ahead of even Alex.
Hamilton," and added his voice to those calling for an end
to the "mad and ambitious schemes" of the administration and
its "infatuated partizans." Others agreed with Campbell, and
Ritchie announced with confidence in the summer of 1826 that
"no administration ever lost strength throughout Virginia,
so completely, as the present one since its commencement."
Virginians were so bitter about Adams's actions, Ritchie
insisted, that he could never expect the state to support
his administration.46
Astute observers from across the state agreed with
Ritchie's analysis. Adams's support continued to fall in the
Old Dominion. The question now concerned who the state would
support in the upcoming presidential contest. Western
Virginia seemed committed to Jackson already, and a general
consensus existed by late 1826 that most of Crawford's

45RE, Feb. 23, 1826; see also RE, Mar. 2, 24, April 26,
1826. In the June 16, 1826 issue, Ritchie noted that he had
received correspondence from across the state comparing J.Q.
Adams's administration with that of John Adams.
46John Campbell to James Campbell, April 8, 1826, CFP,
Duke; RE, June 13, 1826. For other examples of this sentiment,
see James Trezvant to William H. Brodnax, Dec. 10, 1825,
Brodnax Letters, VHS; William H. Roane to Van Buren, April 23,
1826, Harrison Family Papers, VHS.
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supporters now backed the Hero of New Orleans.47 One of
Jackson's correspondents notified him that "Virginia is
changing fast, the Western part of the State was always
disposed to support you, and in the Eastern section of the
State a change is gradually taking place."48 But other
voters remained undecided. Richmond lawyer Benjamin Watkins
Leigh described the growing, but still tenuous, support for
Jackson in a letter to Henry Lee. "I begin to apprehend,
that the vote of Virginia will be given to Gen. Jackson ...,
tho the public feeling is not yet by any means decided. The
most zealous men of the old Jefferson party are for him -

and I believe would be for any body - against John 0 .1,49
Leigh's comments about Jackson's supporters accurately
reflected the state of sentiment as it existed in the summer
of 1826. The Junto had moved much more decisively into the
General's ranks, however, by early 1827. A key reason for
this shift was Van Buren's efforts to add the Junto to the
Jackson coalition. This required assurances that Jackson
47John Campbell to James Campbell, April 8, 1826; David
Campbell to James Campbell, July 3, 1826, both in CFP, Duke;
John Wickham to Tazewell, Dec. 17, 1826, Tazewell Family
Papers, VSL; Sam Houston to Andrew Jackson, Jan. 5, 1827, in
John Spencer Bassett, ed. Correspondence of Andrew Jackson (7
vols. Washington: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 19261935), 3:330-331.
48Arthur P. Hayne to Jackson, July 20, 1826, Bassett, ed.,
Correspondence of Jackson. 3:306-307.
49Benjamin Watkins Leigh to Henry Lee, July 30, 1826,
Benjamin Watkins Leigh Papers, VHS; emphasis mine. Leigh
despised both Adams and Jackson, and had no reason to
misrepresent the political climate in the capital.
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accepted the "Virginia doctrines," which the Little Magician
quickly gave. Although historians usually credit the New
Yorker with bringing Virginia into the Jackson fold,
evidence exists to prove that the Junto sought out Van Buren
as a source of information and possible collaboration.50
Communication between Van Buren and the Junto had
lapsed after Adams's election, as both parties turned to
other matters. Van Buren, back in control of New York,
returned to the national stage, and set about creating a
coalition to drive Adams from office. Sometime in 1826, the
New Yorker settled on Jackson as his candidate. He then
talked with John Calhoun, Adams's Vice President, about
joining forces on Jackson's behalf. Calhoun had already made
overtures to the General, and agreed to work with Van Buren
as well. The New Yorker promised to discuss matters with the
Richmond Junto in the hopes of enticing it to join the
coalition as well.51
The Junto had, in fact, already made tentative gestures
toward Van Buren. William Roane, son of Spencer Roane, wrote
to the Little Magician early in 1826 to praise the speech he
had made on the Panama Mission. Adams had appointed
commissioners to attend a conference in Panama without first
50Remini, Making of Democratic Party. 118-129; Donald B.
Cole, Martin Van Buren and the American Political System
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 116-159; John
Niven, Martin Van Buren: The Romantic Age of American Politics
(New York: Oxford, 1983), 156-214.
5lRemini, Making of Democratic Party. 123-146.
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securing the approval of Congress, thereby leaving himself
open to charges of abusing his presidential powers. Van
Buren, back in Congress, joined Randolph and Tazewell in
denouncing the president's actions.52 Roane thought that the
New Yorker's speech made perfectly clear the dangerous
actions of the administration. The Junto member then
informed Van Buren of the widespread opposition to Adams in
Virginia, and the common fear that the administration was
"breaking down the best principles + changing the ancient +
established usages of the govt." Roane closed by expressing
his support of Van Buren's "efforts to retract the govmt to
its original + true principles."53
Having thus established, or rather reestablished,
communication with Van Buren, the Junto grew bolder. Philip
Norborne Nicholas, brother of Wilson Cary Nicholas, penned
the New Yorker a letter in October of 1826 detailing the
clique's ambivalence about Jackson and hinting at its desire
for reliable information about him. After asking Van Buren
to explain New York politics, Nicholas informed him that
Virginians opposed Adams strongly, but remained undecided
about who to run against him. Jackson, who "was not the
favorite originally of V[irgini]a," had picked up

52Peterson, Tazewell. 126-132.
53Roane to Van Buren, April 23, 1826, Harrison Family
Papers, VHS. Ritchie spoke out repeatedly against the Panama
Mission in the Enquirer in late March and early April of 1826.
In the April 11 issue, Ritchie praised Van Buren's speech.
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supporters, although "there are many with us who I think
carry their hostility to him to quite an unreasonable
length." With more information about the General's views and
about developments in New York and Pennsylvania, perhaps
Jackson's prospects would improve in Virginia. Nicholas then
went to the heart of the matter. "We are so little informed
in the views of those with whom we would cooperate in other
states. There are surely some of us discreet enough to be
confided in."54 The cards were on the table. Nicholas was
suggesting to Van Buren that the Junto join his coalition to
oust Adams.
Van Buren's reply began with a lengthy exposition on
the "inexplicable" state of political affairs in New York.
He traced party developments in the state from the days of
Burr and Hamilton, carefully pointing out that his party "is
now + has been throughout the same old Republican party
which secured the election of Mr. Jefferson." The New Yorker
then abruptly changed the subject to a discussion of
Jackson's prospects in 1828. "If Gen. Jackson and his
friends will put his election on old party grounds," the
Little Magician claimed, "preserve the old systems, avoid if
not condemn the practices of the last campaign[,] we can by
adding his personal popularity to the yet remaining force of
old party feeling, not only succeed in electing him but our

^Nicholas to Van Buren, Oct. 13, 1826, Van Buren Papers,
LC.
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success when achieved will be worth something." Van Buren
seemed to be revealing his blueprint for the upcoming
election, but Nicholas and the Junto remained unclear about
what role they were to have in it.55
Two developments in January of 1827 clarified matters
and strengthened the Junto's commitment to Jackson. John
Randolph, having served the remainder of Barbour's Senate
term, stood for reelection. Randolph's intemperate actions
in Washington and his role as "Van Buren's stalking horse
for Jackson in the Old Dominion" sparked a movement in the
legislature to have him replaced by John Tyler, a moderate
who opposed Adams but who had not yet endorsed the Hero.56
Ritchie and the Junto backed Randolph strongly. They knew
that Tyler, who had defended Clay against the "corrupt
bargain" charges, had the support of the administration men
in Virginia. The senatorial election quickly became a hotly
disputed topic in the state and attracted attention
nationwide.57 Tyler's forces claimed that Randolph's only
support came from the oligarchic Junto, the "parents of the
factious opposition to the administration." They also

55Van Buren to Nicholas, Nov. 1, 1826, Van Buren Papers,
LC.
56John Niven, Van Buren. 181; John Y. Mason to William H.
Brodnax, March 4, 1827, M.S., VSL; "Barre," Constitutional
Whig, Jan. 2, 1827, Jan. 26, 1827.
57The Enquirer and Constitutional Whig were filled with
editorials and essays about the election in late December,
1826 and early January, 1827.
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highlighted Randolph's eccentricities to discredit further
his candidacy. Despite these tactics and the feeling that
Adams's friends in Virginia were attempting to divide the
Republicans of the state by turning out Randolph, the Junto
remained confident that its man would triumph.58
Tyler's subsequent victory, then, left the group
stunned and "deeply mortified." The administration presses
claimed that the opposition and the Junto had suffered a
mortal wound.59 Randolph's defeat did represent a setback
for the anti-administration forces in Virginia, but not a
crippling one. Randolph himself considered the defeat more
of a personal insult than anything else. He had confided to
his close friend and Junto member John Brockenbrough that if
he were not reelected, he would assume it was because the
state considered him unfit for the office. When notified of
his defeat, Randolph asked Brockenbrough, "Why is it that
our system has a uniform tendency to bring forward low and
little men, to the exclusion of the more worthy?" After
reflecting upon the matter, Randolph grew less bitter and

58Benjamin Watkins Leigh to Littleton Waller Tazewell,
Jan. 24, 1827, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL (Leigh was quoting
from a speech given by Samuel Moore of Rockbridge in the
Assembly);
Con stitut iona1
Wh iq. Jan.
1827,
passim;
"Virginius,11 RE, Jan. 4, 1827; Sam Houston wrote Jackson that
"Times have been squally as Richmond, but his friends here say
he [Randolph] will be elected easily." Houston to Jackson,
Jan. 5, 1827, Bassett, ed., Correspondence of Jackson. 3:330331.
59Benjamin Estill to David Campbell, Jan. 24, 1827, CFP,
Duke; "Timon," Constitutional Whig. Feb. 20, 1827.
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decided that "nothing then, remains but a calm and dignified
submission to the disgrace that has been put upon me."60
While one observer claimed that the election results threw
Ritchie "into hystericks," the editor quickly assured his
readers that no significant damage had been inflicted. Since
Tyler opposed the administration and was a true friend of
state rights, there was no need for concern.61
Just a few days after Randolph's defeat, Ritchie
received a long letter from Van Buren that removed all
doubts as to the role the Junto would play in the upcoming
campaign. The professed purpose of the epistle was to gain
the Junto's support for a scheme Van Buren had proposed to
restructure the Republican Party's national convention, but
the New Yorker ranged far beyond that. With uncharacteristic
candor, Van Buren suggested to Ritchie that the "planters of
the South and the plain Republicans of the north" unite in
the "substantial reorganization of the Old Republican
party." Jackson would serve as their leader and Van Buren's
general convention scheme would be the means by which unity
and victory would be achieved.
Van Buren explained the reasoning behind his plan in a

^E,
Jan. 16, 20, 1827; John Randolph to John
Brockenbrough, Aug. 8, Oct. 13, 1826; Jan. 13, 19, 1827,
Kenneth Shorey, ed., Collected Letters of John Randolph to Dr.
John Brockenbrough, 1812-1833 (New Brunswick: Transition
Press, 1988), 82-84.
61Benjamin Estill to David Campbell, Jan. 24, 1827, CFP,
Duke; RE, Jan. 16, 1827.
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fashion well calculated to impress the Junto. The breakdown
of the old party system, hastened by Monroe's "amalgamating
policy," had revived local and regional prejudices long
considered dormant. Factionalism and corruption ensued. To
correct this, the "old party distinctions" must again be
raised and maintained.. "We must always have party
distinctions and the old ones are the best." Furthermore,
"political combinations between the inhabitants of the
different states are unavoidable ..., and the most natural
and beneficial to the country is that between the planters
of the South and the plain Republicans of the north."62
The engine driving this "political combination" would
be the ideology of Jeffersonian Republicanism, and the
popular Jackson would serve as engineer. Van Buren told
Ritchie that he had "long been satisfied that we can only
get rid of the present, + restore a better state of things,
by combining Genl Jackson's personal popularity with the
portion of old party feeling yet remaining." The device of a
general convention would help bring such a goal to fruition.
Because it was "more in unison with the spirit of the times,
especially at the seat of the war Pennsylvania + N. York," a
convention would lend respectability to the campaign. It
would also bring together Republicans from all regions and,
by drawing "anew the old Party lines," unite them behind

62Van Buren to Ritchie, Jan. 13, 1827 (copy), Van Buren
Papers, LC.
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common principles. Next, Van Buren discussed how a
nomination from a national convention committed to a
specific platform would strengthen Jackson's campaign. "His
election, as the result of his military services without
reference to party + ... principle, would be one thing. His
election as the result of a combined and concerted effort of
a political party, holding in the main, to certain tenets +
opposed to certain prevailing principles, might be another
and a far different thing."63
The New Yorker closed his letter by shamelessly
praising Ritchie for his indispensable services in the name
of liberty. In case the Junto leader missed the point, Van
Buren informed him that "there is not another man in the
Union [who] can render as much service to the cause in which
we are engaged as yourself." The Little Magician's words
must have warmed the hearts of Ritchie and the Junto. A
national party grounded in the "Virginia doctrines" was a
longstanding goal of the group, and now it seemed on the
verge of realization.64
Van Buren's proposition and kind words stiffened
Ritchie's wavering commitment to Jackson. The editor had
been more reluctant than others in the Junto to embrace Old
Hickory, and he continued to worry about the General's
ability to hold high public office. Ritchie began to comment
63Ibid.
‘“ibid.
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more favorably on Jackson in the Enquirer. however, soon
after receiving Van Buren's communication. The first reports
of pro-Jackson meetings in Virginia appeared in his paper on
February 20, 1827, when the citizens of Fredericksburg
praised Jackson as the "'great republican leader under whose
auspices the constitution may be restored to its
supremacy.'" On March 1, 1827, Ritchie noted for the first
time that Virginia would probably give its vote to Jackson.
He confided to Tazewell, a leader of the Jackson forces on
the Southside, that "I perfectly agree with you and Mr. Van
Buren that if we are fortunate enough to shake off the
present disastrous administration, the succession of Gen.
Jackson will be the most important era which our country has
witnessed

Principles will then be fixed, which will cast

their shadows or their lights for years to come." After
considerable hesitation, Ritchie finally endorsed Jackson
publicly in the April 27, 1827, issue of the Enquirer.65
Despite his apparent conversion, Ritchie continued to
express misgivings about Jackson's candidacy and felt
compelled to explain the reasoning behind his decision to
back him. Adams's first message to Congress had made clear
his dangerous policies, and from that moment on Ritchie had
opposed him. Repeated abuses of patronage and widespread
corruption in the administration proved the correctness of

65RE, Feb. 20, March 1, 1827; Ritchie to Tazewell, Feb.
28, 1827, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL; RE, April 27, 1827.
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these initial suspicions. Ritchie could not support Adams,
and that left him with no other choice than to back Jackson.
"We are compelled to take Jackson with all our objections to
him," the editor informed his readers, "rather than Mr.
Adams, with his own transgressions." The Junto leader
underscored his devotion to the state rights philosophy and
the tenuous nature of his advocacy of Jackson by adding that
Virginia's support for Old Hickory did not bind the state
"to support measures [passed by a Jackson administration]
which she cannot approve."66
Followers of both candidates attacked Ritchie for his
position on Jackson. Adams's backers accused the editor of
making an about-face. The editor of the Virginian feigned
confusion and asked Ritchie "whether your charges against
General Jackson in 1824 or your eulogy of him in 1827 is to
be regarded as your mendacious commentary." Pleasants kept
up a steady denunciation of Ritchie for switching positions
on Jackson.67 These ribbings were mild compared to the
criticism that defenders of Jackson levelled at the
influential editor. When asked for advice on starting a
Jackson paper in Charlottesville, Rives told Thomas W.
Gilmer to "leave Mr. Ritchie to compromise as well as he can
with former opinions, + to talk about the 'hard alternative'

“RE, June 1, 15, Sept. 11, 1827.
67Lvnchbura Virginian. July 23, 1827; Constitutional Whig.
July 14, Aug. 29, Nov. 10, 1827.
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of supporting Gen. Jackson." He added that he was perfectly
satisfied that the General was a "most orthodox + thorough
faced republican of the Jefferson school." Claiborne W.
Gooch, co-editor of the Enquirer at the time, complained
that Ritchie was too cautious in advancing Jackson's cause
and too "courteous" in attacking Adams. James Campbell
informed his brother that "Hickory requires defense and if
we go on dosing [sic] as we have done in old Va. & talking
about choice of evils & all that kind of stuff the Adams
party may yet beat us." Jackson's forces in Virginia were
clearly disappointed with Ritchie's leadership.68
Ritchie responded to these criticisms by praising
Jackson more strongly and by dropping all mention of his
reservations about supporting his candidacy. The Junto
leader now described Jackson as "an honest, high-minded man"
dedicated to the cause of liberty and above corruption. He
expounded on Jackson's firmness and integrity, defended him
against all charges of wrongdoing, and confidently predicted
an overwhelming victory at the polls the following
November.69
Ritchie's shift in editorial policy revealed the
strength of Jackson's cause in Virginia. In fact, the
68Rives to Thomas W. Gilmer, July 20, 22, 1827, Rives
Papers, LC; Gooch to John Campbell, Oct. 8, 1827, Gooch Family
Papers, VHS; James Campbell to David Campbell, Nov. 3, 1827,
(typescript) ; Alexander Smyth to David Campbell, Nov. 6, 1827,
both in CFP, Duke.
69RE, Oct. 26, Nov. 20, 27, 1827; Aug 29, Oct. 14, 1828.
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General appeared so popular by late 1827 that his supporters
became complacent about the election.70 But Adams's forces
refused to abandon hope and unveiled some new campaign
tactics that they hoped would strengthen their cause. They
now focused all their efforts on condemning Jackson rather
than praising Adams. This allowed them to attract voters who
remained concerned about the General's qualifications or his
commitment to the "Virginia principles." A reinvigorated
party, now called the Anti-Jacksonians, set about spreading
the message that Old Hickory was a militaristic demagogue
completely unfit for the presidency. Pleasants and others
cranked out editorials that called into question Jackson's
actions as governor of Florida, his conduct at the Battle of
New Orleans, even his marital status, all for the sake of
revealing to Virginia that Jackson lacked integrity,
honesty, and a commitment to liberty.71 The Anti-Jacksonians
held meetings to express popular dissatisfaction with the
General and to prove that he had repudiated all of the
principles sacred to the state. They claimed, with some
70The Enquirer turned to other matters in the summer of
1827, only occasionally touching on the election. See RE, MaySeptember, 1827, passim.
^Constitutional Whig. Nov. 17, 1826; March 2, May 15,
June 15, 1827; James Campbell to David Campbell, Nov. 3, 1827,
CFP, Duke; "Preamble and Resolutions of A Meeting ...
Disapproving the Election of Gen. Andrew Jackson to the
Presidency of the United States," (Richmond: T.W. White,
1827); Richard E. Parker to Tazewell, May 4, 1828, Tazewell
Family Papers, VSL; Lynwood Miller Dent, Jr., "The Virginia
Democratic Party, 1824-1847" (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State
University, 1974), 69-71.
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authority, that Jackson looked favorably upon a system of
protective tariffs and federally-funded national
improvements. "General Jackson is as friendly to a broad
construction of the Constitution— is more inimical to State
Rights," John Pleasants of the Constitutional Whig insisted,
"than the present administration." Given this, the editor
asked his fellow Virginians what they stood to gain by
electing Jackson: "Where is the probability that this event
will make her [Virginia] principles triumphant?"72
The Anti-Jacksonians extended their attacks to Old
Hickory's supporters, demanding to know why Jackson was now
thought to be the best candidate for the office, when just
four years earlier Virginians had denounced him as a
military chieftain. "If he was not worthy of the Presidency
in 1825," one commentator noted, "neither will he be in
1829." Why was it that Virginians supported Jackson now,
Adams's followers asked. Was it due to his principles or to
the notion that only he could preserve the endangered rights
of the states? Hardly. As the Anti-Jacksonians saw it, there
was "no serious apprehension felt about state rights" among
opponents of the administration. That was merely a "bug bear
got up for electioneering purposes, to inflame the minds of
the people against the present administration. Virginia did
not get her President [Crawford]; there is the rub! It is
that disappointment which rankles in the bosom of her
^Constitutional Whig. March 14, 2, 1827.
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politicians and has made them so extremely lynk eyed in
discerning constitutional infractions.1,73
The Anti-Jacksonians reserved their most bitter
invective for Ritchie and the Junto. Attacks on the group
escalated as the campaign reached fever pitch in 1827, and
Ritchie worked tirelessly to assure Virginians that such a
clique did not exist. Since the editor felt compelled to
refute nearly every claim about the Junto and its powers, it
must be assumed that Ritchie considered these charges a
serious threat to Jackson's hopes in Virginia. He also
viewed them as personal assaults on himself and his paper.
His honor required vindication.74
Supporters of the administration had denounced the
Junto regularly since early 1825, but their tactics grew
bolder and their language more biting as the campaign
proceeded.75 Ritchie's foes condemned the clique's grip on
political matters in the state and accused the Junto of
subordinating Virginia's interests by joining with Van Buren
and other northern politicians in an unnatural alliance to
put Jackson in the White House. One columnist claimed that
73"No Turncoat," March 6, 1827 and "Americanus," Feb. 13,
1827, both in Constitutional Whig.
74RE, 1825 to 1828, passim; for evidence that Ritchie took
these attacks personally, see Ritchie to Col. A. Ritchie, n.d.
(probably late 1825), John P. Branch Historical Papers of
Randolph-Macon College. Vol. 3, no. 3 (June 1911), 205-206.
75RE, March 1, 1825, March 31, 1826; Lynchburg Virginian.
Nov. 17, Dec. 5, 1825, Oct. 9, 1826; Niles' Weekly Register.
Dec. 17, 1825.
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the Junto was using its vast power to "plunge the People
into political excess." The Lynchburg Virginian referred to
the group as the "Metropolitan demagogues" and claimed that
its opposition to the tariff and internal improvements
stemmed from economic concerns, not political principles.
The Virginian asserted that the decision to support Jackson
had broken the unity of the Junto, although the group
remained a formidable force working behind the scenes. When
pressed by Ritchie to substantiate claims about the Junto,
"that idle chimera, which has no existence," the paper's
editor admitted that the Richmond Party was an "intangible
body," but added defiantly that it was "not the less
powerful because of its intangible character."76
The National Intelligencer went farther in denouncing
the Richmond Party. William Seaton and Joseph Gales, who ran
the paper, published a series of editorials in April of 1827
that described the union between the Albany Regency and the
Junto. A few months later, they referred to the Junto as the
"Political Vatican of Virginia," and insisted that its
members were plotting to take the Old Dominion out of the
Union in order to strengthen their political position.77
76RE, May 8, 1827 (describing editorial in Winchester
Republican); Lynchburg Virginian. Oct. 8, Nov. 12, 1827; RE,
Nov. 6, 1827.
^National Intelligencer. April 7, 19, 1827; RE, April
24, 27, June 15, 1827. Just before the election, Gales
Seaton published more essays on the "combinations" that
formed to elect Jackson. Intelligencer. Sept. 11, 13, 23,
Oct. 4, 1828.

13,
and
had
25,
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While these claims about disunionism were completely
groundless, others agreed that the Richmond Party held too
much power in the state. Its dominance must be broken and
the people's power restored to them. Ritchie's group had
deluded Virginians into believing that Jackson was fit to be
president, when in fact he would lead the country to ruin.
Furthermore, the Junto's decision to support Old Hickory was
based on personal and party considerations, without any
concern for what was best for Virginia. Clique members were
hypocrites, intriguers, and base scoundrels. Only through a
concerted effort to prevent Jackson's election could the
Junto be cut down and removed from power. "I trust in God,"
Joseph C. Cabell wrote in the Autumn of 1827, "that the
reign of a Central Junto is nearly over, and that the people
will now take the matter into their own hands." From
Washington, Henry Clay suggested to his friends in Richmond
that they use animosity toward the "party of the metropolis"
as a tool "to induce men to discard their preference for
General Jackson." Ritchie's claim that attacks on the Junto
were revived "to answer party purposes" seemed verified by
the actions of the group's opponents.78
The ferocious attacks of the Anti-Jacksonians seemed to
slow down the Jackson machine in Virginia, at least
78Joseph C. Cabell to John H. Cocke of Bremo, Oct. 17,
1827, Cabell Family Papers, UVA; Henry Clay to Francis Brooke,
Sept. 24, 1827, Calvin Colton, ed., The Private Correspondence
of Henry Clay (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1971
[reprint of 1855 edition]), 178-180; RE, Jan. 16, 1827.
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temporarily. While the administration men spoke of growing
support for Adams, Jackson supporters worried about efforts
"to turn the tide against Old Hickory."79 Pleasants, seizing
the moment, called for a statewide convention to unify the
Anti-Jacksonians.80 An Anti-Jackson Convention was held in
Richmond on January 8, 1828, the thirteenth anniversary of
the Battle of New Orleans. Delegates adopted an address that
cataloged Jackson's faults and warned of the consequences of
his election. The "dearest interest" of the country were at
stake, and "even the permanence of her free institutions __
were in peril," should the military chieftain win in
November. The address closed by naming both Madison and
Monroe to its electoral ticket and by calling on Virginians
to go forth at the next election and "save the Temple of
Liberty from pollution."81
Jackson's followers in Virginia responded vigorously to
the barrage of accusations, condemnations, and arguments

79James Campbell to David Campbell, Nov. 3, 1827;
Alexander Smyth to David Campbell, Nov. 6, 1827, both in CFP,
Duke; Judge Stuart to James Barbour, Oct. 28, 1827, Barbour
Family Papers, UVA; John Taliaferro to James Monroe, Dec. 15,
1827; Samuel Southard to Monroe, Dec. 16, 1827, both in James
Monroe Papers, LC.
^Constitutional Whig. Sept. 1, 15, 19, 26, Oct. 6, 13,
1827.
81"The Virginia Address of the National Republican Party
(Va.) Convention (1828)," VSL. Madison and Monroe had
previously and explicitly declined to serve in any capacity
for either candidate. They immediately refused to become
electors for Adams. The audacious move of the Anti-Jacksonians
outraged Ritchie. Ambler, Ritchie. 116.
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laid down by the Anti-Jacksonians. The "noise they are
making has roused the lion from his den and will cause the
friends of Genl Jackson to offer some strong views," one
western Virginian commented. Already the "old patriots" were
holding meetings and declaring for Jackson. "Virginia +
Pennsylvania can do much and will do it," he concluded, "if
too much rubbish is not thrown their way." John Tyler, now
in Congress and fighting for Jackson, agreed. Old Hickory
"will come in on the shoulders of the South - aided and
assisted by New York and Pennsylvania." In Richmond, John
Campbell, a Junto associate, wrote home predicting that "We
shall sweep every thing before us."82
The Jacksonians in Virginia had every right to be
confident. Despite the efforts of the Anti-Jacksonians, all
signs pointed to a landslide for the General.83 The party
was well organized and solidly behind Jackson. Questions
about his orthodoxy had been replaced by a new found zeal
for his character and achievements. "Support of Gen. Jackson
is now of a character widely different from that which it
bore a year ago," Benjamin Watkins Leigh informed his
brother in early 1828. "Then, it was with most men, only a
82David Campbell to James Campbell, Nov. 11, 1827, CFP,
Duke; Tyler to John Rutherfoord, Dec. 8, 1827, Tyler, Life and
Letters of Tvlers. 1:376-378; John Campbell to David Campbell,
Dec. 7, 1827, CFP, Duke; Dent, "Virginia Democratic Party,"
72-75.
83John Y. Mason to James H. Rochelle, Dec. 13, 1827, James
Henry Rochelle Papers, Duke; William C. Rives to Thomas W.
Gilmer, Sept. 25, 1828, Rives Papers, LC.
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hearty determined opposition to the present
administration...; now, it has become a positive preference
for Gen. Jackson; all his acts are justified; and he is as
much the idol of his party ... as ever Mr. Jefferson was of
his." Homilies about Jackson's efforts "on the blood-stained
fields of Orleans, covering himself with evergreen laurels,
and crowning his country with immortal glory," replaced
questions about his views on internal improvements and the
tariff. Jackson the military chieftain was now Jackson the
defender of liberty and savior of the country.84
In October 1828 the Jackson Central Committee,
controlled by the Junto, addressed the people of Virginia on
the significance of the upcoming election. The "important
principles" involved rendered this election "momentous in
the extreme." The Adams administration had pursued policies
"not only inconsistent with the constitution, but
incompatible with freedom." Now it was up to the people to
decide "whether they will put down this most violent effort
to destroy our free constitution." The president's
supporters had made every effort to defend his course, but

^Benjamin Watkins Leigh to William Leigh, Feb. 3, 1828,
Francis Otway Byrd Papers, VHS; "A Freeholder of Buckingham,"
RE, April 8, 1828. Leigh had published a popular pamphlet in
1827 under the pseudonym of Christopher Quandary that poked
fun at the Jacksonians for describing their candidate as
"another WASHINGTON" and for attributing to him "the sum total
of all that is great and good." Christopher Quandary [B.W.
Leigh] Some Serious Considerations on the Present State of
Parties. With Regard to the Presidential Election (Richmond:
Thomas White, 1827).
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to no avail. They had then attacked Jackson "with an
intemperance and an acrimony which are the surest badges of
incorrect opinions and a bad cause." These efforts to
discredit Jackson had failed, and the people stood ready "to
assert and maintain the supremacy of the public will; to
vindicate the elective franchise; to preserve the
constitution in its purity; and to hand down to posterity
the liberty acquired by the virtues and valor of our
ancestors." The preservation of liberty and the expansion of
freedom flowed downward through the Founding Fathers to
Andrew Jackson. He must be elected in an "illustrious and
decisive" manner to show the people's commitment to the
basic principles which had founded the nation.85
On election day Virginians went to the polls in record
numbers. Some voters listened to last minute speeches on
"Objections to Mr. Adams." Others marched to town in groups
of fifty or sixty under signs emblazoned with the words
"Jackson and Reform." Virginians cast nearly 27,000 votes
for Old Hickory, as opposed to 12,000 for the hapless Adams.
The people had spoken. The Constitution stood vindicated.
Liberty had been preserved.86
85"Address of the Jackson Central Committee," RE, Oct. 7,
1828. Ritchie, Daniel, Nicholas, and Roane all sat on the
committee.
86"Notes - Heads of a Speech intended to be delivered at
Nelson Court House - 3 Nov 1828," Cabell Family Papers, UVA;
Jacob Lynch to William B. Campbell, Nov. 5, 1828, CFP, Duke.
Lynch told Campbell that Jackson received 564 of 580 votes
cast in Abingdon in western Virginia. He then named every man
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Thomas Ritchie and the Richmond Junto played a key role
in Jackson's victory in Virginia. The clique headed the
opposition movement in the state and later organized
Jackson's forces for the electoral contest. It kept up a
steady attack on Adams and refashioned an image of Andrew
Jackson that Virginians found more acceptable. The Junto
also represented Virginia in Van Buren's new union of the
"planters of the South and the plain Republicans of the
north." In short, the group was an integral part of
Jackson's emerging political machine.
Despite its strong endorsement of Jackson during the
last days of the 1828 campaign, some members of the Junto
continued to have nagging doubts about the Tennessean. The
group understood Jackson's views on two matters crucial to
Virginia, the tariff and internal improvements, imperfectly.
His fiery temper and military background remained a source
of concern. Ritchie and the Junto wondered if Jackson would
remember the role Virginia played in his election when he
selected his cabinet. Most of all, they worried about
Jackson's devotion to the "Virginia Principles" of state
rights and strict construction. Ritchie wasted no time in
notifying Jackson of Virginia's expectations of his
administration. The people of the Old Dominion presumed the
government would be guided by the "high minded enlightened

who voted for Adams. For vote totals, see Congressional
Quarterly, Inc., Presidential Elections. 93.
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principle[s]" of republicanism. Should Jackson deviate from
this course, he could expect Virginia to oppose him as
strongly as it had Adams.87 The price of liberty was eternal
vigilance, and that was a price Virginia had always been
willing to pay.

87Andrew Stevenson to Jackson, Dec. 8, 1828, Jackson
Papers, LC; [Thomas Ritchie], "Memorandum of Points to be
considered in the administration of the government," [Dec. 9,
1828], Bassett, ed., Correspondence of Jackson. 3:451-452.
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Chapter III
Rumblings in the Atmosphere: 1829-1833

"When I had the pleasure of seeing you in Richmond,"
Thomas Ritchie wrote Martin Van Buren early in 1829, "I was
struck by your views of the benefits which we might promise
ourselves from Gen. J[ackson]'s election." Ritchie and the
Junto had fought hard to get Andrew Jackson into the White
House, and now they hoped that their efforts would pay
dividends. The Junto had supported Jackson not only because
of its distaste for John Quincy Adams and his policies, but
also because it believed that Jackson would restore virtue
to government and zealously protect the rights of the
states. The Junto also hoped to reexert Virginia's influence
in national affairs. "Now is the epoch," Ritchie announced
upon hearing of Jackson's victory, "for Virginia to re
assert her old doctrines - to fix, if possible, the true
interpretation of the Constitution." Naturally, the Junto
would be in charge of carrying out such an important task.1
•Thomas Ritchie to Martin Van Buren, Jan. 31, 1829,
Martin Van Buren Papers, Library of Congress; Richmond
Enquirer (herafter cited as RE), Dec. 6, 1828. Ritchie
apparently made overtures to Jackson even before he took
office. Jackson responded, through Andrew Stevenson, that it
would give him "much pleasure to receive at all times Mr.
R[itchie]'s frank & full opinion on any & all subjects."
123
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During his first term, Jackson lived up to the Junto's
expectations in many ways, but by no means completely. His
efforts to ferret out corruption in the federal government,
to reduce the national debt, and his attack on the Bank of
the United States won applause from the Junto, as did his
veto of the Maysville Road Bill. These encouraging signs
allowed the Junto to remain loyal to Jackson during his
struggle with John C. Calhoun. The group also played an
important part in reelecting Jackson and in securing the
vice-presidential nomination for Martin Van Buren in 1832.
But the Junto's commitment to Old Hickory was never
absolute. While Jackson's appointment of editors to public
positions and his failure to veto certain internal
improvement bills disturbed the clique, his stance toward
South Carolina during the nullification crisis, culminating
in the Proclamation and Force Bill, severely tested its
faith in the President and its control of the Jacksonian
forces in Virginia.
The Junto's hesitancy to endorse all of Jackson's
actions during his first administration was significant for
two reason. First, Ritchie and his group insisted on
retaining their commitment to the doctrines of the state
rights school of thought. They had genuinely hoped that

Jackson to Stevenson, undated [probably early 1829], Harold D.
Moser, et. al., eds., The Papers of Andrew Jackson: A
Microfilm Supplement (Knoxville: University of Tennessee
Press, 1986), reel 12, frame 0391.
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Jackson would follow a state rights course, and were
disappointed when he failed to measure up to the standards
of the "Virginia doctrines." In 1830, Ritchie confided to a
friend that "You must not be surprized to find us pressing
at this time our old State Rights Doctrines ..., believing
that they alone will save the country from the gulf of
consolidation - and that if we give up now, we are gone
forever."2 The Junto continued to view Jackson as an
instrument by which its larger goals could be achieved; he
was the means to an end, not the end itself.
Second, the Junto's actions between 1829 and 1833
revealed its reluctance to embrace completely Martin Van
Buren's idea of the primacy of party loyalty in the new
Jacksonian coalition. To traditionally minded Virginians,
slavish devotion to a political party threatened the
independence of the individual voter, and many remained
suspicious of the idea of following blindly the dictates of
party leaders. William Roane assured his voters in 1831 that
he was a "Jackson-man," but not "in the servile partisan
sense" of the term. He supported the President because of
his policies, not his party.3 When Jackson continued to
alienate Virginians during the course of his administration,
and as defections from the party continued, however, the
2Ritchie to William Cabell Rives, April 15, 1830, William
Cabell Rives Papers, LC.
3William H. Roane, "To the Voters of Hanover," [1831],
Broadside, Virginia Historical Society.
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Junto gradually accommodated itself to the need for
effective party discipline and loyalty. Without a cohesive
base of support, they reasoned, none of their programs could
be implemented.
In addition to national developments that required
their constant attention, Ritchie and the Junto also had
their hands filled at the state level. The constitutional
convention of 1829-30 pushed all other matters into the
background for several months and brought sectional tensions
in Virginia to a boil. That was followed by Nat Turner's
Rebellion in Southampton County and a painful and drawn-out
debate on the future of slavery in the Commonwealth. Then
came another revolt, this time a movement within the ranks
of the Jackson party led by supporters of Philip P. Barbour,
who refused to accept Van Buren as Jackson's running mate in
1832. During these troubled years, the Junto struggled
constantly to maintain order and unity in the Jacksonian
ranks. To a remarkable extent the group was able to keep
Virginia hitched to the Jackson wagon. Only the damage
caused by Jackson's handling of the Nullification Crisis
proved too much for Ritchie and his clique to control. The
President's actions on those matters served as a rallying
cry for both the party's enemies and a growing number of
disaffected Jacksonians. The Democratic Party in Virginia
was reshaped during Jackson's first presidency by
controversy and growing factionalism, but the Junto
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maintained and even strengthened its hold on political
matters. In fact, Jackson even increased his vote totals in
the election of 1832, capturing 75% of the votes in
Virginia.4 After this decisive victory, Ritchie could
downplay party disputes and claim that the Old Dominion had
once again redeemed its honor by voting for the true friend
of state rights, Andrew Jackson.

Jackson's administration did not begin auspiciously, as
far as the Junto was concerned. His cabinet choices seemed
completely uninspired and his decisions in removing
officeholders seemed based more on political motives than on
a desire to restore integrity to the government. Much worse
was Jackson's appointment to office of several editors who
had helped him in the recent election. Not only did this
smack of a spoils system, the Junto argued, but it seriously
endangered the freedom of the press, something all
republicans understood as a central bulwark of liberty.
Ritchie and the other Junto members wasted no time in
informing Van Buren and Jackson of their disapproval of
these actions. At the same time, they refrained from
complaining too stridently, for they continued to look upon
Jackson as the means by which Virginia and the state rights
philosophy could regain ascendancy in Washington.
Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Presidential Elections
Since 1789 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1987),
94.
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News of Jackson's cabinet selections was greeted with
disappointment and dismay in Virginia. After all, the
General's supporters had promised that he would gather the
finest men around him to assist with the work of reforming
and purifying the government.5 Now that promise seemed like
a cruel hoax. Of the men whom Jackson chose to be his
closest advisors, many Virginians believed that only Martin
Van Buren, the Secretary of State, possessed the skills and
competence needed for a cabinet position. The remainder of
the group, they correctly perceived, was decidedly
lackluster. John Campbell informed his brother that not a
single man in Richmond was satisfied with the cabinet
selections. There was "general disappointment here" and many
of their friends were "in a state of great despondency" over
the matter. Andrew Stevenson bluntly informed Van Buren that
dissatisfaction with the appointments had caused a "state of
astonishment and excitement" in Virginia that "required all
our skills and prudence to quiet." Ritchie was more
diplomatic. "We do not hesitate to say," he told his
readers, "that this is not throughout the Cabinet which we
could have wished or expected."6
A second source of early concern centered on Jackson's
sRichmond Constitutional Whig. March 13, 20, April 1,
1829.
6John Campbell to David Campbell, March 26, 1829,
Campbell Family Papers (hereafter cited as CFP), Duke
University; Stevenson to Van Buren, April 19, 1829, Van Buren
Papers, LC; RE, Feb 28, 1829.
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removal policy. Jackson had vowed to "cleanse the Augean
Stables" once in power, and he quickly bounced several
officeholders out of the government. Some were genuinely
corrupt or incompetent, but other removals seemed
politically motivated. That bothered Jackson's supporters in
Virginia. They backed Jackson in his efforts at reform, but
believed that public officials should not be discharged
solely because of their political beliefs. As long as they
carried out their duties effectively, they should be allowed
to remain in office. "I go for reform," Ritchie told Van
Buren, "but what is reform?" It is not punishing supporters
of Adams and rewarding cronies; rather, it should be the
removal of incompetents and abusers of offices, and the
abolishment of all unnecessary positions.7 This is not to
say that Ritchie and others considered themselves above
rewarding party supporters; they simply clung to more
traditional notions of disinterested service. Ritchie's
comment that some of the removals had cut "doubly deep into
the popularity of our party" revealed the problems that many
Virginians had in coming to terms with the new style of
politics set in motion by Van Buren and Jackson.8
A more serious problem concerned Jackson's unfortunate

7Ritchie to Van Buren, March 27, 1829; Stevenson to Van
Buren, April 19, 1829; Ritchie to Van Buren, April 19, 1829,
all in Van Buren Papers, LC.
8Ritchie to John [?] Campbell, October 26, 1829, CFP,
Duke.
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decision to appoint editors to positions in the government.
Virginians spoke out against this policy with near
unanimity. They considered the "seeming intimacy between the
Press and the Government" a blatant abuse of executive
patronage and a dangerous erosion of the freedom of the
press. "The administration will be ruined if any further
appointments are made of editors," one concerned observer
warned Van Buren. John Rutherfoord, a Richmond merchant and
Junto associate, agreed. Jackson's appointments have been a
"source of exultation to the enemies, and of the deepest
regret and mortification to the friends of Genl. Jackson in
this quarter." John H. Pleasants, editor of the anti-Jackson
Richmond Constitutional Whig, announced in May that, because
of his intemperate actions, "Jackson fanaticism has already
died a violent death, and his popularity is declining more
rapidly than it ever advanced."9
Concerned about Jackson's sliding popularity in
Virginia, Ritchie wrote Van Buren to express his
apprehension and to recommend a course of action. Van Buren,
impressed by Ritchie's arguments, showed the letter to
Jackson, who promptly defended his actions in a reply to Van
9"A Lowlander and a Jacksonian,11 RE, Aug. 14, 1829;
William S. Archer to Van Buren, May 6, 1829, Van Buren Papers,
LC; John Rutherfoord to Rives, May 22, 1829, Rives Papers, LC;
Richmond Constitutional Whig. May 15, 1829. Pleasants never
tired of discussing Jackson's controversial appointments and
removals. Between May and August of 1829, discussion of these
issues dominated the Whig, even pushing aside debate over the
upcoming constitutional convention. For examples, see May 5,
19, June 23, 1829.
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Buren. The President asked Van Buren to assure Ritchie of
his commitment to the principles of reform. This
correspondence revealed very clearly the nature of the
relationship between the Junto and the national Jackson
party as it stood in 1829, and is worth further
investigation.
In his letter to Van Buren on March 27, 1829, Ritchie
spelled out the concerns he had about Jackson's early course
as president. The editor considered the election of Jackson
a "new epoch in the history of our country, - as opening a
bright prospect of wise and constitutional principles." But
already Jackson had dampened hopes by selecting an
incompetent cabinet and removing officeholders for
exclusively political reasons. Worse still was Jackson's
penchant for appointing friends, especially newspaper
editors, to government positions. "It really looks as if
there were a systematic effort to reward several Editorial
Partizans," Ritchie told Van Buren, "which will have the
effect of bringing the vaunted Liberty of the Press into a
sort of Contempt." Ritchie understood that patronage was a
"delicate" matter, but he believed that Jackson should act
more prudently in the future. Ritchie closed by informing
Van Buren that the "course of appointments at Washington is
calculated to cool and alienate some of our friends ...[;]
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you can scarcely conceive the uneasiness which prevails."10
The tone of Ritchie's letter, and his position as
leader of the Jackson forces in Virginia, convinced Van
Buren to show the epistle to Jackson. The New Yorker told
the President that he had known Ritchie for a long while and
had complete faith in his devotion to the cause of reform.
In fact, there was "not a man of purer public spirit in the
country." Jackson, unmoved by such praise, wasted no time in
countering the charges made by Ritchie. The General informed
his Secretary of State that Ritchie's concerns about
removals were unfounded, for only those who lacked "moral
honesty" had been dismissed. Perhaps the touchy editor had
been misled by "some disappointed office hunter" on this
matter. Clearly, Jackson continued testily, he had "not
reflected upon the subject, or he would not have suffered
himself to be so easily alarmed." As to appointments,
Jackson seemed perplexed as to why he should not appoint his
friends to office. "If my personal friends are qualified and
patriotic, why should I not be permitted to bestow a few
offices on them?" Write to Ritchie, Jackson closed, and
assuage his fears. The country is in no danger from my
policies."
10Ritchie to Van Buren, March 27, 1829, Van Buren Papers,
LC.
"Van Buren to Jackson, March 31, 1829, Van Buren Papers,
LC; Jackson to Van Buren, March 31, 1829, John Spencer
Bassett, ed. , Correspondence of Andrew Jackson (7 vols.
Washington: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1926-1935),
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The following day Van Buren penned a note to Ritchie
explaining the President's response. While Jackson believed
that the editor's fears were unfounded on this issue, he
hoped that Ritchie would continue to offer his input in the
future. In diplomatic language, Van Buren assured Ritchie
that Jackson's motives remained pure and that he valued the
Virginian's friendship. If Ritchie would travel to
Washington, Van Buren suggested, the two could discuss these
matters in greater detail.12
Jackson's and Van Buren's replies must have stung
Ritchie. They were clearly brushing aside his concerns about
issues that threatened to weaken the Jackson party in
Virginia. That hardly seemed an appropriate response,
especially given the role that Ritchie and the Junto had
played in electing Jackson. Van Buren, astute politician
that he was, realized that Ritchie was dissatisfied with
Jackson's response. To placate him, the New Yorker wrote
again, this time seeking advice on some presidential
appointments. The editor responded pointedly that he was not
capable of advising the President on such matters; he was
far too busy with other work. In a sharply worded note
accompanying a letter from Andrew Stevenson to Van Buren,

4:18-19.
12Van Buren to Ritchie, April 1, 1829, in John C.
Fitzpatrick, ed. Autobiography of Martin Van Buren. Vol II,
American
Historical
Association
Annual
Report.
1918
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), 249-250.
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Ritchie again expressed his dissatisfaction with Jackson's
appointments. By placing editors in high office, the
president has "excited a flame in Virginia which it will be
difficult if not impossible, to extinguish." Following this
outburst, Ritchie, soured by his first encounter with the
new administration, ceased corresponding with Van Buren for
several months.13
The anger and disappointment of Ritchie and the Junto
over Jackson's early course in no way shook their devotion
to his cause. Protestations against his policies were, in
fact, usually accompanied by claims of loyalty to Old
Hickory and his administration. Thus, while John Campbell
noted that the "ruling passion and governing principle with
which he[Jackson] seems to have set out in his
administration are to reward those most who have bawl'd
loudest in his favour without any regard to their characters
or fitness for Office," he quickly added that he had "not
lost all confidence in the old man[']s honesty of purpose
and ardent love of country."14 When opponents of the
administration began claiming that Virginia's anger with the
President stemmed from the lack of political spoils given to
the state, Jacksonians responded vigorously. Criticism of

13Ritchie to Van Buren, April 13, 19, 1829, Van Buren
Papers, LC.
14John Campbell to David Campbell, March 26, 1829, CFP,
Duke. See also John Rutherfoord to Rives, May 22, 1829, Rives
Papers, LC.
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Jackson was motivated by principle and patriotism, they
claimed, not by disappointment over the lack of spoils. As
usual, Ritchie led the way in making this claim. "We are
content to be without ... any hand in the administration,"
he told fellow editor M.M. Noah. "Office or not: whether we
get the loaves & fishes, or are forgotten, it can have no
influence on the principles of Virginia." The only guide to
judging the administration has been, and will remain, "the
course which it may pursue."15 By the summer of 1829, with
Henry Clay's unannounced campaign for the presidency already
well underway, dissatisfaction with Jackson in Virginia was
beginning to be replaced by a defense of his actions. "The
nation is not to be changed by any clamour about Removals
and appointments," Ritchie predicted confidently in October;
"they wait for higher game."16
The "higher game" that Ritchie spoke of undoubtedly
involved the great constitutional and economic questions of
internal improvements, banking, and the tariff. These issues
had dominated state and national debate since the War of
1812. As firm advocates of state rights, the Junto had very
lsRitchie to M.M. Noah, March 14, 1829, Van Buren Papers,
LC; RE, May 15, 1829; William Archer to Van Buren, May 6,
1829, Van Buren Papers, LC.
16RE, Oct. 13, 1829. See also "One of the People," RE,
June 23, 1829; "Mordaunt," RE, Sept. 22, 1829; Claiborne W.
Gooch to Van Buren, Oct. 27, 1829, Gooch Family Papers, VHS.
Pleasants noted this change in sentiment in the June 19, 1829
issue of the Constitutional Whig. When it came to criticizing
Jackson, he noted, "All is hushed into breathless silence!
Hypocrites! Shallow, tortuous hypocrites."
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clear beliefs on these matters, beliefs that allowed little
room for compromise. A significant part of its commitment to
Jackson in 1828 stemmed from the notion that he was a state
rights man and would work to implement proper policies on
these matters. If the Junto was not exactly sure what the
General's ideas on internal improvements were or what he
meant when he claimed that he supported a "judicious
tariff," its members had faith that Jackson would not turn
his back on the South and its principles. Although this
faith was shaken occasionally by Jackson during his first
term of office, the Junto continued to believe that Jackson
was working with the best interests of the South in mind.
Early indications of Jackson's course toward banking,
internal improvements, and the protective tariff system
seemed favorable to the Junto. In his inaugural address and
in his first message to Congress, Jackson spoke of the
rights of the states and of the need to reduce unnecessary
expenses in the government. He also issued a call to weaken
the power of the Bank of the United States, claiming that it
exerted excessive influence over the economy and politics of
the nation. These remarks pleased the Junto, but proof of
Jackson's sincerity was needed.
The Junto had nothing but praise for Jackson's call for
a reduction in the power of the Bank of the United States.
Many Virginians viewed banks, whether at the state or
national level, as "artificial" aristocratic institutions
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that preyed upon the hard working, honest people of the
land. One widely read editorial printed in the Enquirer in
1829 earnestly looked forward to the day when "Banks will
cease to exist, and thus leave the judgement of men, free
and unfettered."17 The Junto's strong ties to both state and
national banks in Virginia - Andrew Stevenson, Wilson Cary
Nicholas and Philip Norborne Nicholas had served as
directors of the Richmond branch of the Second Bank of the
United States in the 1810s and early 1820s, and John
Brockenbrough was President of the Bank of Virginia from
1811 to 1843 - prohibited it from going that far, but it did
fall solidly behind Jackson in his early skirmishes with the
Second Bank of the United States. Ritchie and his clique,
like the President, considered a national bank
unconstitutional and worried about the undue influence it
exerted on national affairs. The Panic of 1819 had turned
many against the Bank, and a decade later it still had few
defenders in eastern Virginia.18

17"George Clinton" [William Robertson?], RE, Feb 21, 1829.
In an editorial in the Constitutional Whig. Oct. 2, 1829,
"Anti-Jackson and Anti-Bank" claimed that Robertson's attack
on the nature of banking had provoked the fury of the
"arrogant ... and vindictive" Junto, who had him removed from
the Executive Council.
18The Junto broke off its association with the Bank of the
United States in the early 1820s. After leaving the BUS,
Philip N. Nicholas also served as President of the Farmer's
Bank of Virginia from 1818 to 1837. For the Junto's bank
connection, see Joseph Harrison, "Oligarchs and Aristocrats The Richmond Junto," Virginia Magazine of History and
Biography. Vol. 78 (1970), 195.
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As Jackson moved to crush the Bank in Congress, Ritchie
kept up a steady barrage of editorials in Richmond
denouncing the "monster of corruption" and calling for its
extinction.19 He assured his readers that Old Hickory would
slay the Bank dragon by vetoing the Bank Bill that had
worked its way through Congress. When word arrived that
Jackson had indeed vetoed the bill, Ritchie praised him
warmly and described the veto as the "most important and
glorious act of his civil administration.1,20 The Junto
considered Jackson's early struggle against the Bank of the
United States a signal success and an important step in
reforming the national government and preserving the
independence of the individual.
Jackson's record on internal improvements was less
spectacular. Between 1829 and 1833, Ritchie and his group
continued to call for state funded internal improvements in
Virginia. They understood the value of improved waterways,
roads, canals, and turnpikes in the developing market
economy of nineteenth century America, and realized only too
painfully the consequences of continuing to neglect these
19RE, July 10, 1832. See also RE, May 18,June 8, July 13,
1832.
20RE, July 13, 1832. See also, RE, May 18, June 8, July
10, 1832; P.V. Daniel to Van Buren, July 12, 1832, Van Buren
Papers, LC. Early in Jackson's first term, Pleasants claimed
that Van Buren had travelled to Richmond to consult with the
Junto about banking policy, implying that Van Buren held sway
over the group. Ritchie dismissed this allegation as absurd.
Richmond Constitutional Whig. Dec. 15, 1829; RE, Dec. 25,
1829.
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matters. "We cannot delay it longer." Ritchie told his
readers, referring to a system of state funded internal
improvements. "Virginia is too proud to be longer kept in
the rear of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York."21 At the same
time, the group refused to countenance federally funded
improvements, claiming that the Constitution failed to give
the federal government jurisdiction over this issue.
Congress could create roads and transportation networks
under certain conditions, but their powers were very limited
in this realm. The Junto hoped that Jackson would move
decisively to restrict the federal government's funding of
public works.22
The President's veto of the Maysville Road Bill in June
of 1830, which had authorized funding for construction and
repairs on a section of the National Road that ran
exclusively through Kentucky, represented a tremendous
victory for state rights proponents, but not a completely
satisfying one. Ritchie, back in regular contact with Van
Buren, told the New Yorker that the Junto had hoped that
Jackson would reject the bill "on constitutional grounds."
Such a course would represent "an achievement more glorious
that the victory of New Orleans." In his message
accompanying the veto, Jackson shied away from explicitly
21RE, Feb. 10, 1829. See also Ritchie's editorials in the
Enquirer of Feb. 3, 5, 7, March 3, and Aug. 7, 1829.
22Ritchie to Rives, April 15, 1830, Rives Papers, LC; RE,
Aug. 7, 11, 1829; April 6, 13, May 14, 1830.
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declaring the bill unconstitutional, claiming instead that
it was simply a bad piece of legislation. After reading the
message, Ritchie noted privately that "it does not exactly
come up to our Virginia doctrine." Nevertheless, he praised
Jackson's "moral courage" and claimed that he had vindicated
the "principles of '98." By vetoing the bill, the General
had "arrested that little, local, grasping, debasing, log
rolling system of appropriations" that plagued the country
and threatened to "prostitute the vital principles of the
Constitution to the lust of self-interest.1,23 A writer in
the Enquirer was more enthusiastic about the veto. Jackson's
actions, he claimed, had reversed "twelve years" of
"despondency" in the South. The Old Hero "has made a
generous effort for the redemption and salvation of his
country. Despotism is arrested in its lawless march, and
anarchy confounded in its tumultuous route."24
Late in his first administration, Jackson disappointed
his Virginia supporters by refusing to veto another bill
authorizing federal funds for internal improvement projects.
An obviously exasperated Ritchie notified Van Buren that
Jackson's decision had "shaken his friends in the constantcy

23Ritchie to Van Buren, June 1830, Van Buren Papers, LC;
Ritchie to Archibald Ritchie, June 8, 1830, Branch Historical
Papers of Randolph-Macon College. Vol. 1, no. 2 (June 1902),
147-149; RE, June 1, 1830. P.V. Daniel expressed much the same
sentiment in a letter to William Brent, Jr., June 18, 1830,
Cabell Family Papers, UVA.
24"Mecklenburg," RE, July 13, 1830.
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[sic] of his principles." Daniel chimed in, citing the
damage the passage of the bill had inflicted upon the
General's supporters in Virginia. In the Enquirer. Ritchie
wondered how Jackson could reconcile the Maysville veto with
his recent decision. As he understood it, under the bill
passed "We extend the powers of the federal government to
our local concerns," and that would lead to consolidation.25
Jackson's record on internal improvements, then, was spotty
as far as the Junto was concerned.
Closely related to the internal improvement question
was the tariff controversy, the most discussed and divisive
issue in Jackson's first administration. The Junto, along
with many southerners, resented the protective tariff
system, believing it punished farmers and planters at the
expense of manufacturing interests in the North. Needless to
add, the policy also lacked a constitutional foundation. The
"God-like" Founding Fathers would have never sanctioned such
an unfair and unwise policy. Where, Virginians wondered, "is
the Republicanism in a measure which exalts the capitalist,
the monied aristocracy, above the sturdy yeomanry of the
country, the worthy, industrious and patriotic farmer"?25
Ritchie and other Virginians also believed that the tariff
“Ritchie to Van Buren, July 10, 1832; Daniel to Van
Buren, July 12, 1832, both in Van Buren Papers, LC; RE, July
10, 1832.
26"Mathews," RE, Aug. 20, 1830. See also the petition of
the citizens of Nottoway County, reprinted in RE, Dec. 6,
1828, and Ritchie's editorial of Sept. 3, 1830.
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served as the unifying link in a series of policies designed
to destroy the power of the states in general, and the
southern states in particular. They realized that revenue
raised from the import taxes could be used to fund internal
improvement projects once the national debt was eliminated.
This "union ... between the friends of the Tariff and of
Internal Improvements" would be especially dangerous. If
such an alliance should come to pass, Ritchie warned, the
"rights of the States, and the liberties of the people would
be threatened with a fearful eclipse." Experience had taught
Americans that "one assumed power leads to another."
Decisive action must be taken to end the protective tariff
system. More than just economic gain or loss was at stake;
the fate of liberty and the republican experiment hung in
the balance.27
The importance of the tariff question led the Junto to
keep in constant touch with Washington. Even before
Jackson's inauguration, Ritchie wrote Senator Littleton
Waller Tazewell of Virginia to tell him of the course the
House of Delegates had adopted concerning the Tariff of
1828. The House had passed resolutions condemning the socalled "Tariff of Abominations" and declaring it
27Ritchie to Rives, April 15, 1830, Rives Papers, LC; RE,
May 14, 1830. Ritchie frequently attacked the "American
System" of Clay, claiming that "it alters the very character
of our Federal Government - causing it to break down the
barriers which separate its powers from the Rights of the
States ..., threatening us with consolidation. with disunion."
RE, Sept. 3, 1830. See also RE, Jan. 30, April 6, 1830.
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unconstitutional. Would Tazewell explain to Jackson how
deeply the state felt on this issue, and try to secure his
support in removing or modifying the tariff? Ritchie himself
was ready to fight to the end on this issue, and he hoped he
could count on the president's backing.28
Actions in South Carolina, where hostility to the
tariff produced talk of nullification and disunion, changed
the nature of the debate over the tariff. Virginians now
found themselves in the delicate situation of condemning
both the tariff and South Carolina's response to it. Worse,
South Carolinians claimed that the doctrine of nullification
derived naturally from the principles enunciated in the
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. Nullification and
secession were merely the logical conclusions of the state
rights philosophy cherished by Virginians and the Junto.29
Ritchie and others acted quickly to refute the
28Ritchie to Littleton Waller Tazewell, Feb. 21, 1829,
Tazewell Family Papers, Virginia State Library. For a
revealing examination of the tariff debate within Virginia,
see the series of essays on "Mr. Madison's Letters" that
appeared in the Enquirer between Jan. 17 and Feb. 26, 1829.
In a few places, opposition to the tariff took the form
of non-importation agreements reminiscent of the Revolutionary
era. A writer from Prince Edward county forwarded 213 samples
of home-spun clothing to Ritchie and described the atmosphere
in his home community. "Instead of seeing us dressed up, and
appearing in public with a tawdry suit of clothes manufactured
to the North, and many of us playing the 'shabby genteel,' you
would now see us clad in the substantial home-spun, with the
good old domestic way, and worn with an easy lofty pride,
becoming a people resolutely bent on stern resistance to
usurpation and oppression" ("Earnest," RE, Feb. 10, 1829).
29William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1965), 207-209.
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assertions of the Nullifiers. While some denied that the
Resolutions of 1798 condoned nullification, Ritchie was
forced to admit that Jefferson had in fact originated the
notion of a state nullifying a national law. He pointed out,
however, that the tariff controversy was not, in and of
itself, sufficient cause for such an extreme measure to be
taken.30 Plenty of room for compromise still existed.
Congress may choose to lower rates sufficiently in 1832.
Failing that, an "Anti-Tariff Convention" could be called to
express the region's displeasure. This was, he declared, the
only "peaceful and constitutional means of stating the
grievances of the people."31
Ritchie and the Junto hoped to distance Virginia from

30Thomas Ritchie to Archibald Ritchie, June 8, 1830,
Branch Historical Papers. Vol. 2 (June 1902), 147-149. Ritchie
made it clear that Virginia would not abide nullification.
"Agricola's" eight part essay on "The Virginia Doctrines, Not
Nullification," was the fullest refutation of the connection
between the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and the doctrine
of nullification. It ran in the Enquirer from Aug. 17 to Sept.
14, 1832. Madison denied the connection as well. See Madison
to Nicholas Trist, Feb. 15, 1830, Gaillard Hunt, ed., The
Writings of James Madison (9 vols. New York: G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 1900-1910), 4:61-66; Madison to Joseph Cabell, Aug. 16,
1829, Ibid., 4:42-44; Madison to Edward Everett, Aug., 1830,
Ibid.. 4:95-106. Ritchie's comments on Jefferson and
nullification are in RE, March 13, 1832.
31RE, Aug. 5, 1832. Ritchie's writings on the tariff can
be sampled in the following issues of the Enquirer: Jan. 6,
1829; Feb. 8, July 12, 19, Aug. 5, 12, Sept. 23, Nov. 1, 1831;
March 13, April 24, July 17, Sept. 14, 1832. Philip P.
Barbour, John Brockenbrough, and William H. Roane represented
Virginia at the Anti-Tariff Convention that met in
Philadelphia in October of 1831. RE, Oct. 11, 1831; Charles
Ambler, Thomas Ritchie: A Study in Virginia Politics
(Richmond: Bell Book & Stationary Co., 1913), 142-143.
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the course of the Nullifiers in South Carolina because they
understood clearly the politically explosive nature of the
tariff debate. Should the state rights men of the Old
Dominion be grouped together with the Ultra-Tariffites from
the Palmetto State, the Jackson party would be torn apart in
Virginia, and the Junto's power would be dashed to pieces.
Concerned that a "New Coalition, the friends of the firm of
Clay, Webster & Co.," were "attempting to brand the whole
Jackson party with the name of nullifiers." the Junto
scrambled to set the record straight.32 Philip N. Nicholas
informed John Campbell, now Treasurer of the United States,
that the "So. Carolina doctrines, are not those of
V[irgini]a as I, & I have no doubt, you, have always
understood them. They lead to disunion & to the destruction
of the Republican Party." David Campbell spoke for many when
he claimed that the Nullifiers "have press'd the principles
advanced by Mr. Madison much farther, than either he or
Virginia intended to carry it." Ritchie stated bluntly that
nullification was not "conformable to the Virginia School of
Politics." To make sure everyone understood where the
leading Jacksonians of Virginia stood on this matter, he
added that "We deny that nullification is a legitimate
conclusion from our State Rights Doctrines." The editor
hoped that these strong words would keep people from
associating the Jacksonians of Virginia with the Nullifiers
32RE, July 27, 1830.
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of South Carolina.33
While taking great pains to distance themselves from
the political arguments of the Nullifiers, the Junto
continued to condemn the protective tariff system on
economic grounds. Here the rhetoric employed by the group
was similar to that of South Carolinians. Ritchie stated
emphatically that Virginia and the South would never accept
as a "settled policy" a tariff that made the region the
"hewers of wood and the drawers of water, for the Northern
manufactures." An anonymous writer in the Enquirer added
that "Whilst Virginia loves the Union, & is willing to make
new sacrifices for its preservation, there is a point of
forbearance in the endurance of wrongs, beyond which she
will not go. She must look out for her own safety."34
Ritchie, in fact, hinted strongly that Virginia might join
with its southern neighbor if the federal government used
force to subdue South Carolina. In letters to Washington,
members of the Junto urged Jackson to adopt a conciliatory
stance toward the Palmetto State and warned of the
consequences if he did not. Jackson must be "forbearing"
toward the Nullifiers, John Brockenbrough argued, because
33Nicholas to John Campbell, July 23, 1830; David Campbell
to Arthur P. Hayne, May 16, 1831, both in CFP, Duke; RE, Sept.
14, 1832. William H. Roane told his constituents that he
opposed the "restive, wincing movements" of the South Carolina
Nullifiers. Roane, "To the Voters of Hanover," [1831],
Broadside, VHS.
^RE, Sept. 14, 1832; Feb. 8, 1831; "Henry," RE, Feb. 1,
1831.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

147

"any precipitation on his part would unite Virginia to S.
Carolina. There is a rumbling in our Atmosphere about the
Sovereignty of the States." Ritchie agreed with this
assessment in a letter to William Cabell Rives. "Impress
upon our friends in the Administration," the Junto leader
wrote, "the necessity of pursuing a forbearing as well as
decided course towards S. Carolina. This must be done, he
insinuated, "lest the flame of discontent should spread.1,35
The tariff and nullification questions placed Virginia
Jacksonians in a decidedly uncomfortable position. To
maintain loyalty to their party and to the Union, they were
called upon to denounce the Nullifiers and their actions.
Yet, at the same time, their state rights ideology demanded
that they condemn the protective tariff system and work for
its eradication. One observer's comment that the "State
Rights party —

appears to be completely distracted between

the principles of the state and devotion to General
Jackson," captured the essence of the dilemma exactly. "We
are now laboring between two extremes," Ritchie lamented,
35John Brockenbrough to John Randolph, Nov. 8, 1832,
Kenneth Shorey, ed., Collected Letters of John Randolph of
Roanoke to Dr. John Brockenbrough. 1812-1833 (New Brunswick:
Transaction Books, 1988), 140-141; Ritchie to Rives, Dec. 1,
1832, Rives Papers, LC; Richard E. Parker to Littleton Waller
Tazewell, Feb. 6, 1832, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL. In the
April 24, 1832, issue of the Enguirer. Ritchie told his
readers
that
"If
South
Carolina should
resort to
nullification, Virginia will be loth [sic] to send a man or a
musket for her subjection." Still, he continued to work for a
peaceful solution, constantly calling on all parties to be
deliberative and calm. See RE, April through October, 1832,
passim .
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"the wrong and the remedy - the Tariff and Nullification."3S
The Junto hoped that the way out of this sticky situation
would be a compromise acceptable to both sides. The group
looked anxiously to Jackson for relief from the perplexing
problem that threatened to tear apart all that it had worked
for.37
Initial signs from Washington were encouraging. In his
fourth annual message to Congress, delivered on December 4,
1832, Jackson acknowledged the validity of South Carolina's
claims and promised to work for a peaceful resolution of the
crisis, including a downward revision of tariff rates.38
Ritchie was elated by Jackson's temperate words. "The
President's Message has given the highest satisfaction," he
told William Cabell Rives. "His tone about S.C. is precisely
what it should be." Perhaps the crisis could be resolved
without destroying the Democratic party or the Union. The
people's hero, Andrew Jackson, would once again preserve the
Union and the rights of the states.39

36John Murdaugh to John Tazewell, Dec. 13, 1832, Tazewell
Family Papers, VSL; RE, Dec. 8, 1832.
37For a complete account of the Nullification Crisis, see
Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, and Richard Ellis, The Union
at Risk; Jacksonian Democracy. States' Rights, and the
Nullification Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press,
1987) .
38Robert Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American
Democracy. 1833-1845 (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 10-11.
39Ritchie to Rives, Dec. 6, 1832, Rives Papers, LC; RE,
Dec. 6, 8, 11, 1832.
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The hopes of Ritchie and others for a peaceful solution
received a heavy blow just one week later, when Jackson's
"Proclamation to the People of South Carolina" was
published. In one bold sweep, Jackson attacked South
Carolina, nullification, and the compact theory of
government. "I consider," he stated flatly, "the power to
annul a law of the United States, assumed by one State,
incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted
expressly by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized in
its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it
was founded, and destructive of the great object for which
it was formed ." Further, the Union had been formed by the

people, not the states, and the Constitution had created a
government, not a league. The states had surrendered
"essential parts of sovereignty" in joining this government.
As President and the direct representative of the American
people, Jackson explained that he would act to stop anyone
who attempted to deny the sovereignty of the people or the
perpetuity of the Union.40
Virginians were stunned by Jackson's Proclamation,
especially his remarks about the origins and nature of the
Union. "Many of the doctrines of the President's grand
manifesto," one writer noted, "are as obnoxious as
Nullification itself." Another suggested that "its
40"Proclamation to the People of South Carolina," as cited
in Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American
Democracy. 20-23.
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principles ... are at war with all our opinions of state
power & the character of our confederacy." John Randolph, on
his deathbed, roused himself to curse the "ferocious and
blood-thirsty proclamation of our Djezza Pacha."41 The
Virginia General Assembly responded to the Proclamation by
electing John Tyler, a known enemy of the admininstration,
to the United States Senate.42
The Junto was much more restrained in its comments.
John Brockenbrough admitted that the Proclamation contained
some dangerous ideas, but remained sanguine about the safety
of the Union. Ritchie told his readers that he agreed with
Jackson on the unconstitutionality of the doctrine of
nullification, but felt compelled to add that "there are
some doctrinal points ...to which we think it our duty to
state that we cannot subscribe." Despite these differences,
there was no reason to abandon the President or to stop
working for a peaceful settlement to the dispute. The
editor's conciliatory attitude roused one Virginian to
condemn the "Ritchie and Co. party" for their devotion to
the administration. They consider it "high treason," he
41"Hampden," Richmond Constitutional Whig. Dec. 18, 1832;
William F. Gordon to Thomas W. Gilmer, Dec. 11, 1832, John
Tyler Scrapbook, Tyler Papers, College of William and Mary;
Randolph to John Brockenbrough, Dec. 16, 1832, Shorey, ed.,
Collected Letters of John Randolph. 144. Pleasants, editor of
the Constitutional Whig, praised the Proclamation for its
"fervent devotion to the Union, prosperity and glory of our
country," but admitted that it boded ill for friends of the
state rights persuasion. Constitutional Whig. Dec. 14, 1832.
42Ambler, Thomas Ritchie. 152.
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added, "to utter aught in opposition to the sovereign will
of his most august majesty, our good master the autocrat of
all the Americas.1143
John Marshall effectively summarized the impact of the
Proclamation on Jackson's supporters in Virginia when he
told Joseph Story that "that paper astonished, confounded,
and for a moment silenced them." Van Buren was also aware of
this, and begged Jackson to pursue "toleration and
magnaminity" toward the state until they regained their
political bearings. The Junto's course should, in fact, be
seen as an effort to limit defections within the party and
to control the damage done by the Proclamation.44
After the initial shock of the Proclamation, the Junto
worked hard to convince Virginians that the President's
message was only mildly offensive and that the crisis would
soon be resolved. Instead of chastising Jackson, the state
should pour all of its resources into mediating a compromise
between South Carolina and the federal government. Ritchie
even published a lengthy defense of the Proclamation penned

43Brockenbrough to Rives, Jan. 11, 1833, Rives Papers, LC;
RE, Dec. 13, 15, 25, 1832; John Murdaugh to John Tazewell,
Jan. 12, 1833, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL. Pleasants attacked
Ritchie for standing by Jackson and protecting his own narrow
party interests, instead of working to save Virginia and the
doctrine of state rights. See the Constitutional Whig. Dec.
28, 1832.
^Marshall to Story, Dec. 25, 1832, Marshall Papers,
William and Mary (typescript copy of original in Massachusetts
Historical Society); Van Buren to Jackson, Dec. 27, 1832, Van
Buren Papers, LC.
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by his former partner, Claiborne W. Gooch.45 But the damage
had already been done. The Jackson party in Virginia was
weakened by the Proclamation, Ritchie admitted, and if
Jackson took further action, it would be "shivered to
pieces." Despite these developments, Ritchie continued to
insist that his main concern was to avoid the use of force
in settling the dispute between South Carolina and the
federal government.46
Jackson's Force Bill and Clay's Compromise, signed into
law by Jackson on March 2, 1833, provided one more test of
the Junto, its devotion to Jackson, and its

control of the

Democratic party in Virginia. The intent of the Force Bill
was to insure that federal law could be enforced in South
Carolina. It provided for the extension of federal
protection to tariff collection centers, the creation of
federal courts to hear tariff cases, and the establishment
of jails to house offenders. The Bill also gave Jackson full
power to use military force if these actions did not prove
sufficient to enforce the law.47 Ritchie and other
Virginians focused on the military provisions of the bill
and on the powers

that it

conferreduponthe President. "All

45RE, Jan. 1,3, 8, 10, 12, 17, 29, 1833; "Cato," [C.W.
Gooch], Jan. 31, Feb. 2, 9, 14, 21, 1833.
46Ritchie to
Rives, Jan. 6, 1833, Rives Papers, LC.
Ritchie also told Rives that "We are in an embarrassing
situation - But prudence & firmness will yet save us." Ritchie
to Rives, Feb. 2, 1833, Rives Papers, LC.
47Freehling, Prelude to Civil War. 284-286.
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the provisions about using force ought to be stricken out,"
the editor told his readers. There was no need for such a
measure at this time. "We stand upon the brink of a
precipice," he noted, and the Force Bill threatened to push
the South over the edge.48
Ritchie had kinder words for Clay's Compromise Bill,
which gradually lowered tariff rates over a nine year period
in exchange for a revocation of South Carolina's Ordinance
of Nullification. The editor made clear that his support for
the compromise did not mean that he was now in favor of a
protective tariff system. But the country had come close to
disunion over this question, and Ritchie favored any measure
that would end the crisis peacefully.49 When word arrived in
Richmond of the passage of the so-called Compromise of 1833,
Ritchie gladly informed his readers that "the Tariff Bill
has passed - and Nullification is dead.... The friends of
Liberty may no longer tremble for the preservation of the
only Republic on Earth."50
The Nullification Crisis of 1832 and 1833 severely
tested the ability of the Junto to hold together the
coalition that had elected Jackson in Virginia in 1828.
Despite their own disappointment with the President's

48RE, Feb. 9, 1833; Jan. 22, 1833. See also issues of Jan.
19 and 26, 1833.
49RE, Feb. 16, 28, March 2, 5, 1833.
S0RE, March 5, 1833.
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course, the members of the group continued to profess their
devotion to him and to the Democratic party.51 Ritchie had
done everything in his power to minimize the damage caused
by the Proclamation and the Force Bill. For the most part,
the Junto managed to weather the storm and to maintain its
hold over political affairs in the state. But many
Virginians left the party during the crisis, frightened by
the specter of Jackson assuming unprecedented powers as
chief executive of the land. A prominent Williamsburg
citizen insisted that Jackson held "consolidating & despotic
principles which we had supposed were finally overthrow by
the revolution of 1800." C.W. Gooch, who at the height of
the crisis criticized Ritchie for abandoning Jackson,
lamented that "since his [Jackson's] admirable proclamation
I have heard him more vilely abused & denounced, by recently
open mouthed friends, than at any other period in his
life.”52
An anonymous writer in the Enquirer summed up the
51See William H. Roane to Peachy Gilmer, Jan. 1833,
Randolph Family Papers, UVA; Mark Alexander to Nathaniel
Beverley Tucker, Feb. 6, 1833, William and Mary Quarterly,
series 1, Vol. 12 (1903), 85-86 (on Stevenson's loyalty to
Jackson); Richard E. Parker to Van Buren, March 21, 1833, Van
Buren Papers, LC.
52J.A.G. Davis to Thomas Jefferson Randolph, Feb. 17,
1833, Thomas Jefferson Randolph Papers, UVA; Gooch to Rives,
Feb. 16, 1833, Rives Papers, LC. Lynwood Dent overemphasizes
the fallout over the Proclamation and the Force Bill when he
wrote that Jackson's actions "severly damaged his party in
Virginia.11 Lynwood Miller Dent, Jr., "The Virginia Democratic
Party, 1824-1847" (Ph.D, diss., Louisiana State University,
1974), 139.
.
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experiences of many Virginians during the Nullification
Crisis. He had supported Jackson in 1828 and 1832, "because
I thought he could and would do more to sustain the sinking
cause of State Rights and Virginia principles, than any
other man.... His course did not disappoint me ... [and] my
voice was given for his re-election: and again his opening
message, calm, wise, conciliatory and statesman-like,
satisfied me that I had voted rightly. Five or six days
later, (what a revolution!) the proclamation came.... It
contains matter at variance with all the President's former
measures." Despite his differences of opinions, the writer
insisted that he would continue to support the President.53
The main reason for this continuing loyalty was undoubtedly
Jackson's personal popularity in Virginia during this
period. The Junto's role in keeping the Jacksonian party
together, however, should not be underestimated. The group
provided the leadership and guidance needed to weather the
storm of the Nullification Crisis.

National problems were not the only ones facing the
Junto in the years between 1829 and 1833. In Virginia, a
protracted and divisive constitutional convention attracted
everyone's attention for much of 1829 and early 1830. Then
Nat Turner's Rebellion led some state leaders to question
the state's need for the peculiar institution. All the
53"No Nullifier," RE, Jan. 8, 1833.
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while, opponents of the administration harangued the public
and harassed the Junto about Jackson's policies and actions.
When it appeared that the northerner Van Buren would capture
the vice-presidential nomination in 1832, some Virginians
balked and pledged themselves to support Virginian Philip P.
Barbour instead. Each of these developments challenged the
Junto's leadership and forced it to take actions to shore up
the Jackson party in Virginia. While it was able to contain
much of the discontent within the state, the clique was
unable to prevent further defections from the Jacksonian
cause.
The undemocratic features of the 1776 Virginia
Constitution had never set well with many in the state, and
since its adoption reformers, including Jefferson, had tried
unsuccessfully to call a convention and make the state's
constitution more democratic. Advocates of reform had grown
more insistent as the years passed without any favorable
response from the General Assembly. The main points of
contention centered on suffrage requirements and the
distribution of representatives in the state legislature.
Virginia was among the last of the states to maintain a
freehold requirement for voting, and reformers argued that
the democratic spirit of the era demanded that it be
dropped. The western portions of Virginia had been
underrepresented in the General Assembly for decades, and as
the population continued to shift westward, these
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disparities became even more glaring. Since the biggest
complaint of reformers was that slaves continued to count
toward representation, the debate in 1829 and 1830 revolved
ultimately around the institution of slavery. The "struggle
for political power" in Jacksonian Virginia, one historian
noted, "centered on slavery."54
The Junto, which held considerable political power
itself, was split over the desirability of a convention.
Ritchie had supported constitutional reform for years, and
continued to do so. Those members of the clique more closely
associated with the old planting class of eastern Virginia,
Andrew Stevenson, Philip N. Nicholas, and William H. Roane,
resisted efforts to tamper with the state constitution.55
Opponents spoke ominously of the dangers of "innovation,"
and intimated that westerners would use their new political
power to place a hefty tax on slaves, most of whom lived
east of the Blue Ridge. The easterners' chief spokesman was
^Alison Goodyear Freehling, Drift Toward Dissolution: The
Virginia Slavery Debate of 1831-1832 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1982), xii, 47. Along with Freehling's
study, Dickson D. Bruce, Jr., The Rhetoric of Conservatism:
The Virginia Convention of 1829-1830 and the Conservative
Tradition in the South (San Marino: The Huntington Library,
1982), offers the best overview of the debate surrounding the
calling of a convention.
55Francis Fry Wayland, Andrew Stevenson: Democrat and
Diplomat. 1785-1857 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1949), 82; Nicholas to Joseph C. Cabell, Sept. 20,
1825, Cabell Family Papers, UVA; While Roane admitted that
slavery was "an irremediable drawback to her [Virginia's]
growth and prosperity," he opposed efforts to restructure
fundamentally the existing Virginia constitution. RE, April
17, 1829.
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Benjamin Watkins Leigh, a Richmond lawyer not connected with
the Junto, who began a vigorous campaign to stop all efforts
at calling a convention. Leigh wrote incessantly to his
friends and to prominent leaders describing the dangers of
meddling with the state constitution, and assuring them that
more than redistribution of representatives was at stake.
Once those people who lived west of the mountains received
proportional representation, Leigh argued, they would
immediately move to "take the government out of the hands of
the slaveholders, and make them pay the expense of it!" To
ensure his points were clear, Leigh denounced proponents of
reform for kindling the "spirit of faction, incarnate and
embodied," in the state.56
The question of calling a convention consumed
considerable time in the years between 1825 and 1829. Each
year the General Assembly discussed the issue before packed
galleries while commentators debated back and forth in the
columns of the state's newspapers. When the state
legislature finally agreed to ask the electorate if they
desired a constitutional convention in 1828, the issue had
become a truly sectional one in the state. The older regions
of the state, the Tidewater and the Piedmont, generally
opposed reform because it threatened to reduce their
representation in the legislature. The goal of the men who
56Leigh to Tazewell, Aug. 22, 1825, Tazewell Family
Papers, VSL; Leigh to Peachy R. Gilmer, Aug. 17, 1825, M.S.,
VSL.
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represented these areas during the convention was to prevent
a significant shift in power to the western sections of the
state, the Valley and the Trans-Allegheny region. The people
of the west resented the aristocratic features of Virginia's
constitution, and believed that slaveholders in the east
were largely to blame for the declining status of the state.
If they could succeed in democratizing the state's laws by
equalizing representation and achieving white male suffrage,
Virginia could be revitalized and reclaim its rightful
position in the Union.
After Virginia voters overwhelmingly supported the call
for a convention in 1829, the state's newspapers printed
letter after letter filled with suggestions, demands, and
recommendations for the upcoming convention, scheduled to
convene in Richmond in early October. Both Ritchie and
Pleasants, the two most influential editors in the state,
supported the convention and calls for reform. Upon hearing
of Jackson's victory in November of 1828, Pleasants had
suggested that "while the spirit [of reform] is abroad, let
the broom also be used in Richmond and the State
Government." Pleasants's connection of national and state
issues, contrived as it may have been, was nevertheless
significant. The editor of the Constitutional Whig wanted to
know if the advocates of "Jackson and Reform" were serious
when they spoke of change and of returning power to the
people. It was a valid question, and one which the Junto
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failed to answer decisively during the Virginia
Constitutional Convention of 1829-1830.57
Many writers urged Virginians to take the necessary
steps to bring their constitution in line with the spirit of
the age. "A Freeholder" found it "worse than idle, to talk
about the necessity of having a piece of land ... in order
to give you the privileges of freemen in the State." Owning
land "adds nothing to the intellect, integrity, or
patriotism, of the possesser [sic]." The provision calling
for a freehold requirement was "an odious badge of genuine
aristocracy, and ought to be despised and ridiculed by every
man who has a just regard for Liberty and Equality of
political rights." Peachy Harrison expressed shock at the
"rank aristocracy" and "oligarchic" nature of those who
defended the existing constitution. Several commentators
pointed out that under the current system, slaves counted
more toward representation than many white men. Reformers
agreed that the times demanded change.58
Conservatives responded quickly and strongly to the
charges of reformers. They argued that Virginia's 1776
constitution, the first written constitution ever, imparted

57Richmond Constitutional Whig. Nov. 22, 1828. For
examples of Ritchie's support for reform, see RE, Oct. 17,
Dec. 3, 1829.
58,1A Freeholder," RE, Feb. 14, 1829; Peachy Harrison to
Gessner Harrison, Nov. 4, 1829; Richmond Constitutional Whig.
July 21, Nov. 13, 1829. The debate on the upcoming convention
can be traced in the Enquirer. February through October, 1829.
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special dignity to the state. While it might be flawed, as
all man-made laws must be, there was no reason to scrap it
or to adopt rashly a new constitution. No guarantee existed
that the new charter would be any better than the old; in
fact, it probably would not be as good. Virginia's "freehold
suffrage has enabled her to retain character," Thomas Ruffin
explained to William H. Brodnax. Widening suffrage would
necessitate giving the vote to "Yankee shopkeepers" and
other undesirables. Besides, Ruffin asked, "Is it not our
experience that every new Constitution ... gets worse &
worse"? James Mason saw no reason to extend the franchise
"to every squatter, who pays one cent of tax." William H.
Crawford warned Leigh, who needed no reassuring, that if
Virginia adopted a white population basis for
representation, it would divorce itself "from the rest of
the slave holding states."59
Once the convention opened, it quickly became apparent
that a long and bitter struggle over the questions of
suffrage and representation, what Ritchie called the
"engrossing and paramount subject," lay ahead. For the
better part of four months, delegates argued over these

59Thomas Ruffin to William H.
Brodnax Letters, VHS; John Y. Mason
Dec. 18, 1829, James Henry Rochelle
Crawford to Leigh, Dec. 24, 1829,
Papers, VHS.

Brodnax, Oct. 22, 1829,
to James Henry Rochelle,
Papers, Duke; William H.
Benjamin Watkins Leigh
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questions, neither willing to concede too much to the
other.60 Clearly frustrated at the lack of consensus, James
Madison was overheard saying "that he believed if a motion
were made, that two & two would make four, it would produce
a division in the house." Another delegate noted that the
Convention was "so equally divided into geographical parties
that every question is decided by nearly the same vote."
While Ritchie privately fretted that the convention had
devolved into a "struggle for power" instead of a "contest
of principle," he kept the state's readers informed as to
all developments and continually called on the delegates to
reach an acceptable compromise.61 By early December, Ritchie
was deeply concerned about the increasingly strident tones
of the delegates' speeches and actions. He worried aloud
that such bitterness and lack of unity might lead to a call
for another convention or even talk of separating the state.
"We are literally a volcano at rest," Philip P. Barbour
wrote as debate dragged on, "but with a vast mass of
combustible matter within." Like others, Ritchie knew that
the most "combustible matter" was slavery, and he was
haunted by the specter of an extended debate on the issue.

60RE, Dec. 3, 1829; Freehling, Drift Toward Dissolution.
36-81. Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State
Convention of 1829-1830 (Richmond: Thomas Ritchie, 1833)
offers a full account of the debate.
61John Y. Mason to John H. Rochelle, Dec. 18, 1829,
Rochelle Papers, Duke; Ritchie to John [?] Campbell, Oct. 26,
1829, CFP, Duke.
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His conciliatory nature led him to push aggressively for
some compromise to bring the proceedings to an end.62
When the convention finally agreed to a compromise
constitution that granted reformers practically none of
their demands, Ritchie's relief was obvious. Despite its
shortcomings —

representation remained skewed in favor of

the eastern parts of the state and a significant portion of
the adult white males in Virginia remained ineligible to
vote —

the editor heartily endorsed the new frame of

government and repeatedly called upon his fellow citizens to
adopt it. Both in public and private, Ritchie asserted that
the new constitution was not perfect, but was rather "the
best which could be got." He remained confident that the
state would approve it, and his assessment proved correct.
Virginians voted that spring to accept the new constitution,
although bitter westerners opposed it and pledged to call
another convention. After a protracted and divisive
struggle, the state had "held back white-basis democracy and
opted instead for slaveholders political ascendancy."63
Ritchie hoped that the adoption of a new state
constitution in 1830 would bring to an end the sectional

62P.P. Barbour to John J. Ambler, Jan. 9, 1830, Papers of
the Ambler and Barbour Families, UVA; RE, Nov. 17, 19, Dec. 1,
25, 1829.
Pleasants
shared his
concern:
Richmond
Constitutional Whig. Nov. 12, 1829.
63RE, Jan. 16, 26, Feb. 2, 1829; Ritchie to Rives, April
15, 1830, Rives Papers, LC; Freehling, Drift toward
Dissolution. 80.
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tensions that threatened to divide the state and lessen his
power as party leader. In truth, the convention had been a
traumatic experience for him. Unburdening himself to William
Cabell Rives on the subject, Ritchie noted the "painful"
activities that went on behind the scenes. "Much harsh
language was employed. Many threats of disunion thrown out.
Many friends alienated from each other - and a nasty and
intemperate spirit of proscription began to show itself."
Once a compromise had been effected, Ritchie's mood changed:
"My own spirits are high - and my confidence in the
principles of the Republican Party & the sound sense of the
people remain unshaken." Perhaps now, Ritchie hoped,
Virginians could turn their energies to the larger national
problems facing them.64
Ritchie's desire for a return to national politics
proved elusive. Westerners remained bitter and angry over
the questions of representation and suffrage. Easterners
pledged to guard their rights and interests zealously. Then,
in August of 1831, the actions of a small group of slaves in
Southampton County stunned Virginia and the South. In the
wake of Nat Turner's Rebellion, which cost the lives of over
50 whites and 100 blacks, Virginians were forced to
reevaluate their commitment to the institution of racial

“Ritchie to Rives, April 15, 1830, Rives Papers, LC. As
secretary to the Convention, Ritchie was privy to private
sessions and discussions.
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slavery.65 Fear of insurrection had always haunted
southerners, but the suddenness and brutality of the
Southampton uprising shocked everyone. Ritchie wrote
excitedly of the actions of the "monsters" and "blood
thirsty wolves," and of efforts to capture Turner, the
acknowledged leader of the rebels. Editorials attempted to
explain the uprising, demanded action from the state
legislature, and suggested ways of preventing it from
happening again.66
Virginians also wrote and spoke more openly about
ending the curse of slavery in the state. Some argued that
the only way to avoid another bloody insurrection was to
begin gradually freeing all bondsmen so that slavery could
be eradicated in Virginia. Ritchie's public approval of such
plans helped pave the way for the General Assembly's
intensive, three-week public discussion on the future of the
institution in Virginia during the 1831-32 session. With the
scenes from Southampton still fresh in their minds,
reformers such as Thomas Jefferson Randolph, grandson of the
Sage of Monticello, and William Preston clashed with
conservatives such as James Gholson over the advisability
and constitutionality of abolishing slavery in the state.

“Stephen B. Oates, The Fires of Jubilee: Nat Turner's
Fierce Rebellion (New York; Mentor Books, 1975).
“RE, Aug. 26, 30, 1831. For examples of the response to
the rebellion, see the Richmond Constitutional Whig and
Enquirer for the period August through December, 1831.
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Moderates like William Brodnax and Archibald Bryce proposed
compromise measures that would appease both sides and end
the tense debate.67 For a brief time in early 1832, Ritchie
opened the columns of the Enquirer to discussions about the
future of slavery in Virginia. But he also continued to
discuss the key national problems facing the nation, and
when the House of Delegates decided against instituting
plans to end slavery in the state, the editor fired a final
salvo and happily moved on to other matters. He rarely
discussed the topic of slavery in his paper again for the
next several years.68
Another irritating problem for Ritchie was the
continuing attacks on the Junto by Pleasants and others.
Foes of the group delighted in describing its members as
both haughty oligarchs of state power and fawning sycophants
of Jackson and Van Buren. During the 1828 presidential
campaign, attacks on the "Richmond Party" had become a
staple of Virginia political rhetoric. After Jackson's
election, those attacks continued and widened in scope.
Papers from across the nation informed their readers that a
Junto in Richmond sternly ruled the Old Dominion and kept it
allied with the administration. Occasionally, in the heat of
67RE, Oct. 25, 1831; Jan. 7, 1832; Freehling, Drift Toward
Dissolution. 122-169. See also Joseph Clark Robert, The Road
From Monticello: A Study of the Virginia Slavery Debate of
1832 (Durham: Trinity College Historical Society, 1941;
reprint New York: AMS Press, 1970).
68RE, Jan. 7, 1832.
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party battle, an opposition editor would claim that the
President or his chief minion, Van Buren, consulted with the
Junto before implementing a new policy or making a major
decision. Ritchie, as usual, dismissed these claims as
absurd.69
Attacks on the Junto, however, continued to emanate
chiefly from Virginians upset about the supposed power of
the group. Those opposed to "Ritchie & Co." or to Jackson
missed few opportunities to rail against the undemocratic
club in Richmond that ran state politics with an iron
hand.70 Alfred Powell confessed that one of the reasons he
supported the calling of a constitutional convention was
because he believed that it would "annihilate the Richmond
Junto with all its power and influence." Even though the
"party has dwindled and declined in talent" since its
founding by Spencer Roane, under Ritchie's guidance it still
exerted an undue influence in state matters. Patrick Cabell
was hardly less vehement in denouncing "that miserable
Junto, who claim an exclusion of republicanism," and who are

69Ritchie would often reprint these charges before
refuting them. See, for example, RE, Dec. 25, 1829, Nov. 19,
1830, June 28, 1831. For a typical example of accusations
about Van Buren and the Junto, see the Richmond Constitutional
Whig. Dec. 15, 1829, and Ritchie's response in the Enquirer of
Dec. 25, 1829.
70John Pleasants to John Tyler, Jan. 1, 1833, Lyon GTyler, The Letters and Times of the Tvlers (3 vols. Richmond
and Williamsburg, 1884-1896; reprint New York: De Capo Press,
1970), 1:451-452; "Extracts of a letter to W.M. Rives," Jan.
8, 1829, Rives Papers, LC.
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attempting to enforce a "new political Faith" that is
"reprobated by the venerable standards of 98-9." Cabell
confessed that he was filled with "feelings of utter scorn
and contempt" when he dwelled on the "arrogant and insulting
dictation of some half a score of barely third rate men,
residing in, and about, the Metropolis."71
Cabell's description of the group was as precise as
anyone cared to get in their assaults on the Junto. Everyone
assumed that Ritchie headed the clique, and that Peter V.
Daniel and Andrew Stevenson were among his closest advisors.
But other names were rarely mentioned. These three men, and
in particular, Ritchie, came in for the lion's share of
abuse and condemnation. Apparently Stevenson was not well
liked, even by his some of his political allies. While it
might be expected that Pleasants would devote much attention
to blasting Stevenson and his actions as Speaker of the
House, it was somewhat surprising to hear David Campbell and
his brother John, friendly to the Junto at the time,
criticize him. Stevenson's "vanity is beyond all
calculation," David told his wife. "To hear him talk, you
would suppose he was decidedly the greatest man in this
nation." The Speaker's disappointment at not receiving the
French ministry, David added, has made him a pouting "mal
content .11 When brother John heard of Stevenson's appointment
71Notes of Alfred Harrison Powell, n.d. [probably mid1829], Byrd Family Papers, VHS; Patrick H. Cabell to James C.
Cabell, March 21, 1829, Cabell Family Papers, UVA.
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as minister to Great Britain, he told David that "a more
selfish vain windy & vapouring blockhead I have never known
to get as high as he has gotten already." He was sure the
appointment would be laughed at throughout Virginia. Only
"his clan at Richmond" supported him.72 Daniel, longtime
member of the Executive Council and Lieutenant Governor,
also received sharp criticism as a member of the Junto.
Opponents denounced him as "that chief of hypocrites" and
worked to get him removed, or "scratched," from the Council.
Daniel seemed proud that opponents of the administration
found him "odious," and Richard Parker would later note that
the Whigs "cordially hate[d]" Daniel. Despite Ritchie's
support, Daniel failed to win the gubernatorial race in
1830, due in part to his unpopularity.73
The favorite target of criticism and party venom,
however, was Ritchie. Critics never tired of attacking him
or of concocting stories about his influence in Richmond and
Washington. Between 1829 and 1833, Ritchie's fiercest foes
were John Hampden Pleasants and John Floyd. Pleasants was
72Richmond Constitutional Whig. Nov. 26, 1828, April 28,
1829; David Campbell to Mary Campbell, May 21, 1829; John
Campbell to David Campbell, April 6, 1832, both in CFP, Duke.
73John Floyd Diary, Feb. 1, 1832, in Charles Ambler, The
Life and Diary of John Flovd (Richmond: Richmond Press, Inc.,
1918), 176; Jacob Lynch to William B. Campbell, Jan. 6, 1832,
CFP, Duke; Richmond Constitutional Whig. July 18, 1831; Daniel
to Jackson. Dec. 7_, 1834, Andrew Jackson Papers, LC; Richard
E. Parker to Van Buren, Dec. 25, 1835, Van Buren Papers, LC.
For Daniel's general unpopularity, see John P. Frank, Justice
Daniel Dissenting: A Biography of Peter V. Daniel. 1784-1860
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 76, 102.
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already well versed at tweaking Ritchie's nose, and he had
been almost continually denouncing Ritchie and the Junto for
years. Floyd, a Jacksonian who left the party when he did
not receive the office he thought himself entitled to, was
elected governor of Virginia in 1830, beating out Daniel.
During his three year tenure, Floyd made life difficult for
all administration men, but especially Ritchie and his
clique. "Ritchie and Stevenson and the Junta are harnessed
to the Van Buren car," Floyd noted disgustedly in his diary,
and he aimed to derail them.74
By the time he was elected governor in 1830, Floyd had
joined those Virginians who openly opposed Jackson during
his first term. Among these defectors were Littleton Waller
Tazewell and John Tyler, Virginia's two United States
Senators, who objected to some of Jackson's policies,
particularly his decision to negotiate a treaty with Turkey
before consulting Congress. Tyler, sensing the growing
displeasure towards Jackson in Virginia, claimed in March of
1830 that the state supported Jackson only out of the "fear
of greater ill under the auspices of another." A few
observers in Richmond agreed with this assessment.75
74John Floyd Diary, April 28, 1832, Ambler, Life and Diary
of Flovd. 184. See also entries for Mar. 8, 1831 (132) and
Feb. 1, 1832 (176).
75John Tyler to John Rutherfoord, March 14, 183 0, Tyler,
Letters and Times of Tvlers. 3:61-63; John Wickham to
Tazewell, Jan. 5, 1831, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL. For
Tazewell and Tyler's break with Jackson, see Andrew Jackson to
John Coffee, April 24, 1831, Bassett, ed., Correspondence of
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Tazewell, disappointed by Jackson and disgusted by the state
of affairs in Washington, yearned to retire from public
life. Benjamin Watkins Leigh urged him to stay on,
explaining that Ritchie would only "supply your place with a
Senator from Virginia likely to be more manageable." When
Virginia backed Van Buren as the vice-presidential nominee
in 1832, Tazewell resigned from the Senate, claiming that he
no longer spoke for the state and was unwilling to
contribute to the conversion of the government "into a
military despotism.1,76
Floyd took dissatisfaction with Jackson to another
level. He gloated that Jackson "has disappointed friends and
foes; all his enemies said of him before his election, has
been realized." Pleasants admitted that Floyd was the only
man in Virginia more hostile to Jackson than himself. "Floyd
is up to the highest button hole of anti-Jacksonianism," he
told one friend.77 Floyd, Pleasants, Tazewell, and Tyler
formed the leadership on an emerging anti-Jackson party
whose impact was felt immediately. Stevenson let slip the
state of affairs in Virginia when he told Van Buren that the
Jackson. 4:268-269; Ritchie to John Campbell, Oct. 26, 1829;
John Campbell to James Campbell, April 23, 1830; John Campbell
to David Campbell, n.d. [April 1831], all in CFP, Duke.
76Leigh to Tazewell, Feb. 22, 1832, Tazewell Family
Papers, VSL; Tazewell to John Wickham, Dec. 17, 1832, John
Wickham Papers, UVA.
^John Floyd Diary, March 8, 1831, Jan. 2, 1832, Ambler,
Life and Diarv of John Flovd. 123, 173; Pleasants to J.C.
Cabell, Nov. 14, 1831, Cabell Family Papers, UVA.
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state would support Jackson in the upcoming election,
"apostates to the contrary notwithstanding." The unity that
had marked Jackson's ascendancy in Virginia in 1828 was
already showing signs of falling apart.78
Discontent with Jackson in Virginia during this period
can be traced to three sources. First, the President's
actions in removing officeholders and replacing them with
friends and newspaper editors soured some Virginians
dedicated to reform, or, in the case of Floyd, intent on
securing a prestigious post in the new administration.
Second, the acrimonious and protracted dispute between
Jackson and Calhoun cost Old Hickory support among those in
the state who looked favorably upon the South Carolinian.
Some argued that Jackson's petulance in this matter
increased Calhoun's strength in Virginia enough to turn the
state against the administration.79 Ritchie at first denied
that Calhoun was quarreling with Jackson and Van Buren, and
then chided the South Carolinian for airing his private
matters in public. As always, Ritchie worried most about the
impact the feud would have on the Jacksonian party. In the
midst of the Jackson-Calhoun feud, he informed his readers
that they should not commit themselves to supporting anyone
78Stevenson to Van Buren, April 4, 1831, Van Buren Papers,
LC.
79Leigh to Tazewell, Feb. 22, 1831, Tazewell Family
Papers, VSL; "Clinton," RE, Feb. 24, 1831; William S. Archer
to Van Buren, March 12, 1831, Van Buren Papers, LC; J. Burton
Harrison to Rives, Aug. 30, 1831, Rives Papers, LC.
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who challenged Jackson's leadership. The "course of the
Republicans of Virginia fortunately admits of no confusion,"
he noted. "The landmarks are laid down, as straight as a ray
of light from Heaven." Virginia must support the President
and refuse to "bind herself at this time to the ear of any
man who aspires to be the successor of A. Jackson."80
The third and most significant factor in weakening the
unity of the Jackson party in Virginia involved the
political future of the Secretary of State, Martin Van
Buren. Many Virginians cast suspicious eyes on the New
Yorker, not just because of his place of birth, but also
because of his stance on key issues like internal
improvements and the Missouri Compromise. Given the
developments of the past decade, William M. Rives told his
brother, Virginians are "disposed to favour a southern
candidate in disregard of other considerations."81
Van Buren's reputation as an ambitious political
manipulator, a "trimmer," also cost him support in the
state. His "personal character," one observer noted in 1831,
"is at this date held in much aversion by all parties."82

80RE, May 21,
Quotes in March 10
Democratic Party,
University, 1974),

1830; Feb. 19, 24, March 10, 12, 1831.
issue; Lynwood Miller Dent, "The Virginia
1824-1847" (Ph.D. diss, Louisiana State
88.

81William M, Rives to William Cabell Rives, April 30,
183 0, Rives Papers, LC.
82J. Burton Harrison to William Cabell Rives, Aug. 30,
1831, Rives Papers, LC.
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More than one Virginian expressed the idea that Van Buren
had precipitated the spat between Calhoun and Jackson in
order to strengthen his position in the administration. When
Van Buren decided to resign his office in April of 1831,
with the notion that the remainder of the Cabinet, but
especially those allied with Calhoun, would step down as
well, Virginians marvelled at the machinations of the Little
Magician. Ritchie hoped Van Buren's resignation would ease
party tensions and dispel rumors that he was the power
behind the throne, while other members of the Junto were
less sanguine.83 For their part, Pleasants and Floyd needed
little time to decide that the whole affair had been
designed to punish Calhoun and to position Van Buren for the
vice-presidential chair.84
Such a notion was apparently widespread among
Virginians, for Ritchie told Van Buren that he would
seriously damage the party if he chose to run as vicepresident. The Junto leader flatly stated that neither he
nor the state could support Van Buren in this endeavor.
83Ritchie to Van Buren, April 20 and 21, 1831, Van Buren
Papers, LC; RE, April 22, May 3, 13, 1831; Daniel to Van
Buren, April 22, 1831; Parker to Van Buren, April 23, 1831,
both in Van Buren Papers, LC.
Van Buren only informed three people in advance of his
decision to resign. Ritchie was one of them. This fact
confirms Van Buren's high opinion of Ritchie's influence in
the party. Van Buren to Ritchie, April 17, 1831, Van Buren
Papers, LC.
^John Floyd Diary, April 21, 1831, Ambler, Diary of John
Flovd. 139; Richmond Constitutional Whig. April 22, May 30,
1831.
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Ritchie repeatedly told his subscribers that the New Yorker
had not, and would not, seek the second highest chair in the
land. He would instead continue to serve the country as
minister to the Court of St. James.85
The continued attacks on Van Buren in Virginia forced
Ritchie to admit that the administration was losing
supporters in the state. John Randolph, never one to mince
words, bluntly informed Jackson that the "great defection on
the part of your supporters in Virginia" stemmed from the
influence that Van Buren and other northerners had over
affairs. Richmonder John Rutherfoord gloomily noted the
"schisms in the republican ranks" brought on by the
dissolution of the cabinet and other events. Jackson's
popularity was "wholly ruined," another added. "In Virginia
every one is mortified & chagrined," and the "abandonment of
the President has been very extensive."86
Despite growing criticism, Jackson remained extremely
popular in Virginia. Few doubted in 1831 that the President
would win reelection in the upcoming election, and even
Floyd believed that Jackson would "still get the vote of the

85Ritchie to Van Buren, April 30, 1831, Van Buren Papers,
LC; RE, April 8, 22, May 20, 24, Dec. 2, 30, 1831.
86RE, June 24, 1831; Randolph to Jackson, Nov. 8, 1831,
Bassett, ed., Correspondence of Jackson. 4:369-370; John
Rutherfoord to Rives, Nov. 6, 1831; J. Burton Harrison to
Rives, Aug. 30, 1831, both in Rives Papers, LC.
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State because he is now less odious than Clay."87 Within the
Virginia Jackson party, however, considerable
dissatisfaction existed with the idea of Jackson choosing
Van Buren as his running mate. The Senate's rejection of the
New Yorker as minister to the Court of St. James, engineered
by Calhoun and Clay, "excited ... universal indignation" in
the state and moved many to support a Jackson-Van Buren
ticket. Stevenson wrote from Washington and encouraged
Ritchie to throw his weight behind Van Buren's candidacy.
Virginia must "take a strong and bold part" in this matter.
"If she does, all is safe." Ritchie, sensing the displeasure
such a development would cause among certain portions of his
party, wisely withheld acting publicly on Stevenson's
advice. While privately he had already decided to support
Van Buren, he continued to plead with Virginians to abide by
the decisions of the national party convention which would
meet in Baltimore in May of 1832.88
A significant number of Jacksonians ignored Ritchie's
pleas and moved to place Philip Pendelton Barbour in
nomination for the vice-presidency. Barbour, who had ties
87John Floyd Diary, Jan. 2, 1832, Ambler, Diarv of Flovd.
173; RE, June 24, 1831; Arthur Campbell to David Campbell,
Sept. 2, 1831, CFP, Duke.
88Parker to John Campbell, Feb. 3, 1832; Stevenson to
Ritchie, Feb. 4, 1832, both in Van Buren Papers, LC; RE, Jan.
31, Feb. 4, 18, 24, 28, 1832; Parker to Tazewell, Feb. 6,
1832, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL. For the Junto's support for
Van Buren at this time, see John Campbell to Van Buren, Feb.
10, 1832; Daniel to Van Buren, July 12, 1832; Parker to Van
Buren, Sept. 5, 1832, all in Van Buren Papers, LC.
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with the Junto, possessed all of the qualities that Van
Buren lacked; that is, he was an orthodox Southerner. His
popularity had risen since he had ably presided over the
Constitutional Convention of 1829. Voters in Piedmont
Virginia were especially enamored of Barbour, but he
attracted supporters throughout the state. As the campaign
progressed, it seemed that support for the Virginian
outstripped that for Van Buren.89
The Barbour movement proved to be a tremendous headache
for the Junto. There was no way that it could support
Barbour publicly, regardless of its private regard for him.
To abandon Van Buren at this stage would have amounted to
political suicide. For the past decade, the Junto and the
Regency had worked together, first with Crawford and then
with Jackson. Van Buren had always been the prime mover
behind the coalition. Loyalty to him dictated that the
Barbour movement be turned back and the path laid clear for
the Little Magician. Besides, Barbour's supporters
threatened to split the party vote in the state, thereby
allowing the nascent opposition party to sweep into power.
Party unity demanded, Ritchie and the Junto claimed, that
Virginians abide by the decision made at the upcoming
national convention. The group was beginning to realize

89William M. Rives to William Cabell Rives, April 30,
1830; Thomas Walker Gilmer to William Cabell Rives, Sept. 29,
1830, both in Rives Papers, LC; Dent, "Virginia Democratic
Party," 107-113.
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first-hand the necessity of party discipline and loyalty.90
At the Baltimore Convention, Andrew Stevenson, P.V.
Daniel and Philip N. Nicholas all represented Virginia.
Despite this strong Junto influence, the delegates from the
Old Dominion were determined to cast their ballots for
Barbour as vice-president. At a caucus of the state's
delegates, Daniel and Nicholas proposed a compromise that
most of the men in attendance accepted. The state would
support Barbour initially, but should it become clear that
he lacked sufficient votes to gain the nomination, Virginia
would accept the convention's choice for vice-president
without dissent. Everyone understood that that meant backing
Van Buren. This is what eventually happened, but not before
hard-core Barbour supporters, unwilling to accept the Little
Magician on the party ticket, walked out of the
proceedings.91
Barbour's forces in Virginia were exceedingly bitter
about the action of the state's delegates, and refused to
abide by the convention's decision to support Van Buren.92

90RE, No v . 11, 1831, Feb. 28, March 4, 1832; Roane and
Daniel both worked to keep the Virginia legislature from
endorsing Barbour, and Stevenson asked Ritchie to put pressure
on Barbour to withdraw from consideration. See RE, March 1,
1832; Stevenson to Ritchie, Feb. 4, 1832, Van Buren Papers,
LC. See also the "Message of the Jackson Central Committee,"
RE, Oct. 16, 1832.
91RE, May 25, 29, 1832.
^Littleton W. Tazewell to John Tazewell, May 23, 1832,
Tazewell Family Papers, VSL.
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Within a month a "Jackson and Barbour Convention" convened
to Charlottesville to plan for the upcoming election. In
their address, delegates insisted that they did not want to
fractionalize the Jackson party in the state or the nation.
They desired peace and unity. But the possibility of Van
Buren becoming vice-president prompted them to take matters
into their own hands. The New Yorker was hostile to "every
principle and interest which has been justly held dear by
Virginians," they claimed. Furthermore, he had been foisted
upon the people by the oligarchic Richmond Party. Voting for
Van Buren, they concluded, would represent the first step in
subjecting the state to the "control of a northern
regency.1,93
Throughout the summer of 1832, Ritchie and the Junto
worked to bring Barbour's supporters back into the fold. The
group worried above all about the potentially disastrous
implications of splitting the party vote in November.
Defeating the unnatural coalition of Clay and Calhoun
required strength, unity, and harmony. Ritchie stressed
these themes repeatedly in the Enquirer and made every
effort to assuage the fears of the Barbourites about Van
Buren. The state would not fall under the sway of any

93"Resolution and Address of the Charlottesville Jackson
and Barbour Convention," (Charlottesville: Cary & Watson,
1832), VHS; RE, June 8, 1832. The Alexandria Gazette (May 9,
1832) also believed that the Junto was forcing Van Buren upon
the South, as did Littleton Waller Tazewell. Tazewell to John
Tazewell, May 23, 1832, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL.
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"northern regency." Nor had the "Richmond Party" forced Van
Buren upon the state; no such organization existed. There
was, however, a real crisis facing Virginia and the nation.
The tariff controversy in South Carolina and the debate over
the Bank of the United States were both far more significant
than petty squabbles over the second place on a party
ticket. Supporters of the Union and of the Jackson
administration must unite to end the crisis and preserve the
integrity of the Union.94
As the election neared and the focus of discussion
turned increasingly to the situation in South Carolina,
Barbour's support dwindled, leading him to withdraw from the
race in October.95 By then it was clear that a JacksonBarbour ticket had no chance of winning, even in Virginia.
Moreover, many political commentators had crippled Barbour's
chances by linking his supporters with the Nullifiers of
South Carolina. Barbour's friends, John Marshall noted, were
"secretly for Calhoun" and among the "most violent of the
state right party." He had no doubt that they were also
"attached to nullification in principle." But Marshall,
already at odds with Jackson, found no cause to celebrate
the split in the Virginia Democratic party. "There might be

^RE, June 8, 12, 19, 1832.
95Duff Green to Thomas W. Gilmer, Sept. 24, 1832, Duff
Green Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of
North Carolina-Chapel Hill; Gilmer to Barbour, Oct. 2, 1832,
Papers of the Ambler and Barbour Families, UVA.
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some difficulty in managing this tangled business were not
the Jackson majority so overwhelming as to leave his friends
nothing to fear from a division.1,96 The Chief Justice,
removed as he was from the intricacies of party politics in
Virginia, misjudged the anxiety caused by the movement to
keep Van Buren off of the ballot. But he did not misread
public sentiment for Old Hickory. Jackson swept to a
commanding victory in Virginia, capturing 75% of the popular
vote, even with the northerner Van Buren as his running
mate.97

Marshall's connection of the Barbour movement with the
nullification debate brought together nicely the two
greatest problems facing the Junto in the years between 1829
and 1833. After successfully exerting its influence to elect
Andrew Jackson to the presidency, the group found itself
almost immediately embroiled in a number of minor and some
not so minor disputes. If Jackson's cabinet selections, his
patronage policies, and his uneven record on stifling
internal improvement bills all gave cause for concern among
his supporters in Richmond, the President's handling of the
Nullification Crisis and Van Buren's crafty efforts to
inherit the throne caused outright panic. On top of all
96Marshall to Joseph Story, Aug. 2, 1832, (typescript copy
of original in Massachusetts Historical Society), Marshall
Papers, William and Mary.
^Congressional Quarterly, Presidential Elections. 94.
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this, developments within the state produced bitter division
and controversy. Faced with these distressing occurrences,
the Junto responded by maintaining and even strengthening
both its loyalty to Jackson and Van Buren and its position
as leader of the Virginia Democratic Party.98 While
continuing to insist upon their independence from party
leaders in Washington —

they were only interested in

following the principles of state rights —

the members of

the Junto were gradually accepting the need for effective
party discipline and loyalty, the hallmark of the second
party system.99 Jackson's resounding victory at the polls in
1832, coming as it did after four years of bickering,
agitation, and compromise, gave the Junto reason to
celebrate. Despite complaints, defections, and an attempted
rebellion within the ranks, the group somehow managed to
hold the Jacksonian party together. Ritchie and his group

"Ritchie to Rives, Oct. 12, 1831, Rives Papers, LC.
Ritchie admitted that "my heart & hand are with" Jackson
because he will "restore ... the right reading of the
Constitution - and bring back the spirit of Union & harmony to
our people." Lynwood Dent has argued that the Junto remained
"Jackson's one constant source of support in Virginia" during
this period. Dent, "Virginia Democratic Party," 81.
"Daniel and Stevenson were the best examples of this. I
do not, however, agree with Dent, "Virginia Democratic Party,"
122, that the Junto had completely accepted "Van Buren's new
concept of party" by 1833, or with William Cooper's assertion
that "the Junto men were much more concerned about party in
general and about loyalty to the Democratic party in
particular" than republican principles. William J. Cooper,
Jr., The South and the Politics of Slavery. 1828-1856 (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978) , 12. Only after
1837 does this statement have any validity.
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realized, however, that four years of almost constant
struggle had produced much bitterness in Virginia, and they
hoped that Jackson's second term would be marked by peace
and harmony.
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Chapter IV
Party Warfare: 1834-1840

Despite the fallout caused by the Proclamation and the
Force Bill, the Richmond Junto had managed to keep the
Virginia Democratic party fairly unified during Jackson's
first administration. The clique realized, however, that the
growing opposition to Jackson presented a threat that could
not be ignored. Jackson's second term, the Junto hoped,
would proceed more smoothly than the first, and the
President would not provide Virginians with any further
reasons to abandon the Democratic party.
In this hope, the Junto was to be profoundly
disappointed. The years between 1834 and 1840 were marked by
some of the most ferocious party struggles ever seen in
Virginia. The Junto found itself fighting not only an
organized opposition party, the Whigs, but also factions
within the Democratic party that challenged the group's
leadership. After suffering several setbacks in 1834 and
early 1835, the Junto regrouped and reexerted its control in
1836, contributing to Martin Van Buren's victory that year.
Van Buren's election, however, brought no calm to
political affairs in Virginia. The Whigs controlled the
184
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state legislature and continued their attacks on the
administration. They were joined by a group of dissident
Democrats, known as the Conservatives, who disagreed with
Van Buren over his proposal for a sub-treasury banking
scheme that would divorce the federal government from
banking. While the Junto itself was split over the
usefulness of the sub-treasury scheme, it remained united
enough to insist on party unity and support for Van Buren as
the leader of the Democrats. This call for cohesion became
even more imperative when Calhoun Democrats in Virginia
began challenging the Junto's control of the party.
In the bitter partisan battles that took place during
Van Buren's administration, the Junto's power was sorely
tested and ultimately broken. The group worked hard to see
Van Buren capture Virginia's electoral votes in 1840, albeit
by the slimmest of margins. But this triumph represented the
last major achievement of the Junto. Dismayed by the
election of William H. Harrison, weakened by attacks from
both within and without their party, and their ranks thinned
by death and appointment to federal offices, the remaining
members of the Junto were losing their influence and slowly
fading from the political scene. By late 1840, the group's
control over the Virginia Democratic party had become
tenuous at best, and it was clear that the end of an era was
rapidly approaching.
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With Jackson reelected and a compromise reached on the
Nullification Crisis, the Junto fervently hoped that a
spirit of harmony and cooperation would take hold of
Virginia and the nation. Commenting upon Jackson's second
inaugural address, Ritchie thought he saw a new era dawning
in America. "Who can despair of such a Republic," he asked
rhetorically. "Who will not lend a hand to the
accomplishments of the great destinies which are opening
before us? Let us then be true to our country, and we shall
be blessed indeed." The future held great promise if only
the American people could unite and bend their energies
toward constructive, rather than destructive, ends. "Every
thing, we now hope," Ritchie concluded, "will return to its
usua1 channel."1
Ritchie's dream of political harmony proved illusory.
By the end of 1833, debate over slavery had flared up again,
Jackson was embroiled in another controversy, this time
surrounding the removal of the deposits from the Bank of the
United States, and the opposition party in Virginia was
rapidly gaining strength as the spring elections approached.
There was to be no respite after the tumultuous first years
of the Jackson administration, and some Virginians believed
that Jackson himself was partially to blame. It seemed to
one observer that the "atmosphere in which he breaths must
be agitated to give him life and health." Ritchie disagreed
‘Richmond Enquirer. March 7, 12, 1833.
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with this assessment, but was forced to admit in the summer
of 1833 that instead of peace and prosperity, "this is the
day of excess, of political fanaticism, of violent feeling,
of ultra abuse."2 With a hint of annoyance, Ritchie informed
his brother that "we cannot get every thing smooth in the
political world." To another friend, he wrote simply, the
"times are out of joint in politics."3
Throughout 1833 and 1834, the Junto found itself
battling a familiar enemy: John C. Calhoun. The members of
the group had repeatedly expressed their hostility toward
the South Carolinian ever since his break with the Jackson
administration in 1830. Calhoun's course during the election
of 1832 and the Nullification Crisis had sealed his fate in
the eyes of the Junto as a trouble-maker and political
opportunist. Now they were convinced that the former vicepresident was attempting "to rally a Southern Party around
the Slave Question" and to present himself as the spokesman
for the region.4 Since the Junto believed that Calhoun did
not represent the true southern state rights position, it
moved decisively to condemn him. The Junto offered a variety
2David Campbell to James Campbell, Sept. 15, 1833,
Campbell Family Papers (hereafter cited as CFP), Duke
University; RE, Aug. 6, 1833.
3Thomas Ritchie to Archibald Ritchie, Nov. 23, 1833,
John P. Branch Historical Papers of Randolph Macon College.
Vol. 3, no. 3 (June 1911), 214; Thomas Ritchie to William
Cabell Rives, Jan. 6, 1834, William Cabell Rives Papers,
Library of Congress.
4RE, July 26, 1833.
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of reasons for attacking Calhoun. By seeking to create a
purely sectional alliance, the South Carolinian was
undermining the strength and integrity of the Union. He was
also attempting to weaken the state's beneficial
relationship with the national Democratic party, and thereby
lessen the influence of Virginia in Washington. Calhoun's
message appealed to the fears of southern slaveholders, not
to their reason, and was therefore dangerous. All of this
meant that Virginians must take a stand against Calhoun and
his plans for a southern party. Ritchie told William Cabell
Rives that he would "battle with the Calhoun party as long
as I can" in the hopes of minimizing the influence it would
have in Virginia and across the South. Calhoun must be
stopped at all costs, he informed his readers. "No one deals
more in metaphysics and mystification, and no one is so
utterly unsafe and unfit to be trusted."5
The Junto's goal of discrediting Calhoun proved to be a
delicate task. Since the South Carolinian was proclaiming
the need for southern solidarity on the slavery question, an
attack on him might be perceived as an attack on the
peculiar institution and on the South itself. Therefore,
Ritchie and other opponents of Calhoun tempered their
criticism of him with frequent defenses of the slave system
and with menacing threats to those outsiders attempting to

sRitchie to Rives, Aug. 26, 1833, Rives Papers, LC; RE,
April 4, 1834.
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meddle in the South's affairs. In the midst of chiding
Calhoun for his destructive ambition, Ritchie paused
(somewhat gratuitously) to remind his readers that "If ever
the Federal Government pretends to control this species of
property [slavery], the Union itself is gone. We, devoted as
we are to the Union, would be the first to cry for its
dissolution."6 Ritchie's words reveal the hardening
orthodoxy on the slavery question that was coming to
characterize the South in the 1830s. Although he insisted
that he was dedicated to the preservation of both the Union
and the rights of the state, it was increasingly clear where
his ultimate loyalty lay.7
A second source of concern for the Junto was Andrew
Jackson's decision to withdraw federal deposits from the
Second Bank of the United States in late 1833. Even though
the Bank's charter was set to expire in 1836, and a recent
Congressional investigation had cleared the institution of
any wrong-doing and declared that the public deposits were
safe, Jackson moved aggressively to slay the Bank dragon.
When his Secretary of the Treasury, William Duane, refused
to issue the order calling for the withdrawal, Jackson
demanded his resignation. He soon elevated Roger Taney, the
Attorney General, to the position, who immediately began to
6RE, July 26, 1833. See also, Aug. 2, Oct. 8, 11, Nov.
1, 1833.
7For an example of this sentiment, see RE, Feb. 12,
March 12, 1833.
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make the necessary arrangements. To many observers, even
those friendly to Jackson, the President's actions were
perceived as unnecessary and quite possibly illegal. Those
who had broken from the Jacksonian coalition during the
first administration quickly raised the cry of executive
usurpation and warned the country of the dangers of allowing
Jackson to exercise virtually unchecked power.8
In Virginia, the removal of the deposits quickly became
the leading topic of debate. Reaction to Jackson'sattack on
the Bank was largely negative. Most argued that hehadacted
precipitately and without proper reflection. The President
had let "his zeal ... get the better of his judgment," David
Campbell thought. More importantly, he had failed to respect
the authority of the other branches of the federal
government. This was the "very essence of despotism."9
Others agreed with Campbell. The Virginia legislature passed
a resolution denouncing the withdrawal of the deposits as an
unconstitutional act, and instructed Virginia's Senators,
William Cabell Rives and John Tyler, to support legislation
calling for the restoration of the deposits. Rives, strongly

8Robert Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of
American Democracy. 1833-1845 (New York: Harper & Row,
1984), 84-131. After Taney's promotion, Jackson asked Junto
member Peter V. Daniel to be Attorney General. Daniel
declined. RE, Oct. 29, 1833.
9David Campbell to William B. Campbell, Oct. 29, 1833,
CFP, Duke. See also, Littleton Waller Tazewell to John
Wickham, Jan. 14, 1834, John Wickham Papers, University of
Virginia.
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allied with the administration, refused to obey these
instructions and resigned his seat. The Virginia legislature
replaced him with Benjamin Watkins Leigh, a known enemy of
Jackson.10 Even Ritchie criticized Jackson and doubted if he
had acted within the realm of his executive powers. More
importantly, Ritchie worried that Jackson's rash actions
would revive sympathy for the nearly dead Bank of the United
States. John Campbell, a Junto associate and Treasurer of
the United States, echoed Ritchie's sentiment when he
complained that the "Bank was kill'd dead & he [Jackson] has
brought it bank to life."11
Not all Junto members disagreed with Jackson and his
removal policy. Andrew Stevenson, who had stuck with the
President throughout the Nullification Crisis and was now
angling for a diplomatic mission, expressed his support for
Jackson's plan to kill the Bank. Stevenson kept in constant
touch with John Brockenbrough in Richmond in an effort to
control the damage caused by the removals. Richard E.
Parker, Ritchie's cousin, insisted that the removal of the

10RE, Feb. 22, 25, March 1, 1834; Raymond C. Dingledine,
Jr., "The Political Career of William Cabell Rives," (Ph.D.
diss., University of Virginia, 1947), 211-213; Lynwood
Miller Dent, Jr., "The Virginia Democratic Party, 18241847," (Ph.D. diss, Louisiana State University, 1974), 151154. For Leigh's "viper-hatred of Gen. Jackson," see C.W.
Gooch to John Campbell, Sept. 5, 1833, Gooch Family Papers,
Virginia Historical Society.
nRE, Feb. 22, 1834; Sept. 27, 1833; Ritchie to Rives,
Aug. 26, 1833, Rives Papers, LC; John Campbell to David
Campbell, March 21, 1834, CFP, Duke.
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deposits was "prudent and necessary," and Peter V. Daniel
defended the President and spoke out against Ritchie and
other administration men who criticized Jackson.12
Whatever their personal feelings about Jackson's
removal policy, the members of the Junto realized that they
had to move quickly to deflect attention away from the
President's controversial actions. The group understood that
anti-administration forces, which had been slow to coalesce
in the past, were capitalizing on Jackson's sudden
unpopularity in Virginia and attempting to forge a coalition
that could control the state legislature. Speaking of the
radical state rights advocates and the nationalistic
supporters of Henry Clay, Ritchie wrote early in 1834 that
"It is obvious that the two fragments of the opposition in
the Legislature are approaching each other & forming a
Combination against the Administration." John Brockenbrough
expressed concern that the "Nullifiers and Clayites
combined" would carry the day at the upcoming spring
elections, and Parker confirmed these suspicions. "A great
effort is making now in Virginia by the party opposed to
Genl. Jackson, to raise an outcry against him for the
removal of the deposits," Parker wrote one friend, adding
12Francis Fry Wayland, Andrew Stevenson: Democrat and
Diplomat. 1785-1857 (Philadelphia: University of
Philadelphia Press, 1949), 93-100; Richard E. Parker to
Martin Van Buren, Nov. 29, 1834, Van Buren Papers, LC; John
P. Frank, Justice Daniel Dissenting: A Biography of Peter V.
Daniel. 1784-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1964), 119-126.
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that "it will partially succeed."13
Parker/s assessment proved to be an accurate one. As
Harold Moser has noted, the "timing and methods of the
removal of the deposits ... shook the Junto to its
foundations.1,14 Split over Jackson's policy and caught off
guard by the strong reaction against it in Virginia, the
Junto suddenly found itself fighting for its political
existence. In a series of letters to Andrew Stevenson, Junto
members described the frenzied political scene in Richmond
as they battled to hold off the opposition forces. "You have
no idea of the excitement among parties here," one
correspondent wrote. Ritchie told Stevenson that "I never
was so much absorbed by politics in all my life," and
William H. Roane kept Stevenson informed of his heated
contest in Hanover County, just outside the city. In March
of 1833, Roane noted, the political situation in Virginia
was so calm that he had refused to stand for reelection the
following spring. But the removal of the deposits had roused
such fury across the state that he had reconsidered and

13Ritchie to Rives, Jan. 6, 1834, Rives Papers, LC; John
Brockenbrough to Andrew Stevenson, April 5, 1834, Branch
Historical Papers. Vol. 3, no. 3 (June 1911), 253-254;
Richard E. Parker to Edward Lucas, Jr., Jan. 12, 1834,
Edward Lucas and William Lucas Letters, Duke.
14Harold D. Moser, "Subtreasury Politics and the
Virginia Conservative Democrats, 1835-1844," (Ph.D. diss,
University of Wisconsin, 1977), 46.
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decided to run.15
While Roane was fighting for his political life in
Hanover County, tempers flared in Richmond and Ritchie and
Daniel faced physical attack. Ritchie's "temporizing course11
on the Bank question, a former partner, C.W. Gooch,
explained to Van Buren, had so enraged Richmonders that they
nearly destroyed his office at the Enquirer. Fortunately,
"cool heads" prevailed before any damage was done.16 Daniel
was less lucky. Late in March 1834, Daniel unburdened
himself to Stevenson, describing his hellish life in
Richmond. The Whigs were following his every move and seemed
bent on destroying him. "I am watched throughout the day;
every door I enter, every person with whom I speak is a
subject of jealous scrutiny. I am even, it is said,
threatened with being hunted to ruin in my business, and
with personal violence." The worst offender was John
Pleasants, the editor of the Richmond Whig, but there were
plenty of others as well, Daniel told Stevenson. But they
would never stop him from doing his duty. "Damn the
contemptable [sic] slaves of the Bank ..., I put them all at

lsJohn Rutherfoord to Andrew Stevenson, March 19, 1834;
Ritchie to Stevenson, n.d. [probably late 1833, early 1834];
[William H. Roane] to Stevenson, March 27, 1834, all in
Stevenson Papers, LC.
16C.W. Gooch to Martin Van Buren, March 24, 1834, Van
Buren Papers, LC.
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defiance. "I7

Daniel's concern about his safety was well founded. In
the summer of 1833, after lambasting Pleasants in the
Enquirer. Daniel was attacked by Pleasants and Joseph Selden
as he left the state capitol. The assailants were armed with
pistols and a dirk, and Daniel was "hurt ... a great deal."
Pleasants and Selden were arraigned by a grand jury for
assault, and tension in Richmond reached new heights. "God
knows what we are coming to," Ritchie sighed.18
Stunned by the strong and hostile attacks of the
opposition forces, the Junto mounted an extensive
counterattack. Its central strategy was to defend Jackson
and his removal policy by claiming that the Bank of the
United States continued to pose a threat to the country
because of its undue power and influence. Attacks on Jackson
for usurping power were uncalled for and misdirected, they
argued. The President was merely using the constitutional
means at his disposal to protect the country from the
"monster" Bank. Evidence would soon be disclosed that
revealed the "immense power of the Bank & the great abuse of
it," Richard Parker confidently predicted. The people's eyes
would be opened to the dangers posed by the unconstitutional
17Peter V. Daniel to Stevenson, March 29, 1834,
Stevenson Papers, LC.
18Littleton Waller Tazewell to John N. Tazewell, Aug.
19, 1834, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL; Ritchie to Rives,
Aug. 23, 1834, Rives Paper, LC; Daniel to Van Buren, Aug. 8,
1838, Van Buren Papers, LC.
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institution. By criticizing the removal of the deposits,
Jackson's foes were overlooking the real issue at stake.
"The constitutionality of the institution, seems to be
entirely lost sight of," John Rutherfoord complained.19 If
this was in fact the case, it was not the fault of Thomas
Ritchie. He flooded the Enquirer with attacks on the Bank,
always describing the alarming influence it continued to
wield and highlighting the continued threat that it posed to
the liberties of the people and the very existence of the
Union. The real question facing the nation, he insisted, was
whether the people would rule the Bank, or the Bank would
rule the people. Virginians must "choose between the Rights
of the States, and the Liberties of the People[,] or a
tremendous Institution, which threatens and mocks at both."
No compromise could be made on the question, Ritchie
continued. "This ground of the unconstitutionality of the
Bank is like adamant. No republican can surrender it. He
cannot compromise it." To make sure the dangers of the Bank
were clearly laid out, Ritchie offered a blunt summary to
his readers: "Subscribe to the Bank, and we sign the deathwarrant of the true principles of the government." The only
question worth considering in the upcoming election, he

19Parker to Edward Lucas, Jr., Jan. 12, 1834, Lucas
Letters, Duke; John Rutherfoord to Stevenson, March 19,
1834, Stevenson Papers, LC.
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insisted, was "Bank or no Bank."20
Despite the efforts of the Junto to deflect attention
away from Jackson's removal policy, the opposition forces in
Virginia, now known as the Whigs, were able to capitalize on
anti-Jackson sentiment in the state. The first sign of the
growing power of the Whigs came when the General Assembly
selected Littleton Waller Tazewell, a strong antiJacksonian, over Daniel in the 1834 gubernatorial contest.
Tazewell, an extremely private man, agreed to run only
because he believed that the times demanded that everyone do
their part to end the misrule of Jackson. Ritchie
maintained, however, that Tazewell had been elected by a
broad coalition of delegates, including Jacksonians, because
of his services to the state, not his political opinions.
But other observers interpreted Tazewell's election
differently. Hugh Mercer claimed that not only had the Junto
been "put down," but Van Buren's chances of carrying
Virginia in 1836 had been dealt a serious blow. John Strode
Barbour told a kinsman that "the Richmond Junto are broken
down and thrown into the most contemptible and spiritless
minority. Even Ritchie and Peter V. Daniel are fawning and
begging for quarter."21
20RE, Dec. 24, 1833; March 6, 1834. For similar
expressions of these ideas, see RE, Sept. 27, Nov. 1, 1833;
Feb. 8, 15, 1834.
21Tazewell to John Floyd, Nov. 25, 1833, John Floyd
Papers, LC; RE, Jan. 9, 1834; Hugh Mercer to Tazewell, Jan.
20, 1834, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL; John S. Barbour to
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Shortly after Daniel's defeat, the Junto suffered
another setback. When Rives resigned from the Senate rather
than vote to restore the deposits, the Junto hoped to
replace him with Philip P. Barbour, back in good graces
after his abortive vice-presidential bid in 1832. But the
Whigs mustered enough support to defeat Barbour and appoint
Benjamin Watkins Leigh to the vacant seat instead.22
These reverses in the state legislature did not bode
well for the Jacksonians as the annual spring elections
neared. They had controlled the General Assembly for several
years and had not been seriously challenged since 1829. Now
it appeared that the Whigs would not only give the
administration party a strong fight, but might actually
defeat them and assume power in the state. "We are in a
state of inexpressible anxiety about the results of the
elections," John Brockenbrough told Andrew Stevenson. In the
columns of the Enquirer. Ritchie fretted over the
complacency of the Jacksonians and worked frantically to
rouse the faithful to victory.23
As the elections approached, the Junto began to speak
more confidently of success. Ritchie predicted that the
James Barbour, Jan. 22, 1834, cited in Charles D. Lowery,
James Barbour. A Jeffersonian Republican (University, Al:
University of Alabama Press, 1984), 227.
22RE, Feb. 27, 1834.
23Brockenbrough to Stevenson, April 5, 1834, Branch
Historical Papers. Vol. 3, no. 3 (June 1911), 253-254; RE,
March 28, April 1, 8, 11, 1834.
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administration party would be vindicated at the polls, and
Brockenbrough assured Stevenson that everything was safe.
The group was also convinced that fellow member William H.
Roane, running for office in Hanover County, would be
"elected by a triumphant vote."24 Then disaster struck.
Jackson, angry about the Senate's censure of his course
during the removal controversy, issued a Protest to that
body on April 15, 1834. Jackson defended his actions,
insisted that the president's only responsibility was to the
people, and condemned the unconstitutional nature of the
Senate's censure.25 Jackson's Protest sent shock waves
through the Senate and had an immediate impact on the
elections in Virginia. "Richmond is all agog about the
President's protest," Brockenbrough told Stevenson. He had
already met with Ritchie and Philip N. Nicholas, and would
soon meet with Roane, to discuss possible responses. All
agreed that "something must be done at once or the party
will be dissolved." Brockenbrough closed by notifying
Stevenson that "news from the elections [was] bad, very
bad."26
The news was "very bad" for the Junto and the

24RE, April 8, 11, 1834; Brockenbrough to Stevenson,
April 11, 1834, Stevenson Papers, LC.
“Remini, Course of American Democracy. 152-160.
“Brockenbrough to Stevenson, April 20, 1834, Stevenson
Papers, LC. Ritchie mildly criticized Jackson for the
Protest in the April 22, 1834, edition of the Enquirer.
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Jacksonian party in Virginia. The Whigs won enough seats to
gain control of the state legislature. Both parties agreed
that Jackson's Protest had played a key role in the outcome.
Ritchie laid part of the blame on the President, but also
criticized his fellow party members for their apathy.
Governor Tazewell thought that the "dose administered in the
President's Protest, proved even too drastic for the strong
stomach of Jacksonians."27 Even more disheartening to the
Junto was Roane's defeat in Hanover. Ritchie confessed that
"Roane's defeat stung me more than any other election I ever
knew.... I don't know when I have experienced such bitter
feelings - I could think of nothing else."28
The election had been a complete disaster for the
Junto, but there was more bad news yet to come. In the
summer of 1834, Andrew Stevenson, the group's representative
in Washington, had been nominated by Jackson to be the new
minister to Great Britain, only to be rejected by the
Senate. Stevenson had recently been criticized in Virginia
for supporting the removal of the deposits despite the
objections of his constituents. Instructions sent from the
state legislature demanding that Stevenson vote for the

^RE, April 25, 1834; Littleton W. Tazewell to John N.
Tazewell, April 29, 1834, Tazewell Family Papers, VSL.
28These quotes can be found in two undated letters from
Ritchie to Stevenson, Stevenson Papers, LC. See also William
Pope to Stevenson, April 28, 1834, Stevenson Papers, LC,
where Pope blamed the "Richmond and bank influence" for
Roane's defeat.
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restoration of the deposits, coupled with his recent
nomination, had convinced Stevenson to resign his seat in
the House of Representatives.29 When the Senate rejected his
nomination, Ritchie and other Jacksonians argued that
Stevenson was being punished for his political views, and
they sharply criticized those senators who had voted against
him. Ritchie condemned the "slanderous persecution" of
Stevenson by his "remorseless enemies." Richard Parker
argued that the Senate's actions "exceeds in highhanded
injustice the rejection of Mr. Van Buren on a former
occasion." Stevenson felt scorned and mistreated. "I gave up
a lucrative position, with the prospect of increased
wealth," he wrote in a letter published in the Enquirer. "to
devote myself to public service, and now I am to be re-paid
with denunciation and abuse!"30
The hard times continued for the Junto when the Whigcontrolled legislature convened in Richmond in December of
1834. One of the first actions of that body was to strip
Ritchie and Daniel of their official positions in the state
government. Ritchie had served as state printer for twenty
years, but suddenly found himself denied that lucrative
office. The Junto leader thought it was obvious that he had
been replaced for political reasons, and he considered
29RE, May 13, 27, 1834; Wayland, Andrew Stevenson. 101106.
30RE, July 4, 1834; Parker to Stevenson, July 21, 1834,
Stevenson Papers, LC; RE, May 27, 1834.
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himself the first "martyr" of Whig oppression.31 Daniel's
removal from the Executive Council after a protracted debate
in January convinced the Junto that the Whigs were set on
following a vindictive and intemperent course. "The spirit
of proscription never prevailed with more ruthlessness than
it does here at this time," Daniel informed Jackson.32
The removal of Ritchie and Daniel marked the low point
of the Richmond Junto's career. Between late 1833 and early
1835, the group had suffered a series of reverses that
severely weakened its standing in Virginia. Unprepared for
the ferocity of the opposition attack, its members were
derided, turned out of office, and publicly attacked. Worse,
the Junto had been powerless to prevent the Whigs from
assuming control of the state legislature. Something had
gone wrong, terribly wrong, but the group was unsure what it
was. Perhaps it had misjudged anti-Jackson sentiment in the
state. But the President remained popular in Virginia, they
insisted, despite his removal policy and Protest to the
Senate. More likely, the group argued, a sense of
complacency among the administration's supporters, combined
with the devious tactics of the Whigs, had caused its
downfall. But the people were now roused by the intemperance

31RE, Dec. 9, 11, 1834.
32RE, Jan. 17, 19, 1834; Daniel to Andrew Jackson, Dec.
7, 1834, Andrew Jackson Papers, LC; Daniel to Thomas
Jefferson Randolph, Jan. 13, 1835, Thomas Jefferson Randolph
Papers, UVA.
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of the Whigs, and the Junto had learned its mistake. Never
again would it let down its guard or take anything for
granted. The key to victory lay in hard work, party unity,
and an unrelenting attack on its enemies. Politics in
Virginia would never be the same.

Despite its miserable record in 1834, the Junto
continued to speak optimistically about the future. Ritchie
rejected David Campbell's claims that Jackson had "nearly
destroyed the Republican Party in Virginia by his political
sermons" and ruined any chance of Van Buren winning the
presidency in 1836. Instead, the editor believed that both
Jackson and Van Buren remained strong throughout the state.
Once the people realized that the Whigs were the party of
the aristocracy and the Bank, they would oust them from
power. As for himself and the other members of the Junto, "I
am doing all I can for the cause ... [and] nearly all my
ancient friends are warmer than ever." Parker was sanguine
as well. "I think I see indications that the tide is turning
in Virginia," he noted in July of 1834.33
One reason for the Junto's confidence was its belief
that the Whig coalition would soon fall apart. Ritchie
explained to his readers that the lack of shared principles
and the consuming ambition of the party ensured its failure.
33David Campbell to James Campbell, May 6, 1834, CFP,
Duke; Ritchie to Stevenson, May 15, 1834; Parker to
Stevenson, July 21, 1834, both in Stevenson Papers, LC.
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"The combination must eventually dissolve in its own
weakness," he argued. Daniel agreed with Ritchie, while
Parker maintained that the Whig movement would be short
lived because of the antipathy party members had toward the
common man. Without this support, the party would soon fade
into insignificance. Ritchie picked up on this theme when he
described the Whigs as the party of aristocrats and
Federalists. The people would never allow such men to rule
over them for long. A writer in the Enquirer expressed this
idea in melodramatic fashion when he claimed that "returning
spring will dissipate those lowering clouds of Whiggery,
which threaten the destruction of our dearest rights ...,
[and] the Republicans, the virtuous yeomanry of Virginia,
will stand forth before the world, redeemed by the strong
power of their own invincible will."34
The first issue that the Junto seized upon in its
battle to defeat the Whigs involved the senatorial election
of Benjamin Watkins Leigh. The Junto-led Jacksonian forces
supported William Cabell Rives, who they claimed had been
unfairly forced to resign from the Senate in 1833. They
flooded the legislature with petitions praising Rives and
instructing their delegates to vote for him. During the
selection process, huge crowds packed the state capitol.

^RE, Aug. 5, 1834; Daniel to Andrew Jackson, Dec. 7,
1834, Jackson Papers, LC; Parker to Van Buren, Nov. 29,
1834, Van Buren Papers, LC; RE, Nov. 25, 1834; "Publius
Curtius Junius," RE, Feb. 3, 1835.
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Ritchie solemnly announced that the people's will must be
obeyed and Rives elected. When Leigh won a narrow victory,
the administration party accused the Whigs of ignoring the
instructions of their constituents and using their power for
purely partisan reasons. "The guestion at issue, in April
next," Ritchie informed his readers, "will be Leigh, or no
Leigh? Instruction, or no Instruction? Are we freemen, or
are we slaves?"35
The Junto also moved to shore up support for Jackson.
At a public meeting held in Richmond in late February,
Daniel was elected Chairman and Ritchie introduced
resolutions praising Jackson for his struggle against the
Bank. The meeting also condemned the Whigs for electing
Leigh and called on all friends of the Constitution to rally
behind the administration. Before adjourning, the members
selected John Brockenbrough and Philip N. Nicholas as
delegates to the upcoming Democratic Congressional
Convention.36 When the convention met the following week,
the Junto was once again in control. Nicholas was elected
president and Daniel, through a pre-arranged agreement,
nominated William H. Roane as the party's candidate for a
seat in the House of Representatives in the upcoming
election.37
35Richmond Whig. Jan. 28, 30, 1835; RE, Jan. 31, 1835.
36RE, Feb. 28, 1835.
37RE, March 5, 1835.
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After this show of power, the Junto began preparing for
the spring elections. The strategy of the Whigs in the
election of 1835 was to portray Van Buren, the likely
Democratic nominee for president in 1836, as unsafe on the
slavery question. Should the Democrats gain control of the
Virginia legislature in 1835, the Whigs argued, they would
force Van Buren upon the state the following year. A vote
for the Whigs, thus, was a vote against the northerner Van
Buren. A Whig victory "will reunite the South. It will
secure the election of a Southern President. It will restore
to the ascendant, Southern principles." But defeat would
bring northern rule, corruption, "the rebellion of the
South, and the overthrow of the Union." The real issue at
the polls, John Pleasants of the Richmond Whig wrote, was
not Leigh, the right of instruction, or the Bank of the
United States; it was whether the people wanted "Van Buren
or no Van Buren. Submission or opposition, to New York
ambition!"38
The Junto moved decisively to challenge Whig charges
against Van Buren. Ritchie and others asked for assurances
from the New Yorker that he would not interfere with the
institution of slavery, and Ritchie repeatedly told his
readers that Van Buren was "safe" on the slavery question.39
38Richmond Whig. March 31, Feb. 13, 1835. See also the
issues of Feb. 5, March 3, 24, and April 3, 1835.
39Ritchie to Silas Wright, March 2, 1835; Parker to Van
Buren, Feb. 22, 1835, both in Van Buren Papers, LC; RE,
March 20, 31, 1835.
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Rives apologized to Van Buren for the "pertinacious crossexamination to which you have been subjected from Virginia."
If Van Buren could "bear with this (as we are a famous
people for principles, you knowt. & indulge the humour of
your querists," Rives guaranteed him that the Democrats of
Virginia would triumph in 1835 and that the Old Dominion
would support him in 1836.40
As the 1835 elections neared, the Junto continued to
defend Van Buren and denigrate the Whigs. Ritchie compared
the composition of the party to the Tower of Babel, claiming
it was made up of "the Nationals and the Nullifiers, the
Bank, and the Anti-Bank, the Tariff and the anti-Tariff, the
Internal Improvement and the anti-internal Improvement, the
friends of Clay, Calhoun, Webster —

the Spinning Jennies of

the North and the Cotton Planters of the South." Such a
"piebald coalition" was necessarily held together by only
one thing: a desire for office. Van Buren and the Democrats,
on the other hand, were dedicated to restoring the
"Jeffersonian Era of State Rights." David Campbell made a
more clear-cut distinction. "The struggle in Virginia," he
wrote, "is between aristocracy and popular rights." Even the
Richmond Whig was forced to admit that the Jacksonians were

40Rives to Van Buren, April 10, 1835, Van Buren Papers,
LC.
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better organized and more zealous than the Whigs.41
The hard work of the Jacksonians paid off when they
recaptured control of the state legislature in the spring
elections. Ritchie estimated that the new body would be
composed of 78 Republicans and 56 Whigs, a marked contrast
with 1834, when there were 57 Republicans and 77 Whigs. The
huge Republican victory, he claimed, was due to the haughty
actions of the Whigs and their disregard for the common man.
The people had "redeemed11 Virginia by rejecting spurious
claims against Van Buren and by reasserting their control
over the government.42
Back in power in Virginia, the Junto moved to
strengthen its hand in national affairs. Daniel, William
Brockenbrough, Parker, and Stevenson all attended the
Democratic party's national convention which met in
Baltimore in May of 1835. They would, of course, support Van
Buren for the presidency, but they hoped to get Rives the
vice-presidential nomination. The leading candidate for the
position was Richard Johnson of Kentucky, who was completely
unacceptable to the Junto. Its members argued that Johnson
"does not carry out or maintain the political principles
Virginia ever held dear," especially its opposition to the

41RE, April 17, 1835; David Campbell to William B.
Campbell. April 8, 1835, CFP, Duke; Richmond Whig. March 3,
May 12, 1835.
42RE, May 12, 1835; Ritchie to Rives, May 19, 1835,
Rives Papers, LC.
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Bank of the United States. Johnson was also reported to have
fathered several children with a mulatto slave who lived
with him. The clique was convinced that Johnson's nomination
would severely weaken the Van Buren ticket in the state, and
it decided to prevent that from taking place at all costs.
"Ritchie writes me [that] the State will not vote for
Johnston [sic]," John Campbell told Rives. "He is much
concerned about the matter."43
When the convention met, it seemed clear that Johnson
would be selected over Rives. Determined to prevent this,
the Virginia delegation assembled to discuss their strategy.
Daniel was appointed head of the delegation and Stevenson
introduced resolutions affirming Virginia's commitment to
Rives and calling for the state to protest if Johnson won.
When the convention chose Johnson, Daniel announced that
Virginia would not support the decision. Other delegates
defended Johnson and pleaded with the men from the Old
Dominion to make the nomination unanimous, but to no avail.
The Virginia delegation cast the only dissenting vote
against Johnson's nomination, marring an otherwise unified
and amicable convention.44
Despite the convention's nomination, the Junto refused
to accept Johnson. It was convinced that Van Buren could not
43RE, May 26, 29, 1835; Ritchie to Rives, May 19, 1835;
John Campbell to Rives, May22, 1835; William Brockenbrough
to Rives, May 13, 17, 1835, all in Rives Papers, LC.
^RE,

May 26, 29, June 2, 1835.
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win in Virginia with Johnson on the ticket, and the club's
members quickly decided that his name would not appear on
the ballot in Virginia. But the Junto would not break with
the party. "We have been beaten at Baltimore," Ritchie
acknowledged, "but we must not divide our party."45
Rebuffed in Baltimore, the Junto found itself in
trouble back in Virginia. After the spring elections,
discussion in the state had turned increasingly to the
dangers posed by the rise of abolitionism in the North.
Virginia Whigs went to great lengths to connect Van Buren
with northern radicals who wanted to end slavery. They
pointed out that Johnson had fathered several children with
a mulatto woman, and they condemned Ritchie for not
defending the rights of the South in his newspaper.46 These
attacks almost immediately yielded results for the Whigs.
Ardor for Van Buren cooled as condemnations of the
abolitionists became more heated. Van Buren was a "Missouri
Restrictionist, and the advocate of free negro equality,"
the Richmond Whig claimed. Virginia could never support him
for the presidency.47
The Junto moved quickly to defend itself and Van Buren

45Ritchie to Rives, June 5, 1835; Parker to Rives, June
1, 1835, both in Rives Papers, LC; Parker to Van Buren, June
18, 1835, Van Buren Papers, LC.
46Richmond Whig. June 9, 12, 16, 26, July 31, Aug. 4, 7,
Sept. 8, 1835.
47Richmond Whig. April 21, 1835.
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from the charges levelled by "that combination of all kinds
of violent ingredients, called the Whig party."48 Ritchie
again assured Virginians that they had nothing to fear from
Van Buren regarding slavery. He was not one of those
northern "fanatics" endangering the Union by interfering in
the private affairs of the South. The Junto leader spoke out
strongly against the abolitionists and rejected claims that
he was more concerned about party loyalty than defending the
interests of the South. His first priority, he insisted, was
to protect the rights of southerners from abolitionists.49
At the same time that he was professing his devotion to
the South, Ritchie also criticized those "Political
Partizans" in the region who seized upon every occurrence to
"prepare the way for dissolution." If the country was going
to endure, if the South was to continue enjoying the
benefits of the Union, then moderation and compromises would
nave to be made. In two editorials entitled "A Calm Appeal
from the South to the North," the editor announced that all
southerners really wanted was to be left alone on the
slavery question.50 When a Committee of Vigilance proposed
harshly worded resolutions condemning the abolitionists,
Ritchie, Daniel, and Nicholas countered with more moderate

48Daniel to Van Buren, Sept. 25, 1835, Van Buren Papers,
LC.
49RE, July 21, 24, 28, Sept. 1, 1835.
50RE, July 21, Aug. 4, Aug. 14, Sept. 8, 1835.
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resolutions, only to be voted down. Patience was needed, the
Junto men explained; the storm of abolitionism would surely
pass.51
The Junto was not willing to wait, however, to oust
Benjamin Watkins Leigh and John Tyler, Virginia's two Whig
Senators, from their seats. Soon after Leigh's reelection in
early 1835, Ritchie and others had hit upon the idea of
using instructions to force his resignation. The people,
they claimed, had not supported Leigh for the position, and
he should therefore give up his office. Leigh, despite
having authored a resolution defending the right of
instruction in 1812, told his fellow senator, John Tyler, "I
will not be instructed out of my seat. I will not obey
Instructions which shall require me to vote for a gross
violation of the Constitution."52
The move to unseat Leigh and Tyler accelerated once the
Democrat-controlled Virginia legislature convened in
December. After promptly restoring Ritchie to his post as
public printer and returning Daniel to the Executive
Council, the legislators proceeded to prepare official
instructions calling on the two senators to vote for Thomas

51Daniel to Van Buren, Sept. 25, 1835, Van Buren Papers,
LC; RE, Sept. 29, Oct. 9, 1835.
52RE, Jan. 31, 1835; Ritchie to Rives, June 5, 1835,
Rives Papers, LC; Benjamin Watkins Leigh to John Tyler, July
5, 1835, Lyon G. Tyler, The Letters and Times of the Tvlers
(3 vols. Richmond and Williamsburg, 1884-1896; reprint, New
York: De Capo Press, 1970), 1:523.
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H. Benton's expunging resolution. Benton, a senator from
Missouri and strong supporter of Jackson, had repeatedly
proposed that the Senate's censure of the President be
expunged from the official Senate record. The reprimand was
not only unconstitutional, but insulting to the Hero of New
Orleans and the highest elected official in the United
States. It must be removed.53 Virginia Democrats in the
legislature agreed with Benton, and forced through a
resolution instructing Leigh and Tyler to vote for Benton's
measure. If they could not carry out these instructions,
they would be expected to resign. Governor Tazewell was
called upon to deliver the instructions to Virginia's
senators.54
Tazewell's refusal to forward the instructions to Tyler
and Leigh, followed by their unwillingness to comply with
them, touched off an extended debate in Virginia on the
right of instruction and the responsibilities of elected
officials. Ritchie and the Jacksonians castigated the
governor and the state's senators for refusing to bow to the
wishes of the people who had put them in office. They
accused the three Whigs of imposing their wills on the
majority of Virginians. "Which ought to prevail," a writer
in the Enquirer asked, "two men, or the majority of the
people?" Ritchie was incredulous about Tazewell's response.
53Remini, Course of American Democracy. 376-381.
^RE, Feb. 11, 25, 1836.
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"Is Mr. Tazewell the government of Virginia? Has it come to
this, that nothing is now to be done ... which he does not
approve?" The sacred right of instruction, fundamental to
republican government, was at stake; Virginians must act to
enforce it.55
While the Junto and the Jacksonians were making the
most of the three men's refusal to comply with the
legislative instructions, Virginia Whigs condemned the
Democrat's actions as petty political vengeance. Pleasants
noted repeatedly that Tyler and Leigh were being persecuted
solely because of their party affiliation. The editor
recommended that both men resign rather than follow the
obnoxious instructions. This would prevent the Democrats
from further exploiting the situation.56 The right of
instruction was being employed, Tyler thought, as a "mere
weapon of party warfare." Still, he found himself faced with
a difficult decision. He could not vote for the expunging
resolution, nor could he refuse to obey explicit
instructions given to him by the voice of the Virginia
electorate.57 Sensing that Tyler was wavering, fellow Whigs
wrote to give him advice and encouragement. James Barbour
told Tyler that whatever he and Leigh decided to do, they
55"Look to the 'Alternatives'," RE, Feb. 9, 1836; RE,
Feb. 25, March 8, 10, 1836.
56Richmond Whig. Feb. 2, March 4, 8, 12, 1836.
57Tyler to William F. Gordon, Jan. 8, 1836, James Henry
Rochelle Papers, Duke.
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must act together. "Should you and Mr. Leigh divide in your
course, it will be the most fatal shock that the Whig party
will have received." Tyler's close friend William Gordon
explained that "obedience ... is not what your masters at
Richmond desire; they want your place, and Leigh's.
Obedience will disappoint them woefully.... You suggest the
propriety of resigning, and appealing to the people; discard
the idea[;] power can only be controlled by power."58

Despite the advice of Barbour and Gordon, Tyler
resigned his seat, while Leigh steadfastly refused to give
in to the Jacksonians.59 This action revealed the rift in
the Virginia Whig party between state rights men like Tyler,
who could not bring himself to disobey the legislature's
orders because of his commitment to the principle of
instruction, and nationalists like Leigh, who argued that he
was not bound to follow instructions that forced him to vote
for an act that he considered unconstitutional.
Leigh's stubborn refusal to yield his senatorial seat
also provided the Democratic party of Virginia with a
popular issue for the upcoming presidential election. The
Senator's high-handed actions, Jacksonians argued, was
further proof of the degeneracy of the Whig party. Not only
58James Barbour to Tyler, Jan. 14, 1836; William F.
Gordon to Tyler, Jan. 15, 1836, Tyler, Letters and Times of
the Tvlers. 1:527-529.
59RE, March 8, 10, 1836; Ritchie to Rives, March 3,
1836, Rives Papers, LC; Leigh to Tazewell, Feb. 18, 1836,
Tazewell jtamily Papers, VSL.
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did the Whigs scorn the voice of the people, they also
spread falsehoods about Martin Van Buren and were attempting
to cause panic throughout the South by exaggerating the
influence of northern abolitionists. If that were not enough
to condemn the Whigs, a writer in the Enquirer pointed out
that the Whigs represented the '’commercial and stock-jobbing
interest," while the Democrats represented the "agricultural
and labouring interest."60
Ritchie spoke out strongly against Whig efforts to
portray Van Buren as an abolitionist. "The last hope of the
Whigs," he wrote, "is to raise an Abolition Panic - to
misrepresent the Free Negro vote of Mr. Van Buren ... and to
exaggerate the strength and increase of the Abolitionists."
To show the extremes to which the Whigs were willing to go
on this matter, Ritchie related a story in his newspaper
about a Richmond company that imported from the North some
children's handkerchiefs imprinted with the letters of the
alphabet and other "common figures." Upon opening the
packages, the merchants discovered a

few "abolition

handkerchiefs" that had pictures of oppressed slaves printed
on them. Immediately, Ritchie wrote, a "Whig in this City
pounced upon these handkerchiefs" and displayed them to the
people of Richmond as evidence of creeping abolitionism.
Soon other politicians were waving the "abolition
60"A Friend to Van Buren, Because a Friend to the South
and the Union," RE, Jan. 5, 1836; "Common Sense," RE, Feb.
23, 1836.
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handkerchiefs" at Whig rallies for dramatic effect. The
upshot of all this, Ritchie noted with satisfaction, was
that the state legislature was currently considering a law
to prohibit the use "of all such pictures ... for political
effect."61
Virginia Whigs, sensing their new-found political power
slipping away, and horrified at the prospect of Van Buren as
president, did in fact make extensive use of the abolition
controversy in the campaign of 1836. Van Buren is "against
us on the slave question," Abel Parker Upshur wrote
Pleasants, and "very near an abolitionist.1,62 Pleasants
needed no confirmation of that. In the columns of the
Richmond Whig, he levelled a vituperative attack on the New
Yorker, Ritchie's blind devotion to him, and the dangers to
the South posed by Van Buren's candidacy. Launching his
assault in early 1836, Pleasants noted that "It is time for
the Southern people to awaken from the death sleep which
Jacksonism, more potent than poppies or mandragons, has cast
over them, and survey their true condition.... Danger,
danger, dark and ominous, threatens the independence, the
safety, the very existence of the Southern States.
Fanaticism threatens on one hand - political machinations
whose success would usher in a central and consolidated

61RE, April 1, 12, 1836.
62Abel P. Upshur to John H. Pleasants, Jan. 5, 1836,
Abel Parker Upshur Papers, VHS.
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Despotism, on the other." The editor warned against
Virginians working for Van Buren's election. "What will it
benefit you," he asked. "What will become of your principles
and your safety, when Northern ascendancy is irrevocably
established?"63
Pleasants was only getting started. He slammed Ritchie
for slavishly following the dictates of Van Buren and his
Albany Regency. The Junto leader, the "most depraved party
hack in America," would swear "that white is black, and
black white, to accommodate party interests." The "traitor
Ritchie" had completely abandoned all of his republican
principles to advance Van Buren's campaign. "Look at his
language and course for 20 years," Pleasants told his
readers, "and compare them with his language and course
since his compact with Van. The bare inspection will
convince you of his total apostasy to all your and his and
Virginia's old principles."64
Pleasants also rebutted charges that the Whigs were
attempting to throw the election into the House of
Representatives by running various presidential candidates

“Richmond Whig. Jan. 30, 1836. For other attacks on Van
Buren, see the Whig on Jan. 15, 19, Sept. 23, 1836.
Surprisingly, the Whigs did not make much of Van Buren's
reputation as a crafty politician bereft of principle. In a
letter in the May 27, 1836, issue of the Whig, however,
"Northampton" reminded Virginians that Van Buren "would walk
upon the ashes of the Union, if his interest could be
promoted."
“Richmond Whig. March 12, Jan. 30, April 19, 1836.
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in different regions of the country. The Jacksonians had
claimed for months that the Whig strategy was to send the
election to the House, where a deal similar to the one made
in 1824 would be consummated and Van Buren would be denied
his rightful place as president.65 Ritchie seemed
particularly concerned about this possibility, and he
ridiculed the Whig strategy by referring to them as "The
Polycephalous Party - Or the Whig-White-Harrison-WebsterTyler-Granger-Anti-Van Buren-Coalition party." Pleasants
denied that the Whigs were working to send the election into
the House, arguing that the party lacked the representatives
needed there to reach an acceptable compromise on the
presidency. Besides, he pointed out, the Whigs could never
match the corruption and venality of the Van Buren forces in
such a struggle.66
While Pleasants was attacking Ritchie and Van Buren,
the Junto completed its return to power by assuming control
of the New Yorker's campaign in Virginia. At a public
meeting called in Richmond on January 9 to appoint delegates
to the state presidential nomination convention, Daniel was
appointed chairman and Ritchie served on a select committee
that prepared and delivered an address berating the Whigs
and calling for vigilance on the part of Virginia Democrats.
The committee further moved that three delegates be
65RE, July 14, 1835; Sept. 2, 6, 9, 16, 1836.
66RE, June 17, 1836; Richmond Whig, June 21, 1836.
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appointed to represent the city at the state nominating
convention to be held on January 11. Daniel was one of the
three elected.67
At the convention, Ritchie, a "special delegate"
representing Loudoun County, served as secretary. The
meeting praised Van Buren as a "Northern man with Southern
Principles." Ritchie, Daniel, Stevenson, John Brockenbrough,

and Philip N. Nicholas were all appointed to the Central
Committee, which coordinated the campaign and issued
addresses to the voters of Virginia. Roane, ill in Hanover
County, was named as an elector.68
In the months before the November election, the Junto
defended Van Buren, criticized the Whigs for "using every
exertion to unite the negro question and the Fanatics with
the Presidential election," and attacked Hugh Lawson White
and William Henry Harrison, the two main Whig candidates, as
opponents of the state rights doctrines of Virginia.69
Ritchie informed his readers that he supported Van Buren
because he had proven himself to be friendly to the
"Virginia doctrines" and because "his election is calculated
to destroy those sectional distinctions, which might prove
fatal to the Union of the States." Harrison, on the other

67RE, Jan. 12, 1836.
68RE, Jan. 12, 16, 1836.
69C.S. Morgan to Van Buren, Jan. 9, 1836, Martin Van
Buren Papers, Duke.
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hand, "has no pretensions to the character of a member of
the State rights school." As for White, Virginians "could
not have been induced under any circumstances to support
him."70
In two addresses published shortly before the election,
the Junto-controlled Central Committee impressed upon the
citizens of Virginia the need to support Van Buren and to
prevent the election from being sent to the House of
Representatives. Every Republican must do his duty and vote
for the party of Jefferson and Jackson. The choice, they
argued, was a clear one: "Will you, in a word, prefer a
Latitudinarian Federalist, or a Democratic State Rights
man?"71 Enough Virginians agreed with this assessment to
give Van Buren a strong victory in the Old Dominion. The
Vice-President captured 56.6% of the popular vote, compared
with 43.4% for Hugh Lawson White. That represented a sharp
decline from Jackson's 75% in 1832, but it was still a
comfortable margin of victory.72
Flushed with victory, Ritchie admitted that he took
"some credit" for Van Buren's victory in Virginia. By
supporting the New Yorker, the state had "trampled under

70RE, Aug. 16, July 29, 1836; David Campbell to William
Campbell, Jan. 21, 1836, CFP, Duke.
71RE, Aug. 2, Oct. 25 1836.
72Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Presidential Elections
Since 1789 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1987), 9495.
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foot any sectional & local feelings" and acted in the best
interests of the nation. Neither he nor Virginia expected to
be rewarded for doing their duty. "All she [Virginia] asks
in return, is that M.V.B. should steer the ship by the
Jeffersonian Chart. Unless he does this, we have to leave
him."73
While Ritchie was proclaiming his state's devotion to
the republican principles of Thomas Jefferson, other members
of the Junto were reaping the rewards of party service. In
the spring of 1836, Jackson had renominated Stevenson as
ambassador to Great Britain and nominated Philip P. Barbour
to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court. On March 16, 1836,
both men were confirmed by the Senate. That same month,
Daniel was appointed Federal district judge for the eastern
half of Virginia. Leigh finally gave into pressure and
resigned his Senate seat in July of 1836, and Richard Parker
was sent to fill the office. When he stepped down after a
few months, Parker was replaced by Roane, who had recently
turned down the lucrative job of Postmaster of Richmond. For
good measure, the legislature appointed Philip N. Nicholas
as a circuit court judge in the state early in 1837.74
The sudden appointment of so many Junto members to

73Ritchie to William B. Lewis, Nov. 20, 1836, Jackson
Papers, LC.
74Wayland, Andrew Stevenson. 110-111; Frank, Justice
Daniel Dissenting. 138; Dent, "Virginia Democratic Party,"
215-216; Richmond Whig. March 7, 10, 1837.
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state and federal offices did not go unnoticed by the
group's opponents. Speaking of Roane's election to the
Senate, the Alexandria Gazette noted that "he belongs to the
Richmond Junto and is 'one of the family' - a relation of
Mr. Ritchie's - upon which family, offices have lately been
liberally bestowed." Pleasants also complained about the
spread of the spoils system that Jackson had instituted.
"Sharp's the word and quick's the motion - catch who catch
can - help your plate or you'll be dished - are the
governing impulses of the time, the blessed times of the
triumph and reign of the 'Spoils System.'"75 There was a
good deal of truth to both of these claims. Before the
bitter campaign of 1836, the Junto had for the most part
declined offers of federal offices, insisting that it was
working for the public good and not personal gain or glory.
But the experiences of the past four years —

protracted

partisan struggles, personal attacks, and lingering
hostilities —

convinced many in the group to abandon their

qualms about accepting spoils and to "catch who catch can."
Besides, they convinced themselves, there was nothing wrong
with being rewarded for helping to prevent the country from
falling into the hands of the Whigs.

The Junto had dramatically improved its fortunes since

75Alexandria Gazette. March 18, 1837; Richmond Whig.
Dec. 13, 1836.
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early 1835, but had little time to savor its victories. Even
before Ritchie travelled to Washington to hear Van Buren's
inaugural address, controversy over economic matters
threatened to split the Virginia Democrat party. Debate on
Jackson's Specie Circular and the redistribution of the
Treasury surplus made clear that "the party was divided into
a banking and anti-banking faction." The Junto attempted to
avoid a showdown on the "troublesome banking and currency
question," but the financial panic that struck in 1837 made
that impossible.76 Virginia's banks, renowned for their
stability, were forced to stop specie payments in May of
that year. This development threatened to bring financial
ruin upon the state because, under Virginia law, suspension
of specie was grounds for revoking a bank's charter. After
consulting with Rives, Governor David Campbell called a
special session of the state legislature to deal with the
banking crisis.77
Both Campbell and Rives had recently quarreled with the
Junto, Campbell over the group's opposition to his election
and Rives over the issue of currency reform, and both were
now committed to minimizing the group's influence in the

76Moser, "Subtreasury Politics," 80-111; quotes on pp.
97, 111.
^James Rawlings to David Campbell, May 15, 1837;
William C. Rives to Campbell, May 22, 1837, both in CFP,
Duke; Richmond Whig. May 30, 1837. In this issue, Pleasants
claimed that Ritchie and the "Junta" were opposed to
Campbell calling the special session.
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upcoming session.78 As Campbell prepared his address to the
special session, Daniel and Ritchie attempted to put their
stamp on it. The editor borrowed a copy of the speech, kept
it all day, made extensive notes, and asked Daniel to
contact Campbell about suggested changes. The Governor
refused both men's advice and noted their dissatisfaction to
his wife. Ritchie "has been disappointed in not having a
finger in the Message—

He and Judge Peter V. Daniel no

doubt both thought I ought to consult them.... I am no
favorite with these gentlemen," he continued, "and I shall
hereafter be entirely on my guard."79
The Junto, like the state Democratic party, was split
on the banking question. Daniel was flatly opposed to all
banks, Ritchie feared a national bank and wanted additional
restrictions placed on state banks so that they could never
again endanger the state's welfare by suspending specie
payments, and John Brockenbrough, long-time President of the
Bank of Virginia, proposed only mild reform measures.80 When
78For Campbell, see C.W. Gooch to David Campbell, Jan.
23, 1837; David Campbell to William B. Campbell, Feb. 2,
1837; David Campbell to Mary Campbell, May 14, 1837, all in
CFP, Duke. For Rives, see John Brockenbrough to William H.
Roane, Feb., 1837, Harrison Family Papers, VHS.
Brockenbrough wrote that "Ritchie has completely given up
Rives."
79David Campbell to Mary Campbell, June 14, 1837, CFP,
Duke.
“Daniel to David Campbell, May 15, 1837, CFP, Duke;
Daniel to Andrew Jackson, July 11, 1837, Jackson Papers, LC;
RE, June 2, 1837; Brockenbrough to Rives, May 20, 1837, Van
Buren Papers, LC.
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Van Buren introduced his Independent Treasury, or sub
treasury scheme, which called for the separation of the
federal government from banking, the rift within the Junto
widened and threatened to destroy the group.
Brockenbrough and Parker had been early advocates of
the sub-treasury system, and Daniel also supported Van
Buren's measure, largely because of his strong party
loyalty. These men believed that the Independent Treasury
bill would allow the federal government to distance itself
from banking, yet still exercise necessary supervision over
the financial system.81 Ritchie and Nicholas, however,
opposed the scheme for a number of reasons. Most
importantly, the editor noted, the President's proposal
would probably fail and might lead to renewed calls for the
restoration of a national bank. The sub-treasury plan would
undoubtedly enlarge presidential patronage and endanger the
"security of the public funds," and for these reasons

Ritchie refused to endorse it, despite the consequences of
differing with Van Buren and his most intimate friends.82
Concerned about the split in the Virginia Democratic
party on the banking question, Ritchie worked feverishly to
formulate acceptable alternatives. First he called for a
"Convention of the Banks of the United States ... for the

81Moser, "Subtreasury Politics," 123-125.
82Ritchie to Van Buren, Aug. 20, 1837, Van Buren Papers,
LC; RE, Aug. 18, Oct. 20, 1837.
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purpose of devising means to bring about a resumption of
specie payments." When that failed to achieve any results,
he argued for a "Special Deposite" system, a variation on
the existing pet bank program established by Jackson. Under
Ritchie's plan, state banks would continue to receive
federal deposits, but would be unable to "issue their paper
upon the faith of these funds." This would make the state
banks stronger, Ritchie argued, prevent the overspeculation
that had brought on the current panic, and blunt calls for a
new national bank as well. Few rushed to endorse Ritchie's
proposal.83
Debate over banking produced divisions in the national
party as well. An insurgent group of Democrats, known as the
Conservatives and led by Nathaniel Tallmadge and William
Cabell Rives, proclaimed their steadfast unwillingness to
toe the party line on the sub-treasury issue.84 The
Conservatives were well represented in Virginia, and they
gave the Junto additional cause for concern. The group
worried that Rives and the Conservatives would break away

83For Ritchie's support of a bank convention, see RE,
July 18, 25, 28, Aug. 1, 4, 15, 22, Oct. 27, 1837. For the
"Special Deposite" plan, see Aug. 18, Oct. 20, Nev. 28,
1837; Jan. 4, Feb. 6, 17, 24, May 4, 29, 1838; Ritchie to
Rives, Aug. 10, [1837], Rives Papers, LC.
MFor a good examination of the Conservative movement,
see Jean Friedman, The Revolt of the Conservative Democrats.
Studies in American History and Culture, No. 9 (UMI Research
Press, 1976). Friedman contends that the Conservatives were
primarily an "antiparty" faction upset at Van Buren's
financial policies and the rise of partisanship. (54)
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from the Democratic party and join with the Whigs to defeat
Van Buren's measure and to gain control of the state
legislature.85
The Junto soon realized the urgent need to set aside
its differences on the banking question and work for party
harmony. Ritchie called upon his fellow party members to
"manifest ... a tolerant and conciliatory spirit" while this
problem was being resolved. He reminded them that they
disagreed with each other only on the Independent Treasury,
while they differed with the Whigs on nearly every issue.
The editor also announced flatly that he was not abandoning
the party or Van Buren. He was, in fact, "disposed ... to
sink or swim with his administration."86 Brockenbrough now
swung around to endorse Ritchie's special deposit system in
the name of party unity, and Daniel and Parker travelled to
Washington to impress upon Van Buren and Rives the need for
compromise. Stevenson wrote from London to tell Van Buren of
the Junto's devotion to him and willingness to work for a
settlement. Brockenbrough urged Rives to rejoin the party so
that it could prevent the Whigs from gaining control in
Virginia. The banker added that Rives's fellow senator,
William H. Roane, was willing "to co-operate in any measure

85Moser, "Subtreasury Politics," 135-138.
8SRE, No v . 28, 1837, Jan. 13, 1838. See also the issues
of March 24 and April 24, 1838.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

229

that will preserve the union and integrity of the party."87

Efforts on the part of the Junto to keep the Democratic
party united proved to be too little, too late. The Whigs
successfully capitalized on the internal bickering of the
Democrats and captured control of the Virginia legislature
in 1838. Ritchie had dragged out old warnings about the
dangers of a national bank, claiming that the Whigs were
exploiting the political situation in an effort to recharter
the Bank of the United States. "Mark the course which the
Bank of the U.S. is pursuing," he informed his readers:
"Mark its object! See how it attempts to sweep on to a re
charter with a step as steady as time and an appetite keen
as death!"** Ritchie's rhetoric failed to rouse the
Democrats of Virginia, and the editor placed much of the
blame for the party's defeat on widespread voter apathy.89
Other observers were quick to fault Ritchie and Rives
for the Whig victory. Jackson condemned the two as "prodigal
political sons" who had done much damage to the party.
Remembering Ritchie's response to the removal of the

*7Brockenbrough to Van Buren, Aug. 7, 1837, Van Buren
Papers, LC; Brockenbrough to Roane, Sept. 13, 1837, Harrison
Family Papers, VHS; Parker to Van Buren, Jan. 18, 1838;
Daniel to Van Buren, Jan. 23, 1838; Stevenson to Van Buren,
Jan. 5, 1838; Brockenbrough to Rives, Aug. 5, 1837 (copy),
all in Van Buren Papers, LC.
**RE, April 13, 1838.
*9RE, May 4, 1838.
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deposits, Jackson wrote that "then, as now, he went off
hastily, & did us much injury." John Letcher was convinced
that Ritchie and Rives had "done more in the space of six
months to divide, and distract the Administration Party,
than all the Whigs in the Union could have effected in a
lifetime." Thomas Jefferson Randolph bluntly informed Van
Buren that the Democrats had lost in Virginia because of the
"course pursued by Mr. Rives and Mr. Ritchie on the Sub
Treasury bill."90
More ominously, other members of the Junto were also
willing to criticize Ritchie for his course during the sub
treasury debate. Brockenbrough informed Stevenson that "our
friend of the Enguirer has ... done infinite mischief to our
party by the middle course he has taken and I think has
permanently injured his own standing."91 Early in 1838,
Daniel reported to Van Buren that the editor "must now be
given up as incorrigible.... He is inseparably wedded to
Rives and the Banks." Ritchie could no longer be trusted,
Daniel wrote four months later, because "he is still dealing
in his old fooleries about special deoosites." By the end of

^Jackson to Van Buren, Oct. 24, 1837; John Letcher to
Ely Moore, April 28, 1838; Letcher to Van Buren, May 12,
1838; Thomas Jefferson Randolph to Van Buren, May 6, 1838,
all in Van Buren Papers, LC. Pleasants took special relish
in attributing the Whig victory to the "skulking course of
the Enquirer, and the treacherous one of Mr. Rives."
Richmond Whig. May 18, 1838.
91Brockenbrough to Stevenson, Jan. 1, 1839, Stevenson
Papers, LC.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

231

1838, relations between Daniel and Ritchie were decidedly
cool.92
The Whig victory, Daniel's criticism, and the continued
debate on the sub-treasury plan combined to weaken Ritchie's
resolve and to lessen his enthusiasm for partisan struggles.
"I am more & more sick of politics,” the editor confided to
Rives, "and would to Heaven! it were in my power to return
to the Shade of private life."93 Still, Ritchie continued to
speak out for harmony, for party unity, for an end to
bickering over "this vexatious question" of banking. "I go
for a compromise," he noted, adding that "my whole heart is
in this."94
Ritchie's desire for a compromise was given impetus by
two developments. First, a union between the Conservatives
and the Whigs looked more likely than ever in 1838 and 1839.
Pleasants issued an invitation "To the Conservative Party of
Virginia" to join the Whigs in "common cause" to defeat the
administration, claiming that the "Conservatives can never
again act with Mr. Van Buren's branch of the party. The
gulph between them is impassable.1,95 Rives resigned his seat
and his membership in the Democratic party in March of 1839,
92Daniel to Van Buren, Jan. 23, May 23, Aug. 8, Oct. 20,
1838, Van Buren Papers, LC.
93Ritchie to Rives, Feb. 3, 1838, Rives Papers, LC.
^Ritchie to Van Buren, July 2, 1838, Ritchie to [?],
[May?, 1838], (copy), both in Van Buren Papers, LC.
95Richmond Whig. July 27, Nov. 20, 1838.
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insisting that "I have not abandoned my party; they have
abandoned me." He denied that he had formed a "corrupt
coalition with the Whigs," but the Junto were not convinced.

Brockenbrough noted that Rives had "given unequivocal
evidence of his union with the Whigs," and Ritchie, who had
worked closely with Rives throughout the sub-treasury
debate, finally abandoned him in the summer of 1839.95
The second development that concerned Ritchie and the
Junto was the increased influence of John C. Calhoun in the
Democratic party. The South Carolinian had rejoined the
Democrats on the Independent Treasury question, and moved
quickly to exert control over the national party.97 Ritchie
remained hostile to Calhoun and his supporters, and warned
Van Buren to avoid the "infatuated councils of those bitter
Hotspurs." The South Carolinian, Ritchie claimed, was
attempting to exploit the rift in the party for his own
advantage. "Mr. Calhoun is for agitation - agitation," he
notified Van Buren, "but you know him sufficiently to know,
how far he is to be trusted, for motives or for measures."
In an editorial, Ritchie denied that he had welcomed the
South Carolinian back into party ranks. "Mr. Calhoun has not
gained our confidence by his recent moves on the chess

96William Cabell Rives, "To
March 18, 1839, Broadside, VHS;
Jan. 1, 1839, Stevenson Papers,
Ritchie to Stevenson, April 14,

the People of Virginia,"
Brockenbrough to Stevenson,
LC; RE, June 28, 1839;
1839, Stevenson Papers, LC.

^Remini, Course of American Democracy. 437-439.
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board.... He is too much of a metaphysician for us."98
Faced with Calhoun's ambition, Rives's defection, and
an upcoming presidential election, Ritchie slowly yielded
his objections to the sub-treasury scheme in an effort to
solidify the Virginia Democratic party.99 "Ritchie's recent
conduct has merit enough in it to cover all his past sins,"
James Buchanan informed Van Buren in May of 1839, and Parker
was convinced that his brother-in-law had resumed his
position as leader of the administration forces in
Richmond.100 To preserve the party and atone for his past
actions, Ritchie worked especially hard in the elections of
1839 and 1840, winning further praise. "I have never felt a
deeper interest in my life," he told Stevenson in 1839, and
more than one observer credited the editor with
strengthening the influence of the Democratic party during
those two campaigns. "Mr. Ritchie ... is all zeal & action."
Van Buren was informed, "endeavoring to stimulate others by
efforts that are almost supernatural."101
98Ritchie to Van Buren, July 2, 1838, Van Buren Papers,
LC; RE, Oct. 3, 1837.
"Ritchie to Stevenson, Aug. 4, 1839, Stevenson Papers,
LC.
IOOJames Buchanan to Van Buren, May 11, 1839; Parker to
Van Buren, June 4, 1839, both in Van Buren Papers, LC. See
also John Rutherfoord to Stevenson, June 4, July 28, 1839,
Stevenson Papers, LC.
101Ritchie to Stevenson, April 14, 1839, Parker to Van
Buren, April 6, 1840, both in Van Buren Papers, LC;
Rutherfoord to Stevenson, April 10, June 4, 1839, Stevenson
Papers, LC.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

234

Ritchie's "supernatural" exertions were not enough,
however, to put the Democrats back in control of the
Virginia legislature between 1838 and 1840. After the
party's defeat in the spring elections of 1840, the Junto
grew worried about the upcoming presidential election. The
Whigs were unified, organized, and eager to excoriate Van
Buren on the banking question and on his aristocratic
pretensions. The "zeal of our opponents has run into a
species of fanaticism," Ritchie told Van Buren. Roane
thought that "at no past time have our adverseries [sic]
manifested more zeal, or been perhaps so well organized as
now.11102 Despite such ominous signs, the Junto remained
optimistic that Van Buren would defeat the Whig candidate,
assumed to be Clay until the national convention selected
William H. Harrison, a popular military hero from Ohio.
In the campaign, the Democrats portrayed the Whigs as a
new brand of Federalists whose sole object was "to swell the
powers of the Federal Government at the expense of the
States, and the great body of the People." They argued that
the "great principles which our democratic ancestors
struggled to establish by the civil revolution of 1801" were
at stake. Only the Democrats could protect and preserve
those fundamental principles. The party stood for strict
construction, opposition to a national bank and "all other

I02Ritchie to Van Buren, June 1, 1840; Roane to C.W.
Gooch, Feb. 8, 1840, Gooch Family Papers, UVA.
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incorporations by the Federal Government,11 the Independent
Treasury, and the "supremacy of the popular will."103 The
Whigs, on the other hand, represented corruption, the abuse
of power, and aristocratic rule. That made the choice facing
the voters an obvious one. The "old war is renewed between
the friends of an equal and well-regulated liberty, and the
partisans of privilege and monopoly." Virginia must support
Van Buren and the Democrats.104
In case these platitudes did not have their intended
effect, the Democrats borrowed a page from the Whigs and
attacked Harrison as an abolitionist sympathizer. In
response, the Whigs revived charges of Van Buren's support
of free black suffrage, and the campaign soon degenerated
into name-calling, shameless accusations, and gaudy
pageantry.105 When the smoke finally cleared, Van Buren had
eked out the slimmest of victories in Virginia, tallying
43,757 votes to Harrison's 42,637.106 Once again, the Junto
•“"Proceedings of the Democratic Republican Convention,
Held at Richmond Feb. 20, 1840," Broadside, VSL. Ritchie,
Daniel, and Brockenbrough all played keys roles in this
meeting.
’“"Proceedings of the Democratic State Convention Held
at Charlottesville, Va., September 9 and 10, 1840,"
Broadside, VSL. Both Ritchie and Daniel attended this
convention, and Roane delivered a speech there.
105See, for instance, Daniel to Van Buren, Sept. 28,
1840, Van Buren Papers, LC; Daniel to William Brent, Jr.,
Oct. 14, 1840, Cabell Family Papers, UVA; Dent, "Virginia
Democratic Party," 274-281.
‘“Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Presidential
Elections. 96.
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had been influential in pushing the state towards a
Democratic candidate. But the role of another group, the
Calhoun Democrats, was perhaps equally important in securing
Van Buren's victory in Virginia. The South Carolinian's
reentry into the party had led some prominent Virginians,
men like Littleton Waller Tazewell, Robert M.T. Hunter, and
William 0. Goode, to abandon their flirtation with the Whigs
and rejoin the Democratic fold. These men followed Calhoun's
lead and supported the New Yorker, and the "Calhoun-Van
Buren alliance ... probably saved Virginia [for] the
Democrats."107 As a consequence, the Calhoun Democrats moved
to increase their power within the Virginia Democratic party
at the expense of the Junto.
The Junto prevailed in 1840, but just barely and at a
terrible cost. Unlike its remarkable comeback in 1836,
reversing two years worth of defeats, the Junto was unable
to sustain the attacks of the Whigs and the Conservatives,
the challenge posed by the Calhoun Democrats, and the
painful division over the sub-treasury scheme. Barbour's
appointment to the Supreme Court and Stevenson's selection
as ambassador to Great Britain in 1836, coupled with
Parker's death in 1840, left the Junto even weaker.
Brockenbrough largely retired from political affairs after
his brother William and his adopted daughter died in late

107Dent, "Virginia Democratic Party," 286-287; quote on
page 287.
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1838, and Daniel and Ritchie were still distrustful of each
other after their bitter quarrel over the banking question.
When Daniel was selected to replace Barbour on the Supreme
Court after the latter's death in 1841, only Ritchie
remained to represent the group in Richmond.108
Looking back on political developments since 1834,
Ritchie was dismayed and saddened. He had spent too much
time attempting to reestablish "harmony & peace ... in our
ranks," he told his old friend Stevenson. But the worst part
had been the divisiveness of the banking controversy. "No
circumstance of my whole political life has given me so much
pain as differing from you, Mr. Van Buren, Judge Parker,
D[octor] Brockenbrough & other friends" on this matter.109
In truth, the sub-treasury debate had "splintered the
Virginia Democratic party and initiated the disintegration
of the Richmond Junto."110 From the heights of its success
in 1836, the group found itself practically defunct in 1840.
Nor could it take much satisfaction in Van Buren's triumph
in Virginia, its crowning achievement, for Harrison had won
the national contest. The Whigs controlled the White House,
and the Junto faced the beginning of a hostile
administration for the first time since 1825.
108Brockenbrough to Stevenson, Jan. 1. 1839, Stevenson
Papers, LC; Frank, Justice Daniel Dissenting. 154.
109Ritchie to Stevenson, Aug. 4, 1839, Stevenson Papers,
LC.
110Dent, "Virginia Democratic Party," 215.
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CONCLUSION:
The Richmond Junto and Politics in Jacksonian Virginia

After the election of 1840, the Junto's influence in
Virginia politics declined steadily. The Whigs had
controlled the state legislature since 1838, and when the
Democrats finally regained control in 1842, it was largely
because of the actions of the Calhoun Democrats and not the
Junto. In fact, the group spent most of its time between
1841 and 1844 fighting the Calhoun branch of the party and
attempting to restore Van Buren to the presidency. Ritchie
worked especially hard for his old friend. The editor
regarded Van Buren's election in 1844 "as essential to the
purity of Republican principles," John Letcher told Thomas
Hart Benton, and "as the only fitting and proper rebuke to
the log cabin and coonskin fooleries of 1840." Other members
of the Junto, including Roane, Brockenbrough, and Nicholas,
supported Van Buren as well. "There are at least two things
I never change," Roane informed Van Buren in late 1843, "the
one - a well tried old friend - the other my politics." He
closed by saying he would travel to Richmond to "see what I

238
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can do towards keeping our crew steady.111
Just a few months after Roane's statement, the Junto
dropped its endorsement of Van Buren over the question of
the annexation of Texas. There were indications that
Virginians would not support the New Yorker in 1844, even
before he made clear his opposition to Texas annexation. Van
Buren's position on the protective tariff question, once
again an issue, caused concern among his supporters in the
state, and Ritchie, as head of the Democratic Central
Committee, received numerous letters in early 1844 detailing
the lack of support for Van Buren around the state. "They
wish for a new man," one elector wrote of his fellow
citizens.2
The biggest issue facing Van Buren, however, was the
question of what to do with Texas. Southerners had made
annexation of the independent nation the primary goal of the
1844 campaign. Whigs and Democrats across the region held
public meetings supporting annexation, and by late 1843, the
'John Letcher to Thomas Hart Benton, Dec. 15, 1842;
William H. Roane to Martin Van Buren, Feb. 9, 1843; Samuel
Denoon to Van Buren, June 14, 1843, all in Martin Van Buren
Papers, Library of Congress.
2For the tariff issue, see R.B. Gooch to Auguste Davezac,
Dec., 1842; H.L. Hopkins and others to Van Buren, Feb. 17,
1843; R. Wallace to Van Buren, Feb. 18, 1843; Peter V. Daniel
to Van Buren, July 6, 1843, all in Van Buren Papers, LC. For
comments about Van Buren's general unpopularity, see Austin
Brockenbrough to Thomas Ritchie, April 21, 1844; William Byars
to Ritchie, April 27, 1844; James Hoge to Central Democratic
Committee, May 3, 1844; R.J. Paulson to Ritchie, May 3, 1844,
all in Ritchie-Harrison Papers, College of William and Mary.
Quote from Brockenbrough to Ritchie, April 21, 1844.
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issue had swept all other questions aside as insignificant.
At first the Junto considered the fuss over Texas to be a
ploy by the Calhounites to discredit Van Buren, but they
quickly discovered the potency of the controversy.3 "This
Texian question has grown up rapidly in the whole South to a
size and extent of which you can form no just idea," Roane
informed Van Buren in late April of 1844, "and it is still
increasing." Silas Wright was convinced that it was the only
question that mattered in the presidential race in Virginia.
No man could hope to win who did not strongly and without
reservations endorse annexation.4
Van Buren's letter detailing his opposition to the
annexation of Texas in April of 1844 ended his chance of
victory in the Old Dominion. Virginians instantly spoke out
against the New Yorker and began searching for another
candidate. Letters flooded Ritchie's office demanding that
the party drop Van Buren and select someone in favor of
annexation; this was "the only means of saving Virginia and
keeping up a united Southern party."5 Even the Junto parted
3Andrew Stevenson to Van Buren, Oct. 8, 1843; John
Letcher to Ritchie, Sept. 23, 1843, both in Van Buren Papers,
LC. For an expression of southern unity on the Texas question,
see I.N. Powell to Van Buren, March 27, 1844, Van Buren
Papers, LC.
4Roane to Van Buren, April 30, 1844; Silas Wright to Van
Buren, April 1, 1844, both in Van Buren Paper, LC.
5James McDowell to the Members of the Central Democratic
Committee, May 6, 1844; W.M. Watkins to Ritchie, May 7, 1844;
John R. Edmunds to Ritchie, May 12, 1844; S. Bassett French to
Ritchie, May 23, 1844, all in Ritchie-Harrison Papers, College
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company with its old colleague. "You are deserted" in
Virginia, an observer told Van Buren on May 1. "Ritchie,
Roane, & Stevenson are all out against you on the Texas
question; positively, openly. and unequivocally against you.
Arrangements are now, at this very hour, being made, to take
up some other candidate, and of this be assured if there be
a God in Heaven." Official confirmation of the group's break
came four days later when Ritchie wrote to the ex-president.
The editor told Van Buren that it pained him to admit that
"we cannot carry Virginia for you" in the upcoming election.
The furor over his anti-annexation stance compelled the
Junto to seek another candidate more suited to the temper of
the times. Of course, Ritchie added, should Van Buren
capture the party nomination at the Baltimore convention,
the clique would support his campaign.6
When the Democratic convention met in late May,
however, Roane delivered a rousing speech announcing
Virginia's support for James K. Polk, who went on to capture
the nomination. Ritchie's work on behalf of Polk's campaign
was rewarded after his victory, when the editor and long
time Junto leader accepted an offer in early 1845 to edit

of William and Mary. Quote from Edmunds to Ritchie, May 12,
1844.
6"Q in the corner" to Van Buren, May 1, 1844; Ritchie to
Van Buren, May 5, 1844, both in Van Buren Papers, LC. Daniel,
now in Washington, broke with his Richmond friends and
supported Van Buren. See Daniel to Van Buren, June 11, 1844,
Van Buren Papers, LC.
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the administration's paper in Washington, the Union. With
Roane's death that same year, and with Stevenson and
Brockenbrough retired from public affairs, the Richmond
Junto ended its long tenure as a key player in political
affairs in Virginia.7

The careers of the remaining Junto members after 1845
were marked by a noticeable turn to the politics of
sectionalism. Ritchie edited the Union for nine years, until
his death in 1854. During his time there, he strongly
supported the expansionist policies of the Polk
administration and became increasingly defensive about the
South and the institution of slavery.8 Daniel sat on the
Supreme Court until his death in 1860, described by his
biographer as the "last Jeffersonian to hold public office
in the United States." He too became a fervent spokesman for
the southern cause, and was the only justice to agree
completely with Taney's arguments on the Dred Scott case
(1857).9 Stevenson, after briefly trying to win the vice7Joseph H. Harrison, Jr., "Oligarchs and Democrats: The
Richmond Junto," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography.
Vol. 78 (1970), 188.
8For Ritchie's later career, see Thomas R. Hietala,
Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian
America
(Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press, 1985); Charles
Ambler,
Thomas Ritchie: A study in Virginia Politics
(Richmond: Bell Book & Stationary Co., 1913), 219-300.
9John P. Frank, Justice Daniel Dissenting: A Biography of
Peter V. Daniel. 1784-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1964), vii-viii; Don E. Fehrenbacher, Slavery. Law, and
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presidential nomination in 1844, retired from politics and
died in 1857. According to Francis Wayland, Stevenson's last
years provided "an example of how the slavery question
gradually changed a Jacksonian nationalist into a
conditional secessionist."10 As a final irony, Parker's son,
also named Richard, presided at the trial of John Brown, and
John Brockenbrough's mansion on Shockhoe Hill, where the
Junto held many of its meetings, became the White House of
the Confederacy.
Perhaps this association with militant sectionalism and
the defense of slavery represents the ultimate tragedy of
the Richmond Junto. The members of the Junto considered
themselves to be Jeffersonian republicans fighting not only
for the rights of the states, but also for the preservation
of the Union. The group formed its political philosophy from
an older generation and attempted to apply it to the issues
and debates of a rapidly changing society. During the
Junto's reign, political, social, and economic matters were
all transformed, and try as it may, the Junto failed to
adapt completely to the new order. It was slow to accept the
dynamics of the second party system, with its emphasis on
party discipline, control from the national level, and

Politics: The Dred Scott Case in Historical Perspective (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 216-222.
10Francis Fry Wayland, Andrew Stevenson: Democrat and
Diplomat. 1785-1857 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1949), 249.
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elaborate organization. The group did acknowledge that
sectional compromise was an integral part of national
politics, and debate over such issues as the tariff,
banking, and the relative merits of presidential candidates
"provided for the formation and subsequent development of
the second party system in Virginia" during the 1820s,
1830s, and 1840s.11
For almost thirty years, the Richmond Junto was the
most potent political force in Jacksonian Virginia. While
the group's political fortunes rose and fell throughout the
period, it remained an accurate gauge of the mood and
sentiment of many Virginians. In this respect, the group's
ideas and actions serve as a window through which the
historian can view the ways in which Virginians, and
Southerners, responded to the challenges posed by the
maturation of the American political, economic, and social
system in the decades before the Civil War.

"Lynwood Miller Dent, Jr., "The Virginia Democratic
Party, 1824-1847" (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University,
1974), 358.
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